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 Policing in America is in crisis. Much of the nation is outraged by the level and 
distribution of encounters and arrests, infringements on civil liberties, and excessive uses 
of force by the police. Prior scholarship typically has attributed these problems to features 
of officer-initiated policing—specifically police officers’ decisions in who to stop and 
when to arrest.  
 By contrast, reactive or call-driven policing has not received comparable 
scholarly attention. Yet, in many places roughly half of all police-work involves 
responding to the public’s calls-for-service. In these cases, a series of interactions take 
place between 911 callers, 911 call-takers, and dispatchers before the police arrive at the 
scene, all of which can produce information that shapes police responses.  
This dissertation is squarely focused on the role of 911 in American policing. It 
aims to answer the question of how 911 call-takers mediate caller demands and impact 
policing in the field. To answer this central research question, the author worked for two 
years as a 911 call-taker in Southeast Michigan, which allowed her to analyze the kinds 
of problems callers report, the decisions that call-takers must make, the challenges and 
dilemmas that they face, and the ways in which training and organizational norms shape 
the call-taking process. 
Using a mix of quantitative, qualitative, and conversation analytic methods, this 
dissertation reveals that the process through which private citizens’ requests become 
xi 
police responses is complex and presents unique challenges to policing. The chapters aim 
to show how the contemporary 911 system has come to offer the public wide latitude 
over the scope of police work. By dissecting the day-to-day duties of 911 call-takers, the 
chapters shine a light on two critical call-taking functions. First, the author reveals an 
overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal. Through unpacking precisely how call-
takers appraise risk, namely through extraction, interpretation, and classification of caller 
information, this dissertation provides a framework to evaluate call-taker actions. Second, 
the author complicates the previously documented gatekeeping function by showing how 
organizational rules and norms can constrain the ability of 911 call-takers to limit the 
public’s heavy reliance on the system. Taken together, the chapters find that call-takers 
exercise discretion when performing these critical functions and their actions impact 
police responses.  
This dissertation puts forth recommendations aimed at encouraging police 
agencies to reconceptualize the call-taking function in an effort to enable call-takers to 
more intelligently deploy discretion. Recommendations include developing protocols and 
criteria that empower call-takers to prevent inappropriate requests from receiving police 
services, training call-takers to assess risk in more sophisticated ways, distributing call-
taker best practices to peers, and using technology to assist call-takers in preserving caller 
uncertainty. The author hopes that these findings and recommendations will help improve 
police encounters with the public and spur readers to strongly consider 911’s role in 







Policing in America is in crisis. Much of the nation is outraged by the level and 
distribution of encounters and arrests, infringements on civil liberties, and excessive uses 
of force by police. Tensions between law enforcement and the public are at historically 
high levels (J. Jones 2015). A series of officer-involved killings in places like Ferguson, 
Staten Island, Cleveland, and Washington County, GA have spurred an entire social 
movement against police brutality (Berman 2014; Davey and Bosman 2014; Boone 2017; 
Fitzsimmons 2014). 
Much sociological scholarship attributes these various and sundry challenges to 
police officers’ decisions about where to patrol, who to stop, and how to treat community 
members. Extensive research on proactive policing documents racial and socioeconomic 
disparities in how officers exercise discretion in stops and arrests. Thanks to scholars 
such as Victor Rios (2011), Alice Goffman (2014), and Jeffrey Fagan (2007, 2016), we 
understand much about how individual officer-level decisions can produce and reproduce 
disparities in the criminal justice system.  
 By contrast, reactive or call-driven policing has not received comparable 
scholarly attention. This neglect has produced a limited understanding of policing 
precisely because police often act in response to telephone calls from the public. In 2011, 
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of an estimated 62.9 million US residents who had one or more contacts with the police, 
more than half (32 million) requested police services through calls for service (Langton 
and Durose 2011). Sociologist Chris Herring is one of the few scholars who has 
examined call-driven policing, specifically using ethnography to show how residents’ 
complaints about homelessness in rapidly-gentrifying areas of San Francisco produce 
police responses (Herring 2019). 
 Calls to summon the police are not without consequence. They can result in arrest 
and the use of force because responding officers primarily are trained in law enforcement 
and force (Friedman 2020). It is difficult to assess the most serious risks associated with 
police mobilization because of a lack of national statistics on use of force. Former police 
detective Nick Selby and co-authors help fill this knowledge gap by calculating the 
prevalence of the gravest policing outcome—police killings. They find that 83 of the 153 
national police killings of unarmed civilians in 2015 began with a 911 call (Selby et al. 
2016).  
 Reviewing local police department reports, albeit a piecemeal approach, further 
highlights how some of the most grievous forms of policing develop not from officer-
initiated encounters, but from the public’s calls to 911. In a review of 87 officer-involved 
shootings (OISs) between 2007 and 2011 in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police, analysts 
found that 65 percent of OISs originated from a call, whereas only 25 percent from 
officer-initiated contact (Stewart et al. 2012). A 2014 comprehensive review of 114 use 
of force incidents among officers in the Spokane Police Department found that 66 percent 
stemmed from a dispatch, whereas only 24 percent stemmed from officer-initiated 
contact (Spokane Police Department Office of Professional Accountability 2014).  
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 Despite the potential problems associated with call-driven policing, scholars and 
public commentators implicitly assume that call-driven encounters are justified and 
unproblematic. A return to 1970s socio-legal scholarship helps explain scholars’ relative 
lack of concern over reactive policing; a core claim in this literature is that because 
citizens initiate police contact, the process is more legitimate than when police initiate 
contact (Black 1973). This widely accepted claim was first made by sociologist Albert 
Reiss in his classic book, The Police and the Public:   
 Reactive strategies were seen as those that required simply that the police respond 
 to a citizen request for service. Such activities of the police...enjoyed a measure of 
 legitimacy because police were mobilized at the request of a citizen seeking 
 police assistance (1971). 
A 2017 National Academy of Sciences report on proactive policing reasserts Reiss’ 
argument that the public is more willing to accept police power when it is in response to a 
citizen request. This sentiment is found not only in academic writing, but is also reflected 
in popular press about policing. Take, for example, Tom Mullen’s 2016 Huffington Post 
op-ed in which he recommends, “Taking cops off the street, unless they are responding to 
a 911 call or serving a warrant issued by a judge,” to reduce troubling police-citizen 
interactions. Underlying such recommendations is the assumption that call-driven 
policing is relatively unproblematic.  
 This assumption is undermined by the fact that call-for-service requests come 
from callers who can be uncertain, inaccurate, biased, legally uninformed, or all of these 
in combination. A spate of high-profile 911 calls in 2018 that either was racially-
motivated or had huge racial impacts highlights some of the challenges associated with 
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call-driven policing. The public was treated to media stories from New York to Colorado 
to Oakland of white community members calling the police on people of color simply for 
going about their lives (Rosenberg 2018; Hudetz and Foody 2018; Mezzofiore 2018). In 
each of these cases, troubling police encounters stemmed not from officer-initiated stops, 
but from 911 calls. Incidents like these continue to happen; the most recent taking place 
in Central Park. Amy Cooper, a white female, called 911 claiming that “there’s an 
African American man threatening my life” after the man, who was birdwatching, 
politely asked her to leash her dog in accordance with park rules (Bellafante 2020).  
 Existing sociological literature overlooks the role that 911 callers, call-takers, and 
dispatchers play in shaping the expectations that responding officers bring to the scene. 
For much of the public, the very first point of contact with law enforcement is through a 
911 call. A member of the public calls 911, a 911 call-taker answers and speaks with the 
caller, and a dispatcher manages the allocation of responding police units and transmits 
information that the call-taker gathered over the radio (Lum et al., 2020). At some 
dispatch centers the same person answers calls and dispatches police, whereas at others 
the two positions are filled by different workers. Figure 0-1 illustrates how information 
flows between callers, call-takers, dispatchers, and responding officers. As information 
filters down through the call-driven policing process, callers’ demands are formed and 
transformed, and ultimately shape police expectations.  
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Figure 1 The Call-Driven Policing Process 
 
 An investigation into high-profile cases of police misconduct demonstrates just 
how interactions between callers, call-takers, and dispatchers can produce 
unconscionable police-community member interactions. Take the shooting of twelve-year 
old Tamir Rice in a Cleveland park by Officer Timothy Loehmann. A critical element in 
the incident was how the 911 call-taker handled the call. A bystander called to report a 
black male brandishing a gun in the park. Forty-nine seconds into the call, the caller 
backtracked on his initial report saying the gun was “probably fake.” At a minute thirty-
eight seconds, the caller clarified that “it’s probably a juvenile.” The caller repeated his 
uncertainty about the gun at the close of the call: “I don’t know if it’s real or not” 
(Schuessler 2017; Lee 2015). 
 Despite the caller’s uncertain and cautious statements, the call-taker chose not to 
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pass along these key pieces of information to the dispatcher. Instead, the dispatcher 
relayed the following information to Officer Loehmann based on the call-taker’s incident 
narrative: “In the park by the youth center is a black male sitting on the swings. He is 
wearing a camouflage hat, a gray jacket with black sleeves. He keeps pulling a gun out of 
his pants and pointing it at people.” Cuyahoga County prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty 
cited the omission of key information from the caller by the 911 call-taker as a 
contributing factor to the shooting: “The shooting might have been avoided if the 
information from the 911 caller had been properly relayed to the officers” (The 
Associated Press 2017).   
 Whether in the police shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, the 
fatal tasing of fifty-eight-year-old Euree Martin in Georgia, or the arrest of Professor 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. at his own front door—all of which started with a 911 call and 
some of which were mishandled by dispatch—scholars repeatedly overlook the ways in 
which the 911 system affects policing. Unlike in the case of officer-initiated policing in 
which individual officer discretion largely shapes the trajectory of an encounter, the 
incidents above suggest that incident trajectory is far more contingent on prior 
interactions between callers and call-takers than current sociological literature implies.  
 Few lines of inquiry exist into the broader organizational contexts in which police 
operate, especially the link between dispatch and police response. This dissertation shines 
a light on the “black box” of caller requests and police dispatch, and their impact on 
policing in the field. The central research question is a reformulation of a long-standing 
socio-legal question posed by Donald Black in 1973 about how the law is mobilized by 
ordinary citizens. Black tries to answer this question by focusing on how social 
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conditions, like legal intelligence and the availability of the law, shape the kinds and rates 
of cases that the people bring forward to the state, whether through the courts or the 
police. He touches on discretion only insomuch as it is rests with the citizen, rather than 
any legal official.  
 Reactive systems, however, are not as unilaterally citizen driven as the research 
perspective that Black developed implies. Requests are processed by state officials who 
make decisions and may exercise discretion of their own. In this dissertation, I shift 
Black’s question to focus on how state officials enact reactive systems of law. 
Specifically, how do 911 call-takers mediate caller demands and impact policing in the 
field? Answering this central research question requires a close analysis of the call-taking 
function with an eye to the decisions call-takers must make, the formal and informal rules 
they follow, and the amount of variation they exhibit in key job duties. I find that the 
process through which private citizens’ requests become police responses is complex 
because the 911 dispatch center is a previously overlooked locus of discretion in the 
criminal justice system.  
 Criminologists, socio-legal scholars, and policymakers have documented 
discretion at nearly every stage of the criminal justice system from the police to the 
courts to the jails and prisons; a notable exception is dispatch. The exercise of discretion, 
defined as “decision-making not strictly governed by legal rules, but rather with a 
significant element of personal judgment,” has implications for the ways in which call-
takers mediate and transform citizen requests for police services (LaFave and Remington 
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1965:63).1 Up until now, scholars and law enforcement officials have been relatively 
blind to the forms that discretion take inside dispatch, the ways call-taker discretion may 
shape street-level policing, and opportunities for call-takers to use discretion more 
intelligently. 
 This dissertation endeavors to bring attention to these blind spots and runs parallel 
to 1950s research that sought to clarify the use of discretion among police. The 1950s-
movement paved the way for a reconceptualization of the police function and the 
emergence of a rule-making movement to better structure how officers use their 
judgment. I advocate for a similar movement to occur inside dispatch through examining 
call-taking within the framework of discretion that is used in the criminal justice system 
more broadly. In the following section, I provide a brief historical overview of the study 
of police discretion to serve as a path forward for this dissertation’s study of dispatch. 
 
Replicating the Study of Discretion within Dispatch 
Documentation of Discretion  
 Although discretion was long acknowledged among prosecutors, grand juries, 
judges, probation, prison and parole officers, it was not formally recognized among the 
police until 1956 when The American Bar Foundation (ABF) sent field researchers to 
observe officers in Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The project was a response to 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson’s 1953 speech to the American Bar Association 
(ABA) about the “breakdown, delay and ineffectiveness of American law enforcement.” 
 
1 Wayne LaFave and Frank Remington (1965) provide a useful definition of discretion that I rely 
on in this dissertation because the term discretion is not consistently used in the criminal justice 
literature. 
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Jackson specifically asked the ABA to gather more evidence on the “day-to-day 
administration of justice” (Walker 1992). The survey—which became the ABF’s first 
major project and, at one time, accounted for 57 percent of the Foundation’s budget—
found that police engaged in a “pervasiveness of decision-making” that was guided, not 
only by rules, but also by judgement and conscience (LaFave and Remington 1965; 
Walker 1993; 1992; Ohlin and Remington 1993).  
 Today it may seem obvious that police officers exercise discretion in the 
performance of their job duties, but this was not the case at the time the ABF did its 
work—indeed, the ABF survey is what documented the extent of the discretion. Field 
researchers found that police haphazardly made decisions about whether to enforce the 
law because “full enforcement” (i.e., enforcing all criminal statutes and city ordinances at 
all times against all offenders) was simply not practical (Goldstein 1963). The survey 
revealed a prevalence of officer discretion when “determining how to invoke the criminal 
process and when to use a variety of investigative techniques…such decisions as whether 
to undertake a custodial arrest, whether to persist in that attempt by use of force, whether 
to stop a suspect for investigation, and whether to conduct a search” (LaFave 1990). 
Without explicit rules to guide these decisions, police were found to sometimes rely on a 
troubling mix of racism, unprofessionalism, and lawlessness (Walker 1992).  
 
Reconceptualization of the Job Function  
 Once discretion was acknowledged formally, a reconceptualization of the policing 
function occurred. No longer were police conceived of as “ministerial actors” (i.e., 
persons who follow the law exactly), but rather as professional decision-makers who 
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exercise discretion. Scholars, such as Yale Law Professor Joseph Goldstein (1960), 
formally added police to the list of existing decision-makers in the criminal justice 
process. Superintendent O.W. Wilson of the Chicago Police Department, publicly 
embraced this new conceptualization of the police when he proclaimed in June 1962: 
 I do not consider police officers to be robots who are prohibited from exercising 
 discretion. Each of you—every day—is called upon to decide whether or not to 
 search, to arrest, or to hold an individual. This is as it should be. If we took 
 discretion out of the job of a police officer, we would reduce the task to one 
 which could be performed by people of far less capability and much less pay. 
 (LaFave and Remington 1965) 
 This reconceptualization of the police was radical at the time because police 
departments were loath to admit the existence of discretion believing that it undermined 
the perception of the police as objective. Herman Goldstein (1963), former executive 
assistant to the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, writes that police 
officials refused to acknowledge discretion because it ran counter to impartiality. The 
idea that personal judgment, rather than the law, guided police action threatened the 
“autonomous professionalism” that law enforcement embraced following the 1931 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (commonly called the 
Wickersham Commission) that exposed rampant corruption between the police and 
government (Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015). 
 Police departments were also hesitant to recognize discretion because of the 
additional administrative burdens it would create. Goldstein (1963) explains how the 
admittance of discretion required additional police instruction, “It is easy, from an 
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administrative standpoint, to support a program of full enforcement. Instructions and 
training are simple. One need only teach the difference between black and white. If 
discretion is to be exercised, criteria become essential.” The development of criteria, 
instruction, and training would be time consuming, challenging, and limit the broad 
authority of the police.  
 Despite police officials’ concerns about admitting to discretion, the ABF’s 
findings made it so that law enforcement had to confront the widespread, haphazard 
decision-making by police. The Progressive Era paradigm of an objective administration 
of criminal justice was so undermined by the survey findings that a new paradigm was 
needed (Walker 1992). The new paradigm captured the complexity of the criminal 
process—haphazard decision-making, discretion, dependency between different parts of 
the criminal justice system—and brought with it an administrative rule-making 
movement.  
 
Development of Administrative Rules  
 President Johnson’s 1967 Crime Commission encouraged police departments to 
develop rules and guidelines over officer action. Scholars, such as law professor Anthony 
Amsterdam, Kenneth Culp Davis, and Herman Goldstein, led the rule-making effort in 
hopes of increasing police accountability. Davis provided the first framework for 
administrative rule-making in his 1969 book, Discretionary Justice, to reduce injustice 
from police discretionary power. He argued that controlling discretionary power required 
a rule-making movement: “Agencies through rule-making can often move from vague or 
absent statutory standards to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and 
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understanding develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when the subject matter 
permits, to precise and detailed rules” (Davis 1969:219).  
 The guiding principles of Davis’ framework centered on “confining, structuring, 
and checking” discretion. Confining discretion involves the creation of written policies 
by police departments to define acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Structuring 
discretion requires instructing officers in specific factors beyond “good judgment” that 
should guide their decision-making. For example, perhaps an officer should consider the 
road conditions before initiating a vehicle pursuit, or take into account the time of day a 
panhandler is on the street corner to assess the level of threat he may pose to the public. 
Checking discretion occurs through supervisor reviews of officer self-reports following 
certain types of incidents.  
 Even with the help of Davis’ rule-making framework, the codification of 
discretion into rules is difficult because of the breadth of situations police encounter 
every day. Creating an exhaustive rules list for every situation is nearly impossible and 
police manuals tend to focus instead on internal matters. Samuel Walker (1992) finds that 
police department rules continue to “overestimate trivial matters of internal discipline, 
and ignore most of the crucial issues related to the exercise of police authority.” Law 
professors Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko (2015) similarly show that police 
manuals are often filled with “detailed rules regarding uniforms, record keeping 
practices, and off-duty conduct,” but provide very little guidance on decision-making and 
the enforcement of law.   
 Despite the challenges that accompany a rule-making movement, some 
departments have observed benefits from rule-making, notably around use of force. Jim 
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Fyfe’s 1978 dissertation research on the positive impact of NYPD’s Temporary Order of 
Policy 237 on reducing police firearm discharges spurred departments across the country 
to develop formal policies around use of force. Fyfe found that the weekly average of 
firearm discharges among police declined 29.9 percent after the NYPD both confined 
discretion, by specifying in written policy when firearm discharges were prohibited, and 
checked discretion, by requiring officers to complete a report after each discharge that 
was reviewed by a supervisor (Fyfe 1978). Some forty years later, the legacy of Fyfe’s 
findings can be found in the 2015 President’s 21st Century Taskforce on Policing Report 
that recommends departments have “clear and comprehensive policies on the use of 
force.” Some departments also engage in routine incident reviews following use of force 
events to both assess whether officers conformed to standards, and to shed light on new 
ways for the organization to handle complex problems (Thacher, n.d.).  
 Since the 1970s the rule-making movement has made uneven progress in policing, 
but a handful of contemporary scholars are attempting to revive and broaden the 
movement. Friedman and Ponomarenko (2015) are leading the way with their call for 
“front-end accountability.” Compared to “back-end accountability” that only kicks-in 
after misconduct has happened through civilian review boards, inspector generals, and 
judicial review, “front-end accountability” establishes rules and policies up-front with the 
public’s input to guide police action. Their ideas are echoed by Risa Goluboff (2016) in 
her book, Vagrant Nation, who also pushes for a rule-making revival in policing: “Those 
powers which are indispensable in a rational scheme of police activity should be 
explicitly recognized, so that standards for their exercise may be created, and limitations 
may be imposed on them to prevent their abuse.” 
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In short, policing has undergone a movement to review the day-to-day 
administration of justice. It has included the documentation of police decision-making, 
the reconceptualization of the police from precise law followers to discretionary actors, 
and the development of an administrative rule-making framework to try to confine, 
structure, and check discretion. Up until now, a similar movement has not occurred inside 
dispatch. The ensuing dissertation chapters follow in the footsteps of the ABF by a) 
documenting the nature of call-taker discretion, b) reconceptualizing the role of call-
takers from administrative support staff to front-line decision-makers who are active 
participants in the construction of incidents, and c) bringing attention to instances of 
intelligent uses of discretion among call-takers. It is my hope that this research will spur 
future administrative and scholarly endeavors to confine, structure, and check call-taker 
discretion. 
  
Road Map  
 To better understand the nature of call-taker discretion, I became an active 
participant in the 911 system. In 2016, I was hired as a part-time 911 call-taker at a 
Sheriff’s Office in Southeast Michigan. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to Central 
Dispatch—the dispatch center where I worked for two years while in graduate school. 
The chapter describes the field site, the kinds of data I collected, how I gained the trust of 
my co-workers, and the ways in which my experiences shaped the research questions and 
analyses in the subsequent chapters. This chapter highlights a salient experience with a 
police official following a spate of racially biased 911 calls in which he laments that such 
calls are an unfortunate, but largely inevitable outcome of the 911 system. 
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 The police official’s response, which was echoed by police leaders across other 
cities, motivates the central research question in Chapter 2—how did it become likely 
that when the public calls the police, regardless of the nature of the problem, they receive 
a police response? To answer this question, the chapter places contemporary call center 
practices in their historical context. Drawing on historical materials, the chapter argues 
that the earliest forms of call-driven policing in the late 19th century attempted to strike a 
balance between citizens’ power to mobilize the police and potential abuses of that 
power, but that balance has eroded due to changing assumptions about who should play a 
role in mobilizing the police, how broad the scope of police work should be, and what 
function dispatch personnel can and should play in mediating caller demands.  
 Chapter 3 turns to dissecting the function of the 911 call-taker in policing. Using 
conversation analysis, this chapter analyzes the 911 call and radio transmission from the 
high-profile arrest of Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. to shine light on a previously 
overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal. The analysis concretely shows how 
discretionary decisions about risk, such as escalating caller uncertainty, can impact police 
response. Through unpacking precisely how the call-taker in this case appraised risk—
namely how he extracted, interpreted, and classified caller information—this chapter 
provides both a framework to evaluate call-taker actions and a reconceptualization of 
call-takers as risk appraisers.  
 Chapter 4 builds on the findings in the previous chapter by quantitatively 
measuring to what extent call-takers vary in how they carry out risk appraisal and the 
causal implications of this variation on street-level policing outcomes. The chapter 
leverages a natural experiment at my field site using the random assignment of call-takers 
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to calls. The analysis provides strong evidence that call-takers deploy discretion when 
making decisions about risk, and that these decisions, in turn, directly affect how police 
officers perceive of incidents and whether they make an arrest.  
 Chapter 5 considers how organizational policies, rules, and logics shape the 
practice of call-taking. A close analysis of the formal rulebook reveals a narrow view of 
call-taking with selectively instructive rules that ignore many of the complicated realities 
call-takers face. The rules primarily are focused on instructing call-takers to extract 
routine incident information. The rules fail to train call-takers to probe callers’ claims or 
assess risk in sophisticated ways. Moreover, the rules defer authority to callers and 
overlook potential civil liberties issues that come from sending the police to check on 
innocent people. By applying the rules to a set of emergency and non-emergency calls, 
the chapter illuminates how and when call-takers deploy discretion, the moral dilemmas 
they face, and the resource allocation problems that can arise. The chapter brings 
attention to instances of intelligent uses of discretion among call-takers as models for 










Chapter 1: Entering a Dispatch Center  
 
On a Wednesday afternoon in early spring, 911 call-takers and dispatchers at 
Central Dispatch answer emergency phone calls and dispatch police to myriad incidents 
across Southeast Michigan. Between the hours of 7 am and 3 pm, the three call-takers on 
duty answer roughly 400 phone calls and generate 204 calls-for-service that the two 
dispatchers relay over the radio to police—five fewer than on a typical Wednesday.  
The call-takers and dispatchers sit or stand at their desk consoles—standing is 
often preferred among those working extended twelve- or sixteen-hour shifts. Their desk 
consoles are close enough together that co-workers can yell over to one another to share a 
laugh or a reprimand. This chatter adds to the noise in the room coming from multiple 
ringing phone lines, simultaneous telephone conversations, and police radio traffic. Each 
console station is equipped with three computers, five monitors, and three keyboards. The 
glare from the monitors illuminates the linoleum-floored room in an artificial, blueish 
glow. And, the smell of stale coffee, microwaved food, and cleaning disinfectant is heavy 
in the air.  
 Depending on the time of day, anywhere from four to eight call-takers and 
dispatchers work together at any one time. Typically, one to four call-takers answer 
phones, two dispatchers dispatch police (with a third working back-up), and one operator 
runs the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). See Figure 1-6 for a floorplan 
of Central Dispatch; each circle represents a manned desk console. Full-time call-
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takers/dispatchers rotate between all three job positions in the diagram: answering 
phones, operating the radio, and running LEIN. Part-time operators are only trained to 
answer phones. 
  Figure 1-1 Layout of Central Dispatch with Job Positions 
 
 Each worker wears an official Sheriff’s Office uniform. The uniforms are thick 
and uncomfortable. They consist of tucked-in khaki colored button-up shirts with 
embroidered Sheriff’s Office badges and name tags, black braided belts with large silver 
buckles, and black tactical cargo pants that come in only men’s sizes. Some employees 
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opt to wear police-grade black military boots issued by the department; others opt for all 
black sneakers bought out-of-pocket.  
 It is rare for an employee to wear their uniform on the street. Almost everyone 
changes up in the locker room before stepping onto the floor. On at least ten occasions, 
five different staff members said their uniforms made them feel vulnerable to attack from 
disgruntled residents looking to retaliate against law enforcement. Many employees carry 
concealed firearms for added protection on the street, but these are not departmentally 
issued and must be locked up in small lockers outside the interior main door before 
entering Central Dispatch.  
 Because staff are not authorized to have firearms at work, and because there is no 
armed law enforcement presence in the building, employees appear to rely on anonymity 
to feel safe. Central Dispatch is located on the second floor of a non-descript brick 
building. There are no signs on the door, no businesses listed in Google Maps for the 
address, nor any mention of the location on local police websites. If a member of the 
public were to look through the glass entry door on the first floor, all they would see is an 
empty brick-lined room with a few old mops and janitor buckets laying around. The lack 
of transparency about Central Dispatch’s physical location is not merely an accident, 
rather it is a method of defense. 
Around 11:45 am, Paul, a thirty-three-year-old full-time call-taker and dispatcher, 
hears the high-pitched ringtone of a 911 call play out over the speakers at his console and 
hits F1 to answer the line, “911, what is the location of your emergency?” He is following 
training protocol by first asking the caller for the location of their emergency. Location is 
the single most important piece of information according to Central Dispatch training 
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because it dictates which police agency will be dispatched to the call and allows for 
police to respond even if the caller hangs-up before providing any further information.  
Carol, a guidance counselor at a local secondary school, is on the line and asks for 
help locating a seventh-grade student who is making suicidal threats over text. Carol 
provides the address of the school where she works, but quickly clarifies that the 
emergency is not occurring at the school. She explains that a student came into her office 
to show her text messages from his girlfriend. The girlfriend texted that she wanted to 
end her life. Paul starts typing the caller’s name and phone number into the computer, 
and selects the incident type “SUICIDE” from a drop-down menu of over 100 incident 
types in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Carol does not know the girl’s last 
name or address, just that she is a seventh-grade student at a neighboring school that is 
closed for the day. Paul asks Carol for the girl’s phone number and inquires as to the 
nature of the relationship between the two students. Carol responds, “He’s calling her his 
girlfriend but they’ve been dating for seven days… it’s online…they haven’t met.” Paul 
tells Carol that he will try to use the phone number to locate the girl, but cautions that if 
the phone is pre-paid he likely cannot locate her. Paul then types up a summary of his 
interactions with Carol for the dispatcher, while calling Sprint’s 24-7 law enforcement 
line to ascertain subscriber information (i.e., name and address) for the suicidal girl. 
Phone carriers have a dedicated law enforcement line that provides subscriber 
information and/or pings cell phones in life-or-death emergencies.  
Across the room, Jasmine, a part-time call-taker, is on the phone with a man 
asking for a civil standby. Jasmine is in her late forties with long brown hair that she 
wears up in a ponytail to adhere to the dress standards at Central Dispatch. She worked 
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for the local court system before joining dispatch about five years ago. The caller, Joe, 
needs to pick up his belongings from his girlfriend but has a no contact order with the 
woman. He asks for the police to accompany him to get his things. Joe’s belongings are 
at an apartment complex that is well-known to staff at Central Dispatch as a site of 
violent crime.    
Jasmine interrupts Joe and puts him on hold to answer another non-emergency 
line that is ringing. The caller says, “Hey!” and Jasmine immediately recognizes the 
voice as belonging to a frequent caller, Bobby. Bobby is a local homeless man who 
routinely calls Central Dispatch just to say hi. Michelle, a veteran call-taker and 
dispatcher, met Bobby once when she was working as a dispatcher for a neighboring 
police department before the call center was consolidated with the Sheriff’s Office and 
cautions that seeing Bobby in-person is not as entertaining as hearing from him. Jasmine 
follows the unspoken protocol at the center by asking Bobby, “What’s the word?” to 
which he responds, “Call me back” and then disconnects. Another favorite phrase of 
Bobby’s includes “zero zero.” Bobby is a welcome distraction to many of the staff. 
Jasmine returns to her line on hold and listens to Joe explain that, “I just got out of 
jail yesterday evening on some bullshit that me and her are going through. Some 
domestic kind of thing. I can’t contact her…but she keeps texting me... I’m trying to 
cover my tracks…So what do I need to do to keep myself together, beyond what I've 
been doing?” Jasmine avoids answering his question, but tells him that she can send a 
deputy over when he’s ready to pick up his belongings. He’s ready now. Before 
disconnecting, Jasmine asks Joe for his race and date of birth, which he gives willingly 
and without question. With this information, a dispatcher can run his name through the 
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Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) to check the nature of the no-contact 
order, whether he has warrants out for his arrest, or if he has any registered firearms. As a 
part-timer, Jasmine is only trained to answer phones so she cannot access LEIN to run 
Joe herself.  
Between answering other calls, Paul tracks down the phone number for the 
suicidal seventh-grader’s mother. He calls the mother to inform her of the information he 
received through 911 and ask about the girl’s location. The mother is at work and 
explains that her daughter should be at her grandmother’s house. Now that Paul has a 
good address, he updates the CAD record in the computer for the dispatcher and dials the 
medical dispatch center to request an ambulance to head toward the grandmother’s house 
for a possible psychiatric transport to the hospital. Depending on how quickly the medical 
dispatch center can get an ambulance to head to the address, the EMTs may have to wait 
in the area until the police show up and secure the scene. An hour after Paul received the 
initial call from the school counselor, the police radio in that the female is being 
transported to the hospital. The dispatcher and call-taker never learn the extent, if any, of 
the self-harm.  
Meanwhile, Jasmine is busy struggling to piece together information from the 
victim of a felonious assault (i.e., an assault with a deadly weapon). The caller, Frank, 
says that someone shot at his vehicle in the parking lot of a Subway. Jasmine asks in a 
confused tone why he waited twenty minutes after getting shot at to call 911. Frank 
responds, “I was scared.” Jasmine asks for a description of the suspect, Frank’s current 
location, and his phone number. Frank pauses and starts yelling at a passerby to tell him 
what street he is on and then struggles to provide his phone number, saying, “I don’t dial 
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my own phone so I really can’t remember.” Jasmine repeats the phone number that shows 
up on her caller-id to jog Frank’s memory and then tells him to stay where he is and the 
police will meet him there.  
In the span of ten minutes, Paul and Jasmine process calls from Carol, Joe, 
Bobby, and Frank. Over the next seven hours, the call-takers on-duty enter many more 
calls-for-service; everything from medical transfers (n=38) to suspicious persons (n=23) 
to suicidal persons (n=6) to dog complaints (n=4) to family troubles (n=4) to a felonious 
assault (n=1). These calls produce a demand on the state for finite, public resources. Paul 
and Jasmine stand at the initial boundary of the criminal justice system and are tasked 
with determining whether these demands will be met with a law enforcement response, 
and the level of risk they involve. Up until now, how call-takers perform these critical job 
functions, and the challenges and dilemmas they face in carrying them out, rarely has 
been the subject of scholarly attention.  
*** 
 This dissertation, as mentioned in the introduction, strives to answer the question 
of how 911 call-takers mediate caller demands and impact policing outcomes. Answering 
this question requires redirecting attention off the streets and into the places where 911 
call-takers work. For this dissertation, I became an active participant in the 911 system 
and conducted research using a mix of qualitative, quantitative, and historical approaches.  
 In 2016, I was hired by a Sheriff’s Office in Southeast Michigan as a part-time 
911 call-taker. Joining the agency as an employee helped me overcome historic wariness 
of law enforcement toward outside researchers and granted me rare institutional access. 
Maurice Punch (1979) puts best the task before police researchers: 
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 The researcher’s task becomes, then, how to outwit the institutional obstacle-
 course to gain entry and…penetrate the mine-field of social defenses to reach the 
 inner reality of police work. Prolonged participant observation seems to me to be 
 the most appropriate, if not the sole, method for achieving these ends.  
Indeed, since the American Bar Foundation survey, essential studies illuminating police 
officer discretion have all been observational in nature (Moskos 2008; Bittner 1990; 
LaFave and Remington 1965; M. K. Brown 1988; James Q. Wilson 1978). Participant 
observation pays attention to how individuals react and behave to make sense of 
uncertain situations. The method’s emphasis on meaning-making and interaction is 
particularly well-suited for studying discretion (Becker and Geer 1957). This method 
helped me to identify and describe the decision-making processes that shape call-taker 
behavior, the situations in which formal rules break-down, and the logics that lead call-
takers to make decisions differently from one another. 
 As my time in the field progressed, I came to ask more reflective questions based 
on my observations and expand my methodological toolkit to include a mix of historical, 
quantitative, and qualitative approaches to answer them. First, I sought to gain greater 
insight into why police leaders I spoke with were so hesitant to empower call-takers to be 
more effective gatekeepers. To do this, I reviewed historical materials on call-driven 
policing and dispatch to clarify the exact times and places when the public’s expectations 
about receiving police responses became so ingrained.   
 Second, I sought to test whether, and to what extent, my observations concerning 
call-taker discretion impacted street-level policing. Quantitative analyses using 
administrative call-for-service and arrest records were conducive to examining direct 
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links between variation in risk appraisal, a concept I observed in my field notes, and 
policing outcomes, such as arrests.  
 Third, to precisely examine the strategies call-takers relied on when facing 
uncertainty or ambiguity, I expanded on my field notes to include audio recordings of 
emergency and non-emergency calls. Audio recordings permitted me a window into the 
exact exchanges between callers and call-takers. One particularly useful audio recording 
came from outside my field site and captured the 911 call that resulted in the arrest of 
Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. This call concretely highlighted the difficulties that I had 
observed and experienced in appraising incident risk, and was accompanied by a robust 
scholarly response that helped inform the analysis.    
 The data in this dissertation were collected during my twenty-five-month 
employment tenure. They include participant observation field notes from June 2016 – 
July 2018 about interacting with citizens on the phone, meeting with management, and 
navigating complex social dynamics with co-workers; call-for-service administrative 
records (N=159,487) which archive the date, time, location, and nature of every police-
citizen interaction over a two-year time-period; arrest records (N=6,743); training 
manuals; and audio recordings of 159 emergency and nonemergency calls. Taken 
together, this is the most comprehensive dataset on a dispatch center in the U.S.  
 This research was approved by University of Michigan IRB, and formally 
supported by the Sheriff and Undersheriff who signed a data use agreement. Supervisors 
at Central Dispatch were also aware of my research and condoned data collection. 
Immediate co-workers knew I was conducting research on 911, but were less aware of 
the types of data and methods I was using. To protect personal identities, all names of 
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dispatch personnel have been changed, in addition to the name of the dispatch center and 
the cities and county it covers. Because callers were not aware of my research objectives, 
I did not take notes on names, phone numbers, or exact addresses. The IRB did not 
require consent from callers because every 911 call is recorded and open to FOIA by the 
public.   
 
Field Site 
 The field site for this dissertation is particularly fruitful site for three main 
reasons: it is a consolidated dispatch center meaning it dispatches for multiple police 
agencies, it covers a geographic area with considerable racial and socioeconomic 
variation, and it receives a high call volume. Central Dispatch handles requests from 95 
percent of the residents in the county. It operates as an organizational unit under the 
control of the local Sheriff’s Office, but dispatches for six distinct police agencies across 
several cities, townships, and villages. Dispatch operations have been consolidated across 
multiple cities and townships over the past eleven years. Because Central Dispatch 
handles calls from across the county, I can hold constant organizational features—such as 
training practices, call-taker characteristics, technology, and office environment—while 
maintaining substantial variation in types of calls and responses.  
 Central Dispatch provides a window into mid-sized law enforcement agencies 
where reactive policing is especially prevalent. Findings from a 2017 National Academy 
of Sciences report on proactive policing (i.e., officer-initiated stops) suggest that existing 
sites of police study such as Chicago, New York, and Oakland are less fruitful spaces for 
investigating call-driven policing because “the use of proactive strategies declines as the 
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size of police departments decline.” In other words, smaller departments, like the ones 
that Central Dispatch dispatches for, spend a greater share of their time responding to 
calls-for-service.  
 Geographically, much of the county where this research took place is rural, has 
low population density (fewer than 3,600 people per square mile), and is white (percent 
white is eighty-five or higher). The county also contains two mid-size cities. These two 
cities, and closely surrounding townships, are racially distinct from one another. African 
Americans make up 7 percent of the population in City A, compared to 32 percent of the 
population in City B and 27 percent in the township surrounding City B. In City B, the 
African American population is highly concentrated with some areas over 70 percent 
Black. The two areas also vary in unemployment, poverty, and median income. The 
average unemployment rate in City A is 3 percent, compared to 7 percent in City B and 5 
percent in the surrounding township. The average poverty rate is considerably higher in 
City B (41%) and its township (17%) than in City A (14%). Similarly, average median 
household income is much lower in City B ($26,097) and the surrounding township 
($55,335) than in City A ($75,925).
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 Based on personnel, call volume, size of population covered, and number of 
agencies served, Central Dispatch is one of the busiest dispatch centers in Michigan. On 
average, the center receives approximately 1,300 calls per day and dispatches police to 
slightly over 500 of them. Calls that receive a police dispatch are referred to as calls-for-
service. Staff at Central Dispatch entered 268,920 calls-for-service between January 1, 
2015 and December 31, 2016, excluding officer-initiated traffic stops. The volume of 
calls-for-service are unevenly distributed across the three shifts at the center— “days” (7 
am – 3 pm), “noons” (3 pm – 11 pm), and “mids” (11 pm – 7 am) — with the “noons” 
shift generating the most calls-for-service. See Figure 1-5 for the fraction of calls-for-
service by shift. 





 The Sheriff’s Office 2017 annual report finds that compared to other divisions 
(e.g., community engagement, administration, corrections, and police services), Central 
Dispatch is the least diverse. Ninety-three percent of staff are white and seventy percent 
are female. When I asked some of my male co-workers why they chose to work in 
dispatch, several mentioned either not passing the necessary exams to become police 
officers or preferring the safety of working indoors. Paul, for example, shared with me 
that he had thought about being a cop, but opted not to because “the pay isn’t that 
different from working in dispatch and being a cop is hard today with people shooting at 
you and stuff.” More than half the full-time employees were hired either directly from 
college or from local dispatch agencies that were taken over in consolidations. Of the 
employees under age forty-five, most hold 4-year college degrees. Table 1-1 includes 
demographics of Central Dispatch employees based on my field notes.  





  Female 0.71 
  Male 0.29 
Job Position  
  Full-Time Call-Taker & Dispatcher 0.77 
  Part-Time Call-Taker  0.23 
Job Experience  
  10 Years or Less Job Experience 0.52 
  10 Years+ Job Experience 0.48 
Race  
  Black 0.07 




 By Spring 2018, Central Dispatch was operating with 21 trained full-time 
operators and six trained part-time operators; this is far below the recommended staffing 
level of 30 full-time operators. Low staffing levels was a consistent problem during my 
time at the center and made for challenging working conditions with some full-time 
operators being forced to work 16-hour shifts multiple days in a row. Many of the staff at 
Central Dispatch consider their co-workers as a second family given the number of hours 
they spend together. This closeness between staff is balanced by a level of fractiousness 
given the demands and stresses of their work.    
 Although my co-workers often blamed the lack of hiring on failures in recruiting 
by the supervisor, data from the agency indicate that the larger issue was attrition during 
the hiring process. In 2016, the agency received 292 applications for full-time 
communication operators and 219 applications for part-time call-takers. To apply for the 
job, you must be over the age of 18 and have a high school diploma or GED. Full-time 
operators earn between $36,713 and $58,631 annually, receive full benefits, are part of 
the police union, and can work overtime for additional 1.5-2.0 times pay. Part-time call-
takers earn $18/hour with no benefits or union status. Despite the number of applicants, 
none of the 292 full-time applicants, and only four of the 219 part-time applicants, were 
hired in 2016.  
 Applicant attrition was not surprising given the protracted hiring process. Making 
a job offer requires applicants successfully completing nine tasks: passing a data entry 
test, attending an informational job meeting, filling out a 31-page personal history 
statement application (9-page for part-timers), observing a 911 operator for an eight-hour 
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shift, passing the CritiCall computer test, participating in a human resources interview, 
background investigation, medical examination, drug test, and psychiatric examination. 
The largest drop-off in applicants comes early in the process. Of the 292 full-time 
applicants, only 78 signed up to take the initial data entry test. Of the 56 who passed, 43 
attended the job description presentation, 18 completed the 31-page personal history 
statement, 10 passed CritiCall, and 2 passed the human resources interview and 
subsequent background investigation. Neither ended up in the job position.  
 Completing this process took me nearly four-months and was at times quite 
intense—like when I was interrogated for two hours by in-house detectives who sat with 
a 3” binder with the name “Gillooly” on the side and grilled me about whether I had 
engaged in drug activity as a student on “liberal” college campuses, if I had ever joined a 
group with the intent of overthrowing the US government, and why I had not told them 
that I was pulled over by the police for making a wake in my 10’ boat when I was 16 
years old in my home state of Rhode Island.  
 The agency began streamlining the hiring process in January 2017 in response to 
mounting pressure from staff. Since then, the agency has eliminated the County’s pre-
employment data entry test, and applicants who do not pass the more challenging 
CritiCall test on their first attempt can retake it 30 days later. Furthermore, the agency has 
bought additional software licenses to enable applicants to practice before taking the test. 
The hiring supervisor also has increased recruitment efforts online and at local college 
campuses. These efforts seem to be helping. I was informed in July 2019 by a former 




Participant Observation Field notes 
 Throughout my time working as a 911 call-taker, I took field notes and jottings of 
my experiences with callers, co-workers, and supervisors. Most of my field notes came 
from the “noon” shift that runs from 3 pm – 11 pm. I selected the noon shift because it 
exposed me to the most calls. Approximately forty percent of my field notes came from 
Friday and Saturday shifts because I was juggling work responsibilities with being a 
graduate student. Furthermore, a 2017 policy change required part-time staff to sign up 
for at least 32 hours per month during “critical shifts” (i.e., Fridays and/or Saturdays) 
because of staffing shortages. 
 One obstacle to taking field notes while working at 911 was the speed at which 
calls came into the center. During a typical shift, I handled a call every two-and-a-half 
minutes, which left little time to take notes between calls. To overcome this obstacle, I 
made quick jottings and referred back during breaks or lulls to add more detail. 
Sometimes, I failed to make jottings as I was unwilling to compromise caller safety in the 
name of research. Other times, I was simply too physically and emotionally exhausted to 
convert jotting into detailed field notes.  
 In three small notebooks, I kept quick-reference items that helped me efficiently 
perform the job. Items like the after-hour key code for the local animal shelter, the 
appropriate information to gather if a juvenile had run away, a reminder to update the 
medical dispatch center if a call was no longer emergent, and directions of travel to 
ensure appropriate agency response. See images 1-1 through 1-2 for examples of these 
notes. 
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Illustration 1-2 Routine Question Prompts 
 
 
 I kept notes about calls and interactions with co-workers in other notebooks or on 
my laptop. Certain work stations offered enough privacy that I could type on my laptop 
without co-workers reading over my shoulder. Employees can use cell phones, IPads, and 
laptops during work, though there is a risk of the items being FOIA’ed in response to 
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mishandled calls.  
 
 Audio Recordings 
 For a researcher, a useful feature of the 911 system is that every call is recorded. 
It was difficult to capture callers’ exact wording, or my co-workers’ exchanges with 
callers; however, I could fill these data gaps with call audio recordings. Audio recordings 
reveal precisely how 911 calls are produced—how a caller presents their problem, what a 
call-taker says in reply, and the decision points a call-taker faces.  
 I redacted personally identifiable information (e.g., names, phone numbers, and 
exact addresses) and then extracted 225 audio recordings of emergency and non-
emergency calls. I excluded calls that lasted less than one minute because they were 
mostly hang-up calls, burglary alarm calls, or private property impounds and did not offer 
much in the way of interaction. Because putting a caller on hold often generates a new 
audio recording file but is the continuation of the same call, my final sample consisted of 
159 unique recordings.  
 The audio recording sampling strategy was intended to produce maximum 
variation across call-takers. To do this, I cross-referenced staffing schedules and sampled 
calls on a day in April 2018 when a mix of full-time, part-time, novice, and experienced 
call-takers were on-duty. Although there are advantages to sampling calls from different 
days—namely greater potential variety in the type of calls—my sampling strategy 
minimized having repeat call-takers across days.  
 
 Call-for-service and arrest records  
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 Despite limitations of administrative data—they are not collected for the purposes 
of research, have no code book that defines variables or values, and are not well-
positioned to answer research questions about process—call-for-service data ended up 
being critically important to this dissertation. Not only do they provide a complete 
archive of the type and frequency of police-citizen contact across the county, but they 
capture the ways in which call-takers and police classify incidents. Classification 
decisions capture interactional outcomes between callers and call-takers.  
 I extracted administrative records of every 911 and non-emergency call that a 
call-taker entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system between January 1, 
2015 and December 31, 2016 (N=367,754). I reduced the sample size to 159,487 by 
dropping all officer-initiated traffic stops because they are not the result of a caller/call-
taker interaction (N= 100,934), non-life-threatening medical calls because police rarely 
respond (N=32,418), Michigan State Police calls because troopers do not use the same 
dispatching software so there is no information about the verified incident (N=29,114), 
and calls that could not be geocoded for a host of reasons (N=45,801). Note that call-for-
service data do not include records of calls that call-takers address without police 
assistance, such as helping a lost driver, redirecting a caller to another agency, or multiple 
calls about the same incident, such as a car fire on the highway.  
 These data, provided by the Sheriff’s Office, include the date and address of each 
call that received a police dispatch, a reported offense code determined by the call-taker, 
a verified offense code as determined by the officer once on-scene, and the personal 
identity of the call-taker. The data set includes identifiers for each of the thirty-one 911 
operators who worked during this period. 
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 Call-for-service records were merged to arrest records. Arrest data are from 2015 
(N=6,743). The arrest records include 4,210 officer-initiated arrests and 2,533 call-driven 
arrests. The most severe charge was kept for each arrest; lower-level charges were 
dropped.  
 Drawing on resources at the Clark geospatial library at the University of Michigan 
and the center for Consulting for Statistics, Computing, and Analytics Research 
(CSCAR), calls-for-service and arrest records were geocoded and merged to block-group 
census data. Census variables come from the 2011-2015 ACS 5-year estimates and 
include racial composition, education level, and poverty status at the block-group level.  
 
Training Manuals 
 Because discretion often arises in the absence of clear rules, an examination into 
call-taker discretion requires a review of formal call-taking protocols. To document 
formal practices and procedures, I collected call-taking rulebooks from my field site. The 
over one-hundred-page formal rulebook was provided by the Sheriff’s Office during 
training. It includes organizational-specific rules, as well as national-level rules provided 
to dispatch centers by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA). Dispatch 
centers can register with NENA to access model policies and practices. The guidelines 
are intended to create some consistency in how calls are handled across communities.  
 
Gaining Trust 
 Gaining the trust of my co-workers was at times harder than the actual job of 
answering 911 emergency phone calls. Staff are largely unwelcoming to newcomers 
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because many quit during training, gossip mercilessly about workers who make mistakes 
for anything from not providing information quickly enough for in-progress calls to 
mixing up “their,” “there,” and “they’re” in their incident narratives, and are not fond of 
part-timers. Moreover, staff are almost entirely from Michigan and have strong 
preferences for the more rural parts of the county.  
 I was a part-time call-taker, who lived in an urban part of the county, was from 
the East Coast, and did not carry a gun. Early on in my training, I realized I needed to 
overcome these differences to build relationships with my research participants. Building 
rapport would be crucial to the quality of data I could collect. Sociologist Karen O’Reilly 
(2009) writes that a key concept in ethnography involves, “Establishing reciprocal 
relationships based on mutual trust and understanding, which in turn demands a certain 
rapport. The kinds of relationship built in the field can affect the quality and range of 
access achieved (and vice versa) and the data collected, or constructed.” 
 To build rapport with my co-workers, I spent the first four months of job training 
speaking only to my communications training operator (i.e., a full-timer who works 
certain shifts as a trainer) and my supervisor. One of the other new-hires was overly 
talkative early on, and I overheard veteran call-takers expressing irritation with her for 
“not knowing her place at the center.” To avoid this social pitfall, I spent my first six 
months answering as many calls as I could, not speaking to anyone unless they spoke to 
me, and quietly observing the unspoken social norms of the center.  
 Over time, I picked up on social cues about what irritated full-timers—such as 
staying on the phone too long with a caller, asking for co-worker help answering the 
same question multiple times, acting overly confident, or making spelling and grammar 
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mistakes in the computer screen. I also picked up on the less call-related cues—such as 
not moving someone’s food out of the microwave until they reclaimed it, wiping down 
your workstation with Lysol wipes after your shift, never saying the word “quiet” 
because it would surely bring a deluge of calls, and showing up twenty minutes before 
your shift to relieve your co-worker.  
 After about eight months of proving myself an efficient worker who was attuned 
to the social norms of the center, my co-workers began opening up to me and vice-versa. 
With rapport built, I could ask more questions about their thought-processes as they 
handled calls, what frustrated them about the job, and what kinds of calls they considered 
problematic. 
 Despite doing my best to navigate the rules of the center, I was paranoid that the 
full-time operators did not fully accept me and thus was missing out on valuable data. A 
major break-through happened when I invited by the full-timers to sit at the desk position 
next to the dispatch desks. This position is informally reserved for full-timers who are on 
phone duty; not for part-timers. Sitting in this position meant not only that I was gaining 
respect at work, but also that I could better overhear the struggles and frustrations 
experienced by dispatchers.  
 A further sign of approaching “insider” status was co-worker teasing. Jokes about 
my trips to the organic grocery store where the “barefoot hippies go,” my confusion 
about what a “chop shop” was (I later learned it is not somewhere to bring your car for 
service), or my East Coast palate that “probably only drank Fiji water” were some of the 
recurring jokes made at my expense. On three occasions, two of my co-workers and one 
of my supervisors joked about me “being a mole” because of my research. Other signs of 
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acceptance included receiving support from full-timers after challenging calls, being 
invited to switch into the “good” locker room, and occasional text or Facebook 
messaging outside of work.  
 Although approaching “insider” status had its perks, it also meant I was becoming 
more jaded and developing biases about people and places. Over farewell drinks at a 
local bar, two of my co-workers reminisced about my initial innocence and how they did 
not think I would make it through training because they had heard that on one occasion I 
was nervous to ride the elevator with a cop, and on another I was scared that a cop was 
going to shoot a Black man in response to a 911 call. I never approached their level of 
distrust and skepticism toward callers, but I did become hardened to the everyday plight 
of many callers. My patience for listening to drawn out stories about child custody battles 
or the reasons why a caller broke up with their girlfriend wore thin faster and often 
resulted in fist banging at my desk when the caller would not stop talking.  
 Despite my years of training in graduate school on implicit bias, racism, and 
social stratification, I caught myself stereotyping people and places based on what 
neighborhood they called from or the way they spoke on the phone. Many 911 operators 
rely on stereotypes when handling calls, such as trusting that callers from certain 
apartment complexes know the difference between gunshots and fireworks. Yet, mental 
shortcuts like these can backfire. I experienced this one afternoon when I entered a call-
for-service to the wrong location. The address the caller gave me existed in both City A 
and City B and I mistakenly assumed the caller was in City B based on her name, the way 
she spoke on the phone, and previous calls to that location. I did not realize my error until 
she called back irritated that the police had not arrived. After correcting my mistake, I 
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was confronted with the truth that my own biases had affected the receipt of police 
services.  
 Being socialized into the job of a 911 operator made me complicit in a criminal 
justice system that I frequently struggled to consider just. Although I provided life-saving 
assistance in some incidences, in others I entered calls-for-service with the main goal 
being to harass low-income people and people of color, such as when a caller could not 
articulate why a person was suspicious beyond their mere presence on the street. 
Additionally, when asking a caller for a subject’s name, race, and date of birth—whether 
that subject was a suspect in an assault or an elderly neighbor who needed to be checked 
on—I was gathering information used to run people for warrants often unbeknownst to 
the caller. At times, that information led to arrests. My own actions, influenced by 
training protocols, co-workers, and bias, speak to some of the ways in which the work 
going on in dispatch centers complicates the existing narrative that police officer 
discretion is the root of the problems facing the police and public today.  
 
Testing Trust  
 In 2018, I wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post about how police departments 
could leverage 911 call-takers to reduce racially motivated call-driven police encounters. 
This piece came out a month after the Philadelphia Starbucks incident in which a white 
employee called 911 to report two Black men for not making a purchase. The men were 
waiting for an associate to join them before placing an order, a commonplace occurrence 
at Starbucks. Yet in this instance, the men were told by the manager to make a purchase 
or leave, and when they refused the employee called the police. Officers were dispatched 
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to a “disturbance” at the Starbucks and asked the men to leave. According to the police 
report, the men again refused and began being “verbally disrespectful to the police.” The 
officers then arrested the two men and charged them with a “defiant trespass” 
misdemeanor (Philadelphia Police Advisory Commission 2018). A bystander recorded 
the interaction and the video of the Philadelphia Police arresting two black men for sitting 
in a Starbucks went viral. The video raised questions about whether the Starbucks 
employee or the police would have behaved in the same way were the two men in 
question white. The Starbucks incident was the fifth story in a spring filled with stories 
about white people calling 911 on people of color simply for going about their lives.  
 The news about these incidents did not surprise me. As a call-taker, I had 
processed countless requests from citizens and rarely denied police services. I saw how 
callers’ biases and idiosyncratic preferences became police responses that affected people 
of color. I handled a call from a man who was bothered by his neighbor’s “Mexican 
music.” I handled a call from a man who felt uncomfortable at the bus station because a 
black teenager’s jeans were hanging too low. I handled a call from a man who was so 
irate with his neighbors for selling illegal cigarettes, chips, and drugs from their 
apartment that he yelled on a recorded line, “I’m sick of these f’ing N----s. I’m gonna kill 
them if nothing gets done.” My own frustration over callers who invoked “they don’t 
belong here” language or made racial slurs on the telephone, coupled with that of my 
mostly white, female, and more conservative co-workers, provoked me to write about the 
potential for call-takers to prevent the worst excesses of 911 from entering the legal 
system through empowered gatekeeping.  
 Although I had considered my policy suggestion for call-takers to reject racially 
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motivated requests practical and sensible, I did not fully grasp the stir that such a 
recommendation could create. For starters, I had forgotten (or perhaps conveniently 
overlooked) the agency rulebook section about the media that explicitly states, “No 
employee can lecture on ‘police’ or related matters to the public without the express 
consent of the undersheriff.” In response to re-reading this rule, I emailed my supervisor 
to ask permission to publish the opinion piece. Within hours, my request had made it far 
up the chain of command.  
 I nervously waited for a phone call from agency brass, fearing reprimand, or at 
worst firing, and the burning of bridges with those at my field site. Agency brass asked 
why I had written the piece and told me it was highly irregular for an employee to go to 
the media. I clarified that my decision stemmed from my dissertation research, which 
seemed to assuage some concerns about my underlying motivations. A top police official 
articulated that he agreed with a lot of what I had written, especially the idea that call-
takers often are overlooked yet critically important to policing.   
 Nonetheless, he had serious concerns about some of my policy recommendations. 
He disagreed that the responsibility should lay with the call-taker to decide whether to 
dispatch the police. Because call-takers do not have a visual and only hear one side of 
any incident, he said it was “unfair to them and to the community” to burden them with 
that choice. His response somewhat surprised me given that I had frequently witnessed 
call-takers struggle to make that exact decision with suspicious person calls, sometimes 
opting to send the police and other times not. Moreover, his comments seemed to run 
counter to studies on dispatch that argued a key function of call-taking involved 
gatekeeping (Percy and Scott 1985; Lum et al. 2020). Ultimately, we agreed about 
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recommendations to encourage call-takers to press callers for more information and alert 
police to potentially inappropriate requests.  
 This interaction, along with subsequent conversations with police leadership from 
other agencies, revealed to me that the notion of empowering call-takers, or placing 
checks and balances over the 911 system, could be perceived as radical and dangerous. I 
was puzzled. If the role of the call-taker was not to decide whether to send the police, 
then what precisely was their role in the system? Were they simply conveyer belts 
passing along caller information? If so, that did not square with my experiences in the 
field where call-takers were making decisions and exercising discretion over caller 
requests. Moreover, I was left wondering how it became likely that when the public calls 
the police, regardless of the nature of the problem, they inevitably receive a police 
response. The historical account of call-driven policing and dispatch that I present in the 










Chapter 2: The Evolution of Call-Driven Policing and Dispatch  
 
Each day across America, many thousands of residents dial 911 seeking 
assistance. An estimated 240 million calls are made to 911 each year. The majority of 
which are for non-life threatening, non-emergencies—such as traffic complaints, noise 
disturbances, and animal complaints (Lum et al. 2020).  
 Calls to 911 are wide-ranging and can involve everything from mental health 
illness to substance abuse to homelessness to interpersonal conflicts (Cumming, 
Cumming, and Edell 1965; James Q. Wilson 1978; Herring 2019; Zezima 2017). With 
some frequency, 911 callers report people of color for simply going about their lives. The 
media has covered the social costs of inappropriate 911 usage in incidents from 
Philadelphia to Cleveland to Colorado (Takei 2018).  
 Chapter 2 aims to place today’s call center practices in their historical context to 
shed light on how callers came to have such broad influence over what the police do and 
where they go. The earliest forms of call-driven policing in the late 19th century 
attempted to strike a balance between citizens’ power to mobilize the police and potential 
abuses of that power, but that balance has eroded due to changing assumptions about who 
should play a role in mobilizing the police, how broad the scope of police work should 
be, and what function dispatch personnel can and should play in mediating caller 
demands. This chapter suggests that contemporary call center practices—particularly the 
conception of dispatch personnel—should be revisited. 
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*** 
 In the wake of the Philadelphia Starbucks incident involving a white barista 
calling 911 to report two Black men for not making a purchase, the Philadelphia Police 
Advisory Commission published a report reviewing the case. Their report was one of the 
first by a police department to explicitly acknowledge the role of 911 caller bias in 
policing and demand policy change. The report reads, “The weaponization of police due 
to racial animus or other reasons must be addressed by the Police Department, citizens, 
and business owners.” They go on to recommend reforming 911 usage by developing “a 
clear and consistent communication strategy to educate the public regarding how and 
when 911 should be utilized” (Philadelphia Police Advisory Commission 2018).  
 Philadelphia remains one of the only major cities to include the public’s usage of 
911 in conversations about police reform. Indeed, the 2015 President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing report and Campaign Zero—a prominent online police reform 
clearinghouse developed by activists, protestors, and researchers—are both silent about 
how the 911 system produces policing challenges.  
 Instead, policymakers and police officials often focus on reforms to improve 
police officer behavior because they consider community bias an intractable problem. 
Following the Starbucks incident, the same high-level police official in Michigan who 
expressed concerns with my proposed op-ed policy recommendation to empower call-
takers to reject racially motivated calls (described in the previous chapter), explained his 
community bias perspective to me in a 2018 interview: “There’s a history in this country 
of police being used as a tool to further societal bias. So I don’t know if these types of 
things are ever totally eliminated because I don’t know if you ever eliminate societal bias. 
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So I think the way you mitigate these situations is when officers do arrive [sic] we 
mitigate the impact of that.” A former police commissioner from Massachusetts 
expressed a similar viewpoint to me in 2019—biased calls are part of the system and our 
best hope lays in training the police to be respectful. Neither leader advocated for placing 
limits or checks on the 911 system.  
 Embedded in the Starbucks case is a clash of ideals. On the one hand, the public’s 
use of 911 is an exemplar of a functioning democratic system of governance—the will of 
the people guiding the work of the government (e.g., the police)—and it produces 
tangible safety benefits. Any member of the public can pick up a phone, dial 911, and 
receive police services. In a December 2019 interview with NPR’s 1A, Houston Police 
Chief Art Acevedo highlights the highly democratic nature of 911: “When you call 911 
we don’t ask whether you’re white, Black, brown, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, man, 
woman, straight, gay. We don’t ask whether you’re a supporter or not a supporter. We 
don’t ask where your zip code is. We don’t ask if you’re a critic, friend, or foe. We ask 
what is the problem, what is the threat, where are you located. And we roll.” Attempts to 
limit the public’s use of 911 could threaten the core democratic principles at the heart of 
the system.  
 On the other hand, an unchecked democratic system can lead to oppressive use of 
government authority and produce unanticipated inequalities. Under call-driven policing, 
the distribution of police intervention is not determined by explicit policy choices about 
where police intervention is most warranted. Rather, police allocation is the result of 
uncoordinated private choices (Thacher 2001). The system prioritizes the needs of the 
caller. Because callers are not trained in the legal subtleties of criminal law, have their 
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own biases about people and places, and/or maintain complicated relationships with 
family members, neighbors, and exes prioritizing caller demands can come at the expense 
of the subject of the call. Indeed, the Starbucks incident underscores how the very people 
already disproportionality negatively affected by policing often bear the burden of these 
calls.     
 From the perspective of the police officials in Michigan, Houston, and 
Massachusetts that I quoted earlier, calls like these are an inevitable byproduct of the 
system. The public has come to expect a police response when they call 911. The 
Michigan official directly expressed this to me when he said, “If you call in this 
community, we already know that your expectation is that we are going to send 
somebody. Maybe that never changes” (2018). But how did that expectation come to be? 
When did it become likely that when the public calls the police, regardless of the nature 
of the problem, they receive a police response? Has the system always offered the public 
such latitude over the scope of police work? And are there ways to change the public’s 
expectations about 911 while preserving a democratic system?  
 In this chapter, I address these questions by showing that the present state of 
affairs is historically contingent rather than preordained or unavoidable. Historian 
Quentin Skinner (1969) writes about the use of contingency in historical reasoning: “A 
knowledge of the history of such ideas can then serve to show the extent to which those 
features of our own arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as tradition or 
even ‘timeless’ truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar history and 
social structure.” This approach attempts to locate the exact times and places where 
practices and beliefs became normalized in society.  
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 By using a historical reasoning approach, I find that the account previously put 
forward by criminologists who study the history of the police—that technological 
innovations like the telephone, two-way radio, patrol car, and 911 system unavoidably 
led to a rise in call-driven policing—is incomplete (Moskos 2008; Sherman 1983). This is 
because institutional and ideological changes also played an important role in shaping 
citizen-driven policing over this period. Through reviewing historical materials, I find 
five discrete developments that affected the public’s access to policing and how police 
departments handled the public’s demands: 1) the introduction of the call box in the late 
19th century, 2) the rise of the telephone, 3) the lessening of police autonomy, 4) the 
civilianization and feminization of dispatch, and 5) the rise of 911 and 311.   
 
 
From the Telegraph to the Telephone 
 The rise of reactive policing—defined by legal theorists as the mobilization of the 
police through citizen-initiated complaints (Black 1973)—has its origins in the invention 
of the fire alarm box. With cities across the U.S. experiencing massive population growth 
and overcrowding in the late 19th century, fires were becoming more prevalent and an 
effective system was needed to preserve life and property. The Great Chicago Fire of 
1871, which killed over 200 people and destroyed nearly four square miles of the city, 
was a stark reminder of the challenges urbanization brought (Poulin 2011). Because 
firefighters did not, and still do not, roam the streets looking for fires, an alarm box 
provided a solution to the limited information available from inside the station house. In 
1845 in the Boston Advertiser, physician and inventor William F. Channing presented 
designs for an alarm box that would connect residents to fire departments by telegraph 
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(Easterbrook 1902). The box would have an alarm that when triggered would tap out a 
signal onto telegraph wire indicating the box number. Telegraph operators inside fire 
stations would then match the box number to numbered neighborhoods and send out the 
fire department. Between 1852 and 1881, over one-hundred fire alarm boxes were 
installed throughout the US (Leonard 1938).  
 Prior to the 1880s, police were not included in the alarm box system; a partial 
reflection of the way society conceived of the police at that time. The function of 
uniformed police was to walk the streets deterring crime, much like the night watchman 
or constable of colonial times. With police out roaming the streets, a resident could 
simply run up to a beat patrolman and ask for assistance (Leonard 1938).  
 The informal watch and constable system was no match for urbanization and 
growing disorder. First, the watch system was largely unreliable because it was volunteer 
based and decentralized. Second, constables and night watchmen were not trained in 
maintaining law and order, and often found themselves busy performing myriad other 
duties, such as land surveying and proclaiming marriage announcements (Walker 1998; 
Whitehouse 1973). A variety of factors, including a rise in mob violence and vice in 
cities, a growing desire among economic elites to limit their workforce’s drinking and 
disorderly behavior, and growing concerns about urban crime, led politicians and the 
public to desire more centralized police forces (R. M. Brown 1969; Fosdick 1920; J.Q. 
Wilson 1973; Spitzer and Scull 1977). In 1838, Boston established the first paid police 
force in America with the explicit goal of preventing crime, suppressing riots, and 
enforcing city ordinances (Lane 1967).   
 Centralized police forces, however, required more advanced communication 
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systems than were previously in place so that station headquarters could communicate 
with, and exercise some control over, patrol officers. Greater communication between 
police officers and station headquarters was expected to increase police oversight and 
reduce lazy or corrupt patrolman behavior (Walker 2016). Police were required to report 
to local call boxes hourly to receive updates and report their statuses to headquarters, 
both of which facilitated greater supervision (Reiss 1992). The police call box was more 
elaborate than the fire alarm. It consisted of a booth with a door and lamp on top, and 
contained an alarm box with a telephone for the police to communicate with the station 
and a signal box for the police or public to alert the station to the type of incident 
(Chicago Public Library Reference Blog 2014). See Illustration 2-1 for a visual of the 
Chicago police call box.  
 




 The introduction of the police call box did more than just improve 
communications between police officers and headquarters; it also facilitated direct 
communication between the public and the police. Chicago led the way in the 
development of one of the first police call boxes accessible to citizens in 1880 under the 
direction of J.P. Barret, Superintendent of the Chicago Electrical Department. Under the 
Chicago system, residents registered and received keys at local police stations to activate 
the police alarms. Keys were reserved for “certain responsible citizens” (Chicago Public 
Library Reference Blog 2014). The system—referred to as “The Little Joker” in homage 
to the fire alarm “The Joker”—was initially installed in the most crime-laden parts of the 
city in an effort to improve public safety. After police lauded the system for helping them 
arrest the men responsible for a vicious East Chicago boarding house murder in 1889, the 
system grew to include over 1,000 street boxes and hundreds of residential boxes 
(Chicago Police Department 1888). Other cities followed suit with similar boxes installed 
in Milwaukee, Brooklyn, and Philadelphia.  
 The introduction of the call box contributed to a rise in reactive policing and 
introduced a new set of policing challenges. Charles Rolfe, in an 1892 report to the 
International Police Association, writes that the call box, “Makes every key holder, to a 
considerable extent, a policeman, for he carries with him the power to summon the police 
to any point wherever he may see that their services are required.” This key-holder power 
could help inform police of crimes and violence that they otherwise would not have 
known about, but with such power also came the potential for key-holders, often 
untrained in the law, to misuse and abuse the system.  
 The alarm box included two safeguards to minimize inappropriate usage. First, 
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when activated, the alarm box would trap the key-holder’s key inside the box until a 
police officer released and returned it to the key-holder. If an officer’s investigation 
found that the key was used in a problematic way, it would be withheld from the key-
holder. The mechanics of the alarm box made it so that individuals who proved to be 
unreliable or untrustworthy would lose the power to summon the police. According to the 
1913 Report of the General Superintendent of Police of the City of Chicago, officers 
appreciated the locked alarm box design because it prevented false alarms and 
encouraged key-holders to wait in the area and provide police with more information. 
 Second, the alarm box included a signal box with a dial for key-holders to spin to 
select the reason for their police mobilization. The signal boxes implicitly limited the 
scope of police-work by clearly defining the types of problems that city officials believed 
were appropriate police matters. See Illustration 2-2 from the 1886 Annual Chicago 
Police Department report for an image of a signal box and the eleven possible 
mobilization categories, including, thieves, forgers, riot, drunkard, murder, accident, 













Illustration 2-2 Enlarged view of Signal Box 
 
 With the proliferation of the telephone the call box became antiquated. Between 
1876 and 1920, the total number of telephones in the U..S increased from approximately 
3,000 to 13,000,000 (Gabel 1969). This was a period in which the telephone went from 
an obscure innovation to a commonplace household device. The spread of the telephone 
theoretically made summoning the police a more democratic process—no longer was it 
reserved for select key-holders, but anyone with access to a phone (Moskos 2008).  
 Technological advances also were being made in radio communications that 
affected how police departments passed along the public’s telephone demands and made 
police more dependent on dispatch. The advent of the two-way radio between police and 
headquarters—first debuted in Detroit in 1928—made it possible for police to give and 
receive real-time updates when responding to citizen requests for service (Poli 1942). 
Initially, some police commissioners opposed such “newfangled” advances because they 
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thought the radio was too complicated to use (Leonard 1938). Others ideologically 
disagreed with the notion of officers being controlled by dispatch. The latter group 
likened themselves to admirals and ship captains who believed that, “When a ship was 
out of sight of land she belonged in the hands of her master and that orders from the blue 
were an outrage and an affront to his dignity” (Leonard 1938). This group believed police 
should have freedom on the streets and resented the idea of being told where to go and 
what to do by dispatch. For them, responding to calls translated into a loss of police 
autonomy. Despite early debate over the new technology, two-way radios eventually 
became ubiquitous across police departments and further facilitated police responses to 
public demands.  
 
The Feminization and Civilianization of Dispatch 
 Shortly after the development of the telephone and two-way radio, police 
departments began hiring women to work inside police communications centers as phone 
operators. Phone companies already were experiencing success with female operators, 
which they believed was because “women are quieter…they have natural aptitudes 
suitable to switchboard operation” (Leonard 1938). The phone companies’ successes, 
combined with news coverage of female phone operators winning heroism awards—such 
as Miss Emma Gatti, a supervisor of a telephone office in Hackensack, NJ who helped a 
hysterical mother construct a tourniquet over the phone to save her child—provided 
evidence to police departments that women could handle emergency calls (The New York 
Times 1935; Chicago Sunday Tribune 1940).  
 In response, New York City Police Commissioner Valentine proposed 
substituting women for patrol officers to switchboard duty. Female police phone 
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operators were perceived to “afford a higher and more uniform grade of service…as well 
as a more courteous service” and could be “employed at a rate of pay below that received 
by the police officer” (Leonard 1938). Valentine explained that such a change would 
enable officers to return to much needed patrol work (The New York Times 1935). 
 Despite the benefits of employing female phone operators, the feminization of the 
police communication profession faced pushback from some law enforcement actors. The 
earliest telegraph and telephone operators were male, recruited from within the police 
force, and experienced patrol officers. Certain officers were hesitant to staff the 
switchboards with female civilians, who had little formal training or background in 
policing, because they doubted female civilians could sense when police were needed: 
“The idea behind keeping the switchboard in masculine control was that only a 
policeman could sense the need for action when calls for help or reports of crimes were 
received” (The New York Times 1935). Moreover, the presence of women in the 
telephone room was troubling to officers who believed they were “not reliable in an 
emergency” because they lacked street experience, extensive knowledge of the law, and 
interviewing skills (Rubinstein 1973).   
 The rise in females inside police communications centers coincided with a decline 
in the status of phone operators. Initially, many police leaders looked favorably upon 
male operators and considered them to possess the qualities and capabilities necessary for 
career advancement in the broader police organization—such as speed, judgement, 
accuracy, and courtesy. Indeed, a prominent police executive on the Pacific Coast 
explained that he selected phone operators based on who was likely to experience career 
advancement (Leonard 1938). By the late 1970s, working as a phone operator was 
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viewed not as a sign of career advancement, but more as a punishment. Non-civilian 
phone operators consisted of, “Sworn officers considered unfit for other duty, being 
punished for internal rule violations, or who have been ‘taken off the street’ because of 
infirmity or incompetence” (Scott 1981).  
 Just as the demographics and status of operators shifted over time, so too did 
conceptions of the operator function within law enforcement. The fact that police 
departments initially had a strong preference for seasoned policemen with interviewing 
skills and street experience to work the phones implicitly suggests that call-takers were 
recognized, at one time, as playing an integral role in policing. With a loss of prestige to 
the job title and fewer trained policemen at the switchboard, police officials increasingly 
conceived of the phone operator function to be clerical. This was reflected in the job’s 
new nickname: “complaint clerk” (Mladenka and Hill 1978). Police officials largely saw 
phone operators as simply passing along raw information from callers to police, and the 
term “agents of information transfer” caught on—a term originally coined by V.A. 
Leonard (1938) in his description of the telephone communication system in large police 
departments.  
 Indeed, by the 1970s phone operators appeared to have little formal authority to 
decide whether caller requests warranted police attention. Police journalist Johnathan 
Rubinstein (1973) observed that phone operators were instructed to enter all citizen calls 
for dispatches. Departments feared phone operators would inappropriately reject calls to 
reduce workloads or to “satisfy some personal whim” if given such authority (Rubinstein 
1973). If the operator had a concern about the legitimacy of the call, then he/she was 
instructed to either inform the dispatcher, who would “advise caution when he assigns the 
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job” to the police, or ask the lieutenant in charge of the radio room for assistance. The 
perception that phone operators did not, and should not, make decisions about whether to 
send the police continues to shape how police departments conceive of the call-taking 
function today.  
 
The Introduction of 911 and 311 
 Following the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, officials called for the implementation of a universal 
emergency telephone number across the US. Officials believed it would facilitate faster 
police responses to emergencies. The Commission concluded that the current system, 
which required the public to look up and dial an appropriate ten-digit police department 
phone number, was too burdensome. Los Angeles County, for example, had fifty 
different telephone numbers for fifty different local police departments (Prybil, 
Montgomery, and Gora 1974). 
 New York City was the first major city to implement 911 and establish a police 
communications center. Officials found that the new system cut police response times in 
half and they expected this would lead to more arrests. New York Times reporter David 
Burnham, who covered the inauguration of New York City’s police communications 
system, wrote that, “One important benefit the police hope the new center will deliver is a 
larger number of arrests” (Burnham 1968).  In reality, the 911 system did not produce the 
envisioned number of arrests because of time delays in citizen reporting and relatively 
few calls involving crimes against persons (Bercal 1970; Cumming, Cumming, and Edell 
1965; Reiss 1971; Webster 1970). 
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 Instead, the establishment of a 911 system without mechanisms to control 
citizens’ usage or filter out inappropriate requests led to an explosion in demand for 
police services; only a small share of which involved true emergencies. Shortly after the 
introduction of NYC’s 911 system, the city experienced a 17 percent increase in the 
number of calls. Between 59 and 62 percent of all calls were non-emergency in nature—
calls about lack of heat, park regulations, instructions on how to file for divorce, 
etc…(Burnham 1969). NYPD Inspector Anthony Bouza best summarized the challenges 
911 posed to a NYT reporter in 1969: “The new number has done two things. It has 
destroyed the knowledge barrier—everyone knows 911—and it has destroyed what might 
be called an inhibition barrier. People call 911 on the slightest pretext.”  
 One potential problem with the increase in 911 calls was that it crowded out the 
ability of the police to perform other functions. Sociologist and former police officer 
Peter Moskos writes about this problem in his ethnography Cop in the Hood in which he 
quotes a fellow officer complaining that, “We can’t get shit done because calls are always 
coming in. How many are really ‘in progress’? Five percent? How many are innocent 
victims? None” (Moskos 2008). He goes on to explain that, “The emphasis on radio calls 
means that in busy districts, officers can do little other than answer dispatched calls for 
service.” 
 Police outside Baltimore faced similar challenges. A study by the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Council of Governments found that D.C. police were also “confronted 
with a staggering volume of nonemergency calls which overload the system” (Vesey 
1984). Furthermore, a 1974 National Survey of Operational 911 Systems found that out 
of 188 systems, nearly half reported that less than a third of their system’s calls were 
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“true emergencies.” In response to the problem of non-emergency calls jamming 911 
systems, some cities adopted 311 lines dedicated for non-emergencies. However, because 
311 calls typically still receive a police dispatch, this did little to reduce the overall 
demand for police services  (Mazerolle et al. 2005).  
 In short, today’s 911 system is highly accessible to the public, can be used for a 
multitude of reasons, and lacks checks and balances. Unlike in the late 19th century, the 
modern 911 system lacks clear definitions and criteria about when it should be used. 
Moreover, personnel shifts inside dispatch centers from sworn officers to civilians and 
women in the early 20th century coincided with police officials increasingly conceiving of 
dispatch personnel as “agents of information transfer” who simply pass on caller 
information, rather than as discretionary decision-makers. This conception has produced 
call-takers with seemingly little authority to place limits over the public’s demands. 
 Although the modern 911 system lacks oversight mechanisms present during the 
call box era, it is possible that different assumptions and norms could have been 
embraced over time to more strictly control citizen-driven policing. For instance, the 
modern system might have more tightly restricted the reasons for why citizens could 
summon the police, much like the signal box did, or police departments might have 
continued staffing dispatch centers with police officers rather than civilians, or agencies 
might have empowered civilian call-takers and dispatchers to be more effective 
gatekeepers. Rather than consider these alternate paths, police officials have largely 
accepted the growth of call-driven policing as inevitable leading them to neglect the 




 This chapter argues that the broad scope of unchecked caller influence over the 
police is a contingent historical outcome; one that could have charted a different course. 
A series of technological, ideological, and institutional changes over time have produced 
a system where the public has come to expect that the police will swiftly respond to any 
and all 911 calls. Call-takers largely appear to lack the authority to limit their requests.  
Yet, the problems of over- and misplaced reliance on 911 to summon the police 
has the growing attention of many in government and there is reason to believe that 
shifting the public’s expectations may be possible. Some police agencies already are 
experimenting with prioritizing 911 calls and trying alternative responses to certain calls 
to reduce burden on the system. For example, Houston Police Department now trains 911 
call-takers to divert mental health-related calls to a crisis phone-counselor if a police 
response is not deemed necessary (Houston Police Department 2015). And, call-takers at 
my field site can redirect calls about broken down vehicles on the highways to the 
Michigan Department of Transportation courtesy patrol.  
 Two recent events hold promise for the implementation of more wide-sweeping 
changes to dispatch policy.  
 First, public outcry over the kinds of racially biased 911 calls that motivated this 
chapter is propelling some police leaders to rethink dispatch policy. At my field site, the 
police official who initially had spoken to me about the intractable problems inherent in a 
democratic call-driven policing system came to embrace the potential for limiting 
dispatches to racially biased calls following conversations with myself, other academics, 
and the public. Other cities are moving in a similar direction. In Alexandria, Virginia, a 
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2019 resolution was proposed by the Alexandria Democratic Committee following an 
incident in which a resident called the police on one of the drafters for canvassing a 
neighborhood with a Black female. The resolution, which was passed, urges, “911 centers 
to continue to train dispatchers to attempt to determine if there is a reasonable concern for 
a caller’s safety or the safety of others, or if a person is calling only because of explicit or 
implicit bias toward minority group members” (Alexandria Democratic Committee 
2018). In Seattle, call-takers are now provided criteria for entering suspicious person 
calls. Call-takers differentiate between suspicious behavior and suspicious persons, and 
have the authority to reject calls about persons (Vera Institute of Justice 2019). The city 
of Grand Rapids, Michigan is considering a more extreme and controversial measure to 
fine callers up to $500 if they make racially biased 911 calls (Hicks 2019).  
 Second, the onset of the 2020 coronavirus pandemic has prompted some police 
officials to implement more restrictive dispatch policies; a change that could last well-
beyond the duration of this pandemic. The Cincinnati Police Department has announced a 
“differential response plan” to reduce in-person contact from 911 calls (Knight 2020). In 
upstate New York, the Schuyler Sheriff’s Office asks callers to provide a call-back 
number for deputies to follow-up via telephone and assess whether an in-person response 
is necessary (Day 2020). The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department has started 
suspending in-person responses for lower-level calls, and taking select crime reports over 
the phone or online. Wauconda, Illinois police are only responding to high priority or 
emergency calls (Police Executive Research Forum 2020). Wauconda’s policy change 
reads as follows:  
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Wauconda Police officers will only be responding to high priority/emergency 
calls. The definition of a high priority/emergency call will include, but are not 
limited to; motor vehicle crashes, forcible felonies, batteries or domestic disputes 
(either in progress or where the offender is still on scene), burglaries where 
evidentiary items need to be collected or the scene needs to be processed, any 
other violent crime or crime against persons, or where the shift supervisor deems 
it necessary. 
 By presenting the public and call-takers with criteria about the kinds of calls that 
demand in-person responses and the kinds that do not, police leaders are implicitly 
empowering call-takers to be more aggressive gatekeepers.  
 These policies, and call-taking policies more generally as I will show in Chapter 
5, are not explicit about how call-takers should make sophisticated assessments about the 
nature of a call or level of risk it may entail. For example, some police agencies are 
concerned that coronavirus stay-at-home orders will cause an uptick in intimate partner 
violence (IPV), and are instructing call-takers to continue sending in-person police 
responses to domestic calls (David Kennedy et al. 2020). But, determining whether a call 
involves IPV, or will escalate to involve IPV, is not a simple process. It will depend on 
how a call-taker extracts, interprets, and classifies caller information, and is likely shaped 
by some level of call-taker discretion. As the following chapters will demonstrate, similar 
issues arise across a host of call contexts. In order to understand the potential for more 
sophisticated call-taking, we first need to have a fuller understanding of the precise call-
taking functions and how they are carried out on-the-ground.
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Chapter 3: How 911 Call-Taker and Dispatcher Decisions Impact Police-Civilian 
Encounters  
 
 Chapter 3 comes at the question of how call-takers mediate caller demands and 
impact policing in the field by conducting a fine-grained analysis of the high-profile 
Henry Louis Gates Jr. arrest. This chapter dissects the function of the 911 call-taker and 
uncovers a previously overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal. Through 
unpacking precisely how call-takers appraise risk—namely through extraction, 
interpretation, and classification of caller information—this chapter provides a 
framework to evaluate future call-taker actions. The Gates case shines a particularly 
bright light on the challenges and dilemmas that can arise during the risk appraisal 
process. In this case, the call-taker played a pivotal role in escalating the caller’s 
uncertainty and, thus, primed the responding officer for a more aggressive encounter. 
These findings are an important step in identifying ways in which police departments can 
pursue more intelligent policies inside dispatch. 
*** 
Practical and Theoretical Background 
 Disaggregating the function of the 911 call-taker in policing is critical because 
call-taker actions set the trajectory of an entire incident. Evidence from Chapter 2 
suggests that throughout history police leaders have largely conceived of the call-taking 
function as involving the transfer of information. This conception likens call-takers to 
 64 
conduits who pass along raw information from callers to the police. Scholars who have 
spent time observing call-taker behavior present a somewhat different picture of the call-
taking function.  
 Because of the work call-takers do to divert, filter out, or resolve via telephone 
inappropriate or misguided requests for police services, a handful of scholars primarily 
have conceptualized their role as gatekeeper (Neusteter et al., 2019; Percy & Scott, 1985; 
Sharrock & Turner, 1978; Whalen et al., 1988). A recent study finds that call-takers at a 
dispatch center in Fairfax, VA resolve, on average, nearly half of all calls without having 
to dispatch the police (Lum et al. 2020). Gatekeepers, like those in Fairfax, prevent some 
inappropriate requests from reappearing in the legal system (Black 1973; Silbey and 
Bittner 1982).  
 Gatekeeping certainly is an important aspect of call-taking, but it fails to account 
for the other key tasks call-takers carry out, in particular call classification. Sometimes 
referred to as “slotting” or “recoding,” classification involves interpreting caller 
information and fitting it into meaningful organizational categories (Gilsinan 1989; 
Manning 1988; Prottas 1978). Practically speaking, this means that a call-taker must 
choose an incident type that aligns with a caller’s problem from a set of predetermined 
incident types in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, each with a different 
priority level (Lum et al. 2020). Decisions about the type of incident and priority level 
impact the number of police cars dispatched, the speed at which officers drive to the 
scene, and police perceptions about the call. Indeed, a 2007 study of the Baltimore Police 
Department’s calls for service finds that police officers make assumptions about a call’s 
legitimacy based on information from dispatch, such as the type of incident (Moskos, 
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2007). 
 Despite the significant consequences call classification can have on policing, it is 
severely under-theorized. A thorough literature review of the 911 system as it relates to 
policing by Neusteter et al., (2019) describes numerous studies that measure call-taker 
stress and well-being, and analyze broad 911 metrics such as call volume, call type, and 
response time across neighborhoods; none of these studies address how call-takers carry 
out call classification or how they process risk.  
 This chapter attempts to fill this gap by reconceptualizing call-takers as not only 
gatekeepers, but also as risk appraisers. In Policing the Risk Society, Ericson and 
Haggerty (1997) write that, “The concept of risk…turns people, their organizations, and 
their environments into myriad categories and identities that will make them more 
manageable.” Though Ericson and Haggerty apply their definition of risk mainly to the 
police, it also aptly describes the work of call-takers who form and transform caller 
requests into more manageable categories using their own knowledge and expertise, 
rules, classification schemes, and technology in order to minimize harm.   
This chapter identifies three key steps in the risk appraisal process—extracting, 
interpreting, and classifying caller information. Extracting information involves asking 
investigative questions to gather information from a caller about the nature of an incident. 
As information is extracted, the call-taker engages in interpretation to make sense of the 
caller’s statements. These two steps are iterative; interpretation helps to guide the 
direction of questioning as the call moves forward. Ultimately, the call-taker classifies the 
information with an incident type based on the nature of the request and level of risk. The 
dispatcher communicates this information to the responding police officers. 
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 Because police call-taking lacks strong governance over the risk appraisal 
process, call-takers can deploy discretion and assessments can suffer from imprecision. 
Dispatch centers often register with the National Emergency Number Association 
(NENA) to access model call-taking and dispatching policies. NENA recommends for 
call-takers to gather the address or exact location of an incident, call-back number, type 
of emergency, time of occurrence, hazards, and identities of the parties involved (NENA 
2017). These protocol suggestions are silent about how call-takers should extract, 
interpret, and classify information, especially when a caller is ambiguous or uncertain. As 
a result, call-takers frequently overestimate incidents. Scholars find that at some call 
centers between thirty and fifty percent of all crime calls that 911 call-takers enter are 
downgraded by officers to minor incidents or no crime once at the scene (Ericson 1982; 
Manning 1988).  
 Evidence from emergency medical dispatching suggests that more scripted and 
structured call-taking protocols may reduce the prevalence of incident misclassification. 
In emergency medical dispatching, call-takers often are provided flipcharts with 
checklists or sequential questioning protocols to help standardize patient risk assessments 
(Lum et al. 2020). At some medical dispatch centers, call-takers who use priority dispatch 
protocols—where questions are scripted and incident types automatically determined 
based on caller responses—correctly code high priority responses in 98.5 percent of all 
cases (Whitaker et al. 2015). 
 Borrowing from research that illuminates how police officers make judgments in 
uncertain situations helps to explain why police call-takers tend to overestimate risk. 
Police sometimes engage in a minimax strategy—meaning they try to minimize the 
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maximum risk. This strategy can result in police interpreting individuals’ actions through 
the prism of worst-case scenario thinking (Muir 1977). Based on my fieldwork, call-
takers also use minimax thinking. This strategy can be particularly troublesome because 
training exercises (a) instill an outsized concern for officer safety relative to the safety of 
the subject of a call and (b) assume that over-responses are preferred to under-responses, 
both of which I will elaborate on in Chapter 5. Turning to scholarship on the effects of 
“priming” will reveal precisely why overvalued risk appraisals can be so problematic.    
 
Setting Police Expectations: The Phenomenon of Priming    
 Priming is generally defined as a subliminal or overt stimulus that precedes an 
event and affects a behavioral response (Tulving 1983). Police responses likely are linked 
to dispatch decisions because of a psychological phenomenon known as “anchoring 
bias.” Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982) describe anchoring 
bias as a phenomenon whereby people make estimates in the face of uncertainty by 
adjusting from an initial value or starting point. Because “different starting points yield 
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values,” high initial values will 
result in high end values (Tversky and Kahneman 1982:15). If police are primed for a 
high-priority encounter then, based on anchoring bias, they will be more likely to 
perceive of the incident in those terms upon arrival. 
 Paul Taylor is one of the few researchers who has studied this phenomenon in 
dispatch. Using a firearms training simulator, he finds that, “When dispatched to a call, 
an officer’s initial understanding of the incident will be formed almost entirely by the 
information received from dispatch” (Remsberg, 2019). In his experiment, dispatchers 
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told one group of officers that the suspect in a “possible trespassing in progress” might be 
holding a gun, while the dispatchers told the other group that the suspect was talking on a 
cell phone. Taylor finds that six percent of officers who had only been advised about a 
cell phone shot the suspect when he pulled the phone from his pocket in the video 
simulation. This shooting error rate is ten times less than for the officers primed to think 
the suspect had a gun (Taylor 2019).  
Taylor’s findings echo earlier observations by police journalist Jonathan 
Rubinstein (1973) who found that police responses are shaped by information from the 
dispatcher. After a year of police ride-alongs, Rubinstein determined that, “What this 
unseen person relates to him establishes his initial expectations and the manner of his 
response to the assignment” (Rubinstein 1973: 88). Any errors by the dispatcher can 
result in serious problems for the police and public. Rubinstein describes a situation in 
which the dispatcher failed to mention to the patrol officer that the call was emergent, 
which is part of a dispatcher’s duty. Because of this omission, the patrol officer arrived 
without lights or sirens to the incident causing the mother—whose child had cut his arm 
and was badly bleeding—to call him lazy and threaten to complain to his captain 
(Rubinstein 1973: 122).  
Given the serious consequences of priming, it is worth considering how decisions 
call-takers make influence the circumstances under which police arrive to a scene. What 




A Conversation Analytic Approach 
 This chapter presents a detailed case study of the interactions that preceded the 
Cambridge Police Department’s arrival to Professor Henry Louis Gates’ home. Because 
single case studies are built for in-depth exploration into complex phenomena, this 
approach is well-suited for unpacking the process through which the 911 call-taker 
carried out his duties. I selected the Gates case for two main reasons. First, this case, 
unlike most others, received a great deal of national and international media coverage, 
which made it possible to obtain audio recordings and review reports written in its wake. 
These materials helped inform the analysis. Second, from my own experiences as a 911 
call-taker, the challenges the call-taker faced—namely weighing caller uncertainty 
against potential incident risk—represent common struggles inside dispatch that 
transcend this specific case.  
 I obtained two audio recordings that were publicly released by the Cambridge 
Police following the incident. The first audio recording is of the interaction between the 
911 caller and call-taker. The second audio recording is of the interaction between the 
dispatcher and responding officers. Because conversation analysis (CA) has been the 
predominant method for analyzing recorded interactional data and unpacking the 
dynamics of interaction, I employ this method to transcribe and analyze the transcripts.2  
 Conversation analysis is a micro-level approach that first emerged in the 1960s 
and insists social interaction provides a window into understanding how institutions and 
 
2 For readers who are interested in learning more about conversation analysis methods see Steven E. 
Clayman, Virginia Teas Gill, (2012), "Conversation analysis", In Routledge Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis (James Paul Gee, Michael Hanford, eds.), New York, Routledge, pp. 120–134. Also, see Jack 
Sidnell, (2012), “Basic Conversation Analytic Methods,” In The Handbook of Conversation Analysis 
(Jack Sidnell, Tanya Stivers, eds.), Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 77-99.  
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organizations come to life (Heritage and Clayman 2010). Through analyzing interactional 
patterns, researchers can learn how co-participants accomplish, or fail to accomplish, 
institutional goals and tasks. Detailed transcriptions are meant to shed light precisely on 
how interactants react to one another’s utterances to co-construct “mutually intelligible 
courses of action.” (Clayman and Gill 2012). Conversation analysis is most powerful 
when done in conjunction with participant observation because observation provides 
opportunities for researchers to “acquire the skills and competencies of participants in the 
field” (Garfinkel & Wieder, 1992). Indeed, my time working in the field helped me to 
better understand the conversational interactions in this chapter’s recordings.   
The method requires close, repeated listening to audio recordings followed by 
detailed transcription. Both recordings in this analysis were transcribed using 
conversation analytic transcription conventions, which capture the details of talk and 
interaction as it actually occurs, including emphasis, overlapping speech, pitch, 
intonation, silence, and inhalations.3 Refer to Table 1 in the Appendix for a complete list 
of commonly used conversation analytic transcription symbols and descriptions. CA is 
becoming increasingly prominent in studies of 911 emergencies and police-civilian 
contact (Cromdal, Osvaldsson, and Persson-Thunqvist, 2008; N. Jones and Raymond, 
2012; Meehan, 1989; Raymond and Zimmerman, 2007; Whalen, Zimmerman, and 
Whalen, 1988; Zimmerman, 1984, 1992b, 1992a).  
 
3 Underscored utterances capture stress or emphasis. Brackets mark overlapping or simultaneous talk. Up 
and down arrows indicate an upward or downward shift in pitch. A period at the end of a phrase marks 
downward intonation to signify a statement. A question mark at the end of a phrase marks upward 
intonation and signifies a question. Numbers in parenthesis mark lengths of silence, represented in tenths 
of a second. A period followed by the letter “h” marks an in-breath and the length of the in-breath is 
reflected in the number of “h’s.” For more information about a conversation analytic approach to 
transcriptions see Alexa Hepburn and Galina B. Bolden, (2012), “The Conversation Analytic Approach to 
Transcription,” In The Handbook of Conversation Analysis (Jack Sidnell, Tanya Stivers, eds.), Wiley-




On July 16, 2009, Harvard University Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. returned 
home to Cambridge from a trip abroad. Finding his front door jammed shut, he attempted 
to push the door open with the help of his driver. Shortly thereafter Sgt. James Crowley, 
an 11-year veteran of the Cambridge police, was dispatched to the address in response to 
a 911 call about a possible in-progress breaking and entering. Six minutes later, following 
a heated verbal encounter between the two men, Sgt. Crowley arrested one of the leading 
African American scholars in the U.S. for “exhibiting loud and tumultuous behavior in a 
public place” (The Cambridge Review Committee, 2010:55). The struggle between Gates 
and Crowley reignited a national conversation about race and law enforcement in the 
U.S. 
The Gates case is one of the more prominent controversies of the past decade and 
exemplifies the prevailing assumptions informing current debates about police reform. 
Both news media and academic outlets widely covered the incident. According to the 
Pew Research Center, nearly twenty percent of all African American-related media 
coverage in 2009 mentioned the Gates incident (Guskin, Khan, and Mitchell, 2010). 
Public discussion and expert analysis following the arrest tended to emphasize Sgt. 
Crowley and Gates’ behavior at the scene, focusing in particular on Crowley’s racial 
profiling and lack of procedural justice as primary explanations for what transpired. 
These explanatory factors are significant but incomplete because they fail to address 
decisions that were made inside the Cambridge Emergency Communications Center 
before Sgt. Crowley arrived on-scene.  
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Explaining Problematic Police-Civilian Encounters: The Gates Case in Scholarly 
Context 
The final report by the Cambridge Review Committee—a group of academics, 
law enforcement leaders, and lawyers tasked with analyzing the incident—advocated for 
police reforms to improve the style of interaction between the police and public without 
giving serious consideration to the decisions that established Sgt. Crowley’s initial 
expectations. Indeed, many of the report’s recommendations involved improving aspects 
of officer on-scene behavior by treating individuals with respect, de-escalating tense 
situations, and appropriately exercising discretion (The Cambridge Review Committee 
2010).  
Both the committee’s report, and a second report about the Gates arrest from the 
National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety, 
concluded that the incident would not have escalated to the point it did if Sgt. Crowley 
had applied more “procedural justice.” Procedural justice is based on the idea that when 
police treat individuals respectfully and with dignity it will lead to greater cooperation 
between the police and public (Tyler, 2004; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Tyler and Huo, 
2002). Fairness and procedural justice are pillars of “rightful policing,” and these features 
of police work establish community trust in the police (Meares and Neyroud, 2015). 
From Gates’ perspective, Crowley treated him disrespectfully, especially since it should 
have been obvious he was not a burglar given his age, need for a cane—Gates’ right leg 
is two inches shorter than his left—and identification documents.  
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Although recommendations to improve on-scene decisions made by the police 
have potential to advance policing, they are focused solely on the moment of interaction 
between police and subject and thus miss other potential areas for reform. Such a narrow 
focus ignores the reasons why Crowley was on-scene in the first place and how the 
decisions made before Crowley arrived directly influenced the interaction.  
On that day, dispatch sent Sgt. Crowley to an in-progress, high-priority incident in 
response to a 911 call at Gates’ address that turned out to be inaccurate, and yet there was 
no inquiry into the call or the actions of the 911 call-taker. The dispatcher said over the 
radio, “Respond to seventeen Ware Street for a possible B and E in progress. Two SPs 
(suspects) barged their way into the home. They have suitcases” (Cambridge Emergency 
Communications Center 2009). These three short statements primed Crowley to perceive 
of the incident as a serious crime with multiple suspects. So serious, in fact, that he drove 
the wrong way down a one-way street to reach the address as quickly as possible. 
Crowley told the Cambridge Review Committee that in the first few minutes of the 
encounter he had “legitimate concerns about safety and security” and the report 
concluded that these concerns contributed to his abrupt demeanor (The Cambridge 
Review Committee, 2010:6).  
 In addition to the information from dispatch, Sgt. Crowley’s heightened response 
likely was also shaped by the community and organizational context in which the 
incident occurred. Cambridge is an affluent east-coast city where residents pride 
themselves in having a diverse and inclusive community (The Cambridge Review 
Committee 2010). In 2009, the population was 68% white, 12% Black, 12% Asian, and 
7% Hispanic, which made it more diverse than the average Massachusetts city or town. 
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Relative to similarly sized cities across the nation, Cambridge ranks well below the 
nationwide average for all index crimes, except larcenies (Cambridge Police Crime 
Analysis Unit 2009). The majority of calls-for-service are for quality of life issues and 
non-emergencies like noise and traffic complaints (The Cambridge Review Committee 
2010). In this type of low-crime context, an in-progress breaking and entering call would 
elicit a magnified response.  
 When public commentators inquired as to why Crowley was on the scene they 
were quick to call it an instance of racial profiling, which in and of itself fails to pay 
sufficient attention to the role the 911 caller and call-taker played. President Obama, on 
nationally televised news, spoke about the incident in racial profiling terms: “There’s a 
long history in this country of African Americans and Latinos being stopped 
disproportionately by the police” (Cooper, 2009:para. 4). Racial profiling certainly may 
have led Crowley to engage with and arrest Gates, but it is not the reason he was on-
scene and primed to view the situation in the way he did.  
Even reviewers of the incident who were well aware of its 911 driven nature 
nonetheless returned to racial profiling as the core problem. The authors of the NIJ report, 
write, “It is important to emphasize that Sergeant Crowley arrived at Gates’ home in 
response to a 911 call as opposed to an exercise of his own discretion.” Because Sgt. 
Crowley was responding to a call, they admit that Gates’ “experience fit somewhat 
uneasily into the typical legal framework of racial profiling” (Meares & Neyroud, 
2015:2). Yet, despite these concessions, the authors nonetheless use a racial profiling 
framework—a framework that evaluates whether an officer’s actions are lawful, 
effective, and fair—to explain the interaction.  
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Meares and Neyroud (2015) defend using this framework because Professor Gates 
described his experience as one of racial profiling. By making this choice, the authors 
effectively shut down any lines of inquiry into the call-driven aspects of the incident, as a 
racial profiling framework does not take into account events leading up to a police 
officer’s arrival. In fact, both the NIJ and Cambridge Review Committee reports suffer 
from a complete disinterest in examining the complexities associated with call-driven 
policing—such as why Crowley was responding to an in-progress breaking and entering 
call and the expectations set in motion by that process.  
The Gates case is by no means unique; it is emblematic of a serious blind spot in 
contemporary conversations about police reform. The 2015 President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing Report—the most prominent recent police reform agenda—
identifies six areas to improve police-public relations: build trust and legitimacy through 
procedural justice, develop comprehensive use of force policies, appropriately use 
technology, cultivate community policing, train and educate officers, and support officer 
wellness and safety. Nowhere in the report is 911 or dispatch mentioned (President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Similarly, Campaign Zero—an online 
clearinghouse of police reforms developed by activists connected to Black Lives 
Matter—does not mention dispatch among their ten recommendations to “limit police 
interventions, improve community interactions, and ensure accountability” (Campaign 
Zero 2019). Moreover, a review of Department of Justice consent decrees that call for 
improved use of force, citizen oversight, officer training, and early intervention systems 
to monitor officer behavior make no mention of call-takers (Walker and Macdonald 
2008). In sum, the leading police reform reports all remain silent on dispatch.  
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Extracting, Interpreting, and Classifying Information from the 911 Caller 
The Cambridge Emergency Communications Center (ECC) received a 911 call at 
12:43 pm on July 16th, 2009. Three key figures played a role in the early stages of the 
incident: the caller who reported two men with suitcases trying to get into the house, the 
call-taker who processed the call, and the dispatcher who relayed information to the 
responding officers. As the transcripts of the incident will reveal, the caller cautiously 
presented an ambiguous problem, but the 911 call-taker made escalating decisions while 
extracting, interpreting, and classifying that information—decisions that shaped Sgt. 
Crowley’s expectations.  
Extracts from the audio recording reveal that the caller was markedly uncertain 
about the nature of the problem. 
               (…) 
17    911:     Alright whatsa problem tell me exactly what happened. 
18    CLR:     .hh Um w- I- don’t know what’s happening, I just had an     
19             ah older woman uh standing here and she had noticed two  
20             gentlemen .h trying to get in a house at that number    
21             seventeen ware street .hh and uh they kinda had to barge 
22             in and they broke (.) the screen door and they finally  
23             got in and when I had looked I went (.) further closer  
24             to the house a little bit after the gentlemens were  
25             already in the house, .h I noticed t-two suitcases so   
26             I’m not sure if these are two individuals who actually 
27             work there I mean who live there?.hh 
 
In line 17, the call-taker follows protocol by asking about the problem. His language 
choice in the problem query—“tell me exactly what happened”—sets a high-standard of 
information extraction that the caller appears to resist from the outset of the call. This 
resistance is evidenced by her initial in-breath (“.hh”) and series of false starts (“um – w 
– I”) before saying, “I don’t know what’s happening.”  
Notice how the caller is subsequently cautious and refrains from making any 
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inferences about what she has witnessed. Instead, in lines 18-27, she provides a series of 
ostensibly factual observations to the call-taker—an older woman was standing outside, 
that woman (not herself) noticed two gentlemen trying to get in a house, the men broke 
the screen door, they had suitcases, etc… In lines 25-26, she invokes the suitcases to 
suggest that the men might live at the house. She concludes her account by speculating 
that the incident may be entirely innocuous.  
Despite the caller’s portrayal of the incident as possibly benign—like the men 
being locked out of the house—the call-taker presses the caller to categorize the incident 
in criminal terms.  
27    911:     You think they might have been break[ing 
28    CLR:                                         [(m’side) .hh I  
29             don’t know:: cuz I have no: idea I just[ 
 
Rather than initially phrasing his question in line 27 from a milder position (e.g., “you 
think they might have been locked out?”)—which would be more than warranted given 
the caller’s ambiguous account of what she saw—the call-taker asks an escalating 
question. This decision is shaped by his interpretation of the caller’s uncertainty through 
the lens of worst-case scenario thinking. He proposes that the men may be breaking-in in 
an attempt to classify the incident. When pressed to make this criminal classification the 
caller declines to affirm the call-taker’s categorization. She responds in lines 28-29 that 
she does not know whether the men were breaking in. The caller thus maintains her more 
cautious stance, and by implication shifts the responsibility of classifying the incident 
wholly back on the call-taker.  
The call-taker hesitates to move forward with his “breaking and entering” 
classification without the caller’s agreement and instead backtracks and tries again.  
30    911:                                      [well do you think the          
31             possibility might have been there, or ah how- what do  
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32             you mean by bahged in, did they kick the door in? hh. 
 
In lines 30-32, the call-taker seems to be exploring the hypothesis that there is an in-
progress burglary in several different ways. In line 31, he emphasizes the word 
“possibility” to see whether accentuating the hypothetical nature of the incident will 
garner the caller’s agreement. But before waiting for a response, he revises his question 
and re-invokes the caller’s previous characterization (“barged in”) to invite clarification. 
The call-taker’s efforts to have the caller support his “breaking and entering” 
classification once again fail.  
33    CLR:     Um: no they were pushing the door in: like uh:: .hh   
34             uhm::: l- like the screen part of the b-front door was= 
35    911:     =How [did they  
36    CLR:          [had like cut 
37    911:     Open the door itself with the lock off. 
38    CLR:     They:: I didn’t see a key or anything cuz I was a little  
39             bit away from the door but I did notice that they, (.)  
40    911:     And what did the [suitcases  
41    CLR:                      [pushed their 
42    911:     have to do with anything.  
43    CLR:     I don’t know=I’m just saying that’s what I saw. Uh- ah-  
44             I hh. jus[t  
 
The caller resists the call-taker’s “kick the door” characterization in lines 33-34. Instead, 
she says that the men were pushing the door. Her observation does not appear to satisfy 
the call-taker, so he interrupts the caller and presses her further about the incident. In line 
40, the call-taker returns to the matter of the suitcases and probes the caller as to why she 
brought them up. His puzzlement over the suitcases show that he failed to grasp the 
exculpatory import of the suitcases as initially presented by the caller.  
Despite never gaining the caller’s agreement about the nature of the incident, the 
call-taker chooses to move forward on the presumption that a break-in has occurred.  
45    911:              [Do you know what apahtment they ah: broke  
46             into. 
47             (0.4) 
48    CLR:     No. They just the first floor (.) I don’t even think  
49             that it’s an apartment. It’s seventeen Ware Street. It’s  
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50             a house. It’s a yellow house. (0.7) Number seventeen.  
51             (0.9) I don’t know if they live there and they just had  
52             a hard time with their key but I did notice that they  
53             (.) kinda used their: a shoulder to try to barge in and 
54             they got in. I don’t know if they had a key or not cuz I 
55             couldn’t see from my ang:le. But: ya know when I looked  
56             a little closely that’s when [I saw (…) 
 
Notice in line 45 how he asks the caller for the apartment number that the men “broke 
into.” After clarifying the address, the caller in lines 51-55 immediately attempts to dial-
down the call-taker’s characterization by suggesting, for a second time, that the men 
might merely be locked out of the house. The call-taker does not up-take her proposition 
and instead moves on to conclude the call. 
After extracting and interpreting information from the caller, the call-taker must 
classify the incident. The technology inside dispatch does not allow for simply passing 
along a caller’s raw information; it must be classified with an incident type. Unlike cut 
and dry calls about barking dogs or illegally parked cars, the Gates call underscores the 
complexities that can arise in classification when callers are uncertain and incidents 
straddle priority levels. The call-taker must decide whether to classify the call as a high-
priority breaking and entering, despite the caller’s uncertainty, or opt for a lower priority 
classification like a “suspicious circumstance,” or even a “citizen assist.” See Figure 3-1 
for a visual depiction of the choices that a call-taker typically faces when classifying an 
incident such as this one. By line 45, it appears that the call-taker has decided to classify 














The call-taker faces competing pressures when making classification decisions. 
On the one hand, over-estimating the incident will prime the police for a serious 
encounter, tie up police units, and put pedestrians and other drivers at risk. On the other 
hand, under-estimating the incident can open the call-taker up to liability and potential 
disciplinary action. Although we do not know for certain, it is likely that the concern 
about over-estimating explains why the call-taker repeatedly attempted to garner the 
caller’s agreement about his hypothesis, but ultimately the concern about under-
estimating the incident leads the call-taker to escalate the caller’s uncertainty.  
 
Relaying Information to the Responding Officer  
The next interaction occurs over the radio between the dispatcher and responding 
police officers. The dispatcher’s information comes directly from the call-taker. In this 
exchange, the dispatcher further escalates the situation by recontextualizing the caller’s 
observations.   
               (…) 
01    CO1:     Control to car one. Eighteen four ah. 
02    OF1:     O-R.  
03    CO1:     Respond to seventeen Ware street for a possible B and E 
 
 
Priority 5 Breaking and 
Entering 
 
Priority 4 Suspicious 
Person 
 
Priority 3 Citizen Assist 




04             in progress. Two SPs bahged their way into the hom:e. Ah 
05             they have suitcases. RP (five) to SPs. Uh. Stand-by.  
06             (0.2)  
07             Trying to get furtha. 
08             (0.7)    
 
Lines 01-07 show the abridged version of the lengthy and complicated caller/call-taker 
interaction detailed above.4 The dispatcher sends police to a possible breaking and 
entering and refers to the two men as “suspects” who “barged” into the house with 
suitcases, despite the caller never affirming the call-taker’s proposal that the men were 
breaking-in and mentioning the suitcases as evidence that they might actually live at the 
address. 
The dispatcher fails to communicate the stance of the caller in relationship to the 
incident in the first transmission creating subsequent interactional troubles.  
     (…) 
17    OF1:     (Inaudible) Can you have the caller come to the front  
18             door. 
19             (0.5) 
20    CO1:     I’m sorry repeat? 
21             (0.7) 
22    OF1:     <Can you have the caller come to the front door.> 
23             (1.5) 
24    CO1:     It’s not her house. She doesn’t live there. She’s uh a  
25             witness in this.  
26             (1.7) 
27    OF2:     C-13 to control I’m on Broadway. I’m going to respond.  
28             (0.5) 
29    CO1:     Received.  
30             (0.7) 
31    OF3:     52 to control. 
32    CO2:     Answering 52.   
33             (1.0) 
34    OF3:     I’m out with a uh gentleman says he resides here.  
35             (inaudible)  
36             Uncooperative. But uh: keep the cars coming.  
37             (0.5) 
38    CO2:     Copy. (…) 
 
Confusion over the stance of the caller is evident in lines 17-25 when a responding 
officer asks the dispatcher to have the caller come to the front door and the dispatcher, 
 
4 Note that in the radio transcript “CO” (i.e., control) stands for dispatchers and “OF” for officers. 
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after asking the officer to repeat his question, replies with emphasis that the caller does 
not live at the house and is “uh a witness in all this.” The decision by dispatch to not 
initially relay information about the caller’s relationship to the incident may have further 
escalated the situation by causing the officer to initially incorrectly assume that the caller 
was inside the house during a serious crime.  
Because radio traffic must be concise, as police and dispatchers are competing for 
broadcast space over air waves, many of the particularities of calls are stripped away by 
call-takers and dispatchers. In some cases, particularities are superfluous, but in others 
they can be critical to understanding the nature of the call. In this case, the dispatcher 
failed to relay the caller’s evident uncertainty as well as her willingness to entertain the 
possibility that the incident, although suspicious, may be entirely innocuous.   
In short, although the Cambridge Review Committee Report concluded that, 
“Sergeant Crowley and Professor Gates each missed opportunities to ‘ratchet down’ the 
situation and end it peacefully”, the above analysis indicates that so too did the 911 
operator and dispatcher (The Cambridge Review Committee, 2010:26). They played 




This chapter offers three main contributions to our understanding of call-taking 
and its impact on police-civilian encounters. First, by reviewing the key reports that came 
out following the arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr., as well as broader national police 
reform agendas, I bring attention to the unfortunate absence of dispatch in public policy 
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debates about policing. Scholars repeatedly overlook the ways in which 911 callers, call-
takers, and dispatchers affect police responses. The approach used here stresses the need 
for scholars to apply a wider frame when examining police behavior, one that includes 
the interactions that take place before the police arrive at a scene. 
Second, by using a conversation analytic approach this paper unpacks the 
functions of call-taking and reconceptualizes the role of the 911 call-taker as that of risk 
appraiser. This reconceptualization transcends the Gates case and provides a framework 
for policymakers to evaluate future call-taker behavior. Specifically, this chapter calls for 
greater evaluation of the information extraction, interpretation, and classification steps of 
the call-taking process when reviewing police-civilian encounters. Analyzing these often-
overlooked aspects of call-taking could help to clarify why call-driven policing 
encounters unfold the way they do. Although it is counterfactual, it is altogether possible 
the interaction would not have unfolded as it did had Sgt. Crowley not been primed to 
believe he was encountering a breaking and entering.  
Third, by bringing to bear a methodology not traditionally used in the field of 
criminology, I expand the methodological toolkit available to researchers in this arena. 
Such a method has growing relevance given the proliferation of new surveillance 
technologies that record two-way interactions between the police and public. Sociologists 
Geoff Raymond and Nikki Jones already are applying CA to body cam footage to 
examine how verbalizations from police have the potential to reduce use of force 
incidence. CA can help shed light on how and when interactions go well or go badly and 
document best practices for 911 call-takers, dispatchers, and police. 
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The inclusion of dispatch in the Gates incident introduces the possibility for a 
distinct set of policy reforms that go beyond improving officer behavior at the scene. 
Reforms targeted at training call-takers and dispatchers to appraise risk in more 
sophisticated ways is one such example. Although there may be legitimate liability 
concerns that lead 911 call-takers to escalate callers’ requests, the account here indicates 
there are risks on the other side as well. Current training practices often disregard the 
costs that can come from escalation and, instead, encourage call-takers to upgrade 
incidents in the face of uncertainty. Training modules that present concrete examples 
challenging the assumption that over-response is preferable may help call-takers to be 
more thoughtful about their actions. Such a training change would require police 
leadership to formally recognize the risk appraisal function of call-taking.  
Another locus for policy intervention exists at the intersection of training and 
technology. The Gates case highlights the costs that can arise from flattening caller 
uncertainty. Reforms targeted at preserving callers’ uncertainties and cautions may 
improve outcomes. Computer Aided Dispatch technology could be designed to include 
fields which prompt call-takers to capture this information. For example, call-takers 
could indicate if a caller presents high levels of uncertainty when reporting high-priority 
incidents by checking a box in CAD. This feature would allow call-takers to signal 
quickly to the dispatcher and police that their information classification choice may be 
overestimated. Not only might preserving caller uncertainty have improved the outcome 
of the Gates encounter, but it also might have prevented the shooting of Tamir Rice. In 
that case, the dispatcher failed to convey to the responding officer that the 911 caller 
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cautioned that the male in the park with a gun was “probably a juvenile” and the gun was 
“probably fake” (Schuessler, 2017). 
Evidence from emergency medical dispatching suggests that policy interventions 
aimed at the information extraction phase of call-taking also might help address some of 
the problems of over-response. Unlike in fire and medical dispatching in which 
departments use protocols and scripts for call-taking, police dispatching lacks 
standardized protocols. This can produce variation across 911 operators in how they ask 
questions. In the Gates case, we see the call-taker repeatedly press the caller to identify 
the incident in criminal terms. Another call-taker may not have proceeded in the same 
way. Standardizing questions could help to guide which line of questioning call-takers 
should pursue in high-pressure situations. This type of “criteria based dispatch” approach 
currently is being piloted among police dispatchers in Tucson, Arizona (Vera Institute of 
Justice 2019).  
The Gates incident raises important questions. It is worth considering what might 
have happened if instead of first asking the caller if the men were breaking in, the call-
taker had asked if they were locked out. Imagine, too, if the call-taker had downgraded 
the call to a suspicious circumstance. Or, if the dispatcher had simply passed on the 
caller’s persistent uncertainties to Sgt. Crowley. We likely will never know the answers 
to these questions, but a greater focus on how call-takers carry out the risk appraisal 





Chapter 4: Variation in Risk Appraisal and Its Effects on Police Officer Action  
  
Chapter 4 builds on the findings in the previous chapter, which establish risk 
appraisal as a critical call-taking function, by quantitatively measuring to what extent 
call-takers vary in how they carry out risk appraisal and the causal implications of that 
variation on street-level policing outcomes. The analysis provides strong evidence that 
call-takers deploy discretion when making decisions about risk, and that these decisions, 
in turn, directly affect how police officers perceive of incidents and whether they make 
an arrest. Documenting this phenomenon is an important step in pinpointing a locus of 
discretion inside the dispatch center.  
*** 
 Around 7:30 pm on a Tuesday in February, I answered a 911 call from a male 
reporting an in-progress breaking and entering at his own address. The caller had just 
returned home and saw a six-foot tall black male wearing a Carhartt jacket on his front 
porch. He told me, “I believe there’s a burglary in progress in my apartment. And I’m 
just fucking scared.” Within seconds, I classified the incident as a “breaking and 
entering” and entered it into the system for dispatch.  
 Paul, a thirty-three-year-old dispatcher with 11 years of job experience, 
proceeded to dispatch the incident over the radio. Rather than dispatch it as a breaking 
and entering, Paul downgraded the incident to a suspicious. He stated, “For units, a 
suspicious…A Street. Between B Street and the alley way. Caller just returned home to 
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find a black male, tan Carhartt jacket in his porch area that he says should be secure.”  
 After dispatching the call, Paul yelled a series of follow-up questions at me from 
across the room. Was I sure that the caller did not know the man? Could it be a friend of 
the caller? Was it a maintenance worker? Because I had not asked these questions, and I 
still had the caller on the line, I repeated the questions back to him. He replied that he 
did not recognize the man. I relayed that information back to Paul, who then asked me 
for a second time if I was sure the caller did not know the man. Again, I repeated the 
question to the caller and the caller stated that he did not.  
 Six minutes later, the police piped up on the radio to report that the suspect on the 
front porch was not a burglar. The officer stated, “We’re secure…It’s gonna be an 
employee of the house. A cleaner.” Paul repeated the officer’s information for units in 
the area and opened the radio waves back up to all officers on the east side of the county: 
“Clear. A member of the cleaning crew. Normal [radio] traffic on East.” Because I still 
had the caller on the, I explained that the man on the porch was a cleaning person to 
which the caller embarrassedly laughed and said, “Oh my god!”  
 Though grateful the police left the scene without incident, I could not help but 
question why I had not challenged or probed the caller’s claim until prompted by Paul, 
and whether my initial risk assessment had been overly aggressive given Paul’s 
downgrading of it. I sat back in my chair and considered how easily the call could have 
gone sideways and how my own actions might have contributed to a negative outcome.   
 
 The nature of this incident is similar in some respects to the Henry Louis Gates’ 
case described in Chapter 3—a caller reporting a man on a porch who appears suspicious 
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but is ultimately not—however the caller’s demeanor and the way the call was handled 
inside dispatch markedly differ. Unlike the cautious caller in the Gates’ incident, this 
caller was unequivocal about what he was observing and made inferences based on his 
observations. The Gates’ caller shifted responsibility onto the call-taker to interpret and 
classify her information. The caller in this incident made classification and prioritization 
decisions for the call-taker. Without any pressing on my part, the caller clearly stated the 
man was committing an in-progress serious crime.  
 Despite a breaking and entering classification being more than warranted, the 
dispatcher in this case reacted much differently than in the Gates incident and attempted 
to de-escalate the situation. First, Paul took my seemingly clear-cut breaking and entering 
incident and downgraded it to a lower-priority suspicious circumstance before 
dispatching the police. Second, he prompted me to consider and propose alternative 
hypotheses about what the caller was observing before hanging up (e.g., perhaps it was a 
friend or maintenance worker). Third, he interpreted certain information, such as the 
Carhartt jacket description, as potential evidence that the subject on the porch was a 
workman of some sort—an interpretation that ultimately was correct. Whereas I had 
failed to interpret the caller’s information in any way other than as a breaking and 
entering, Paul had remained open to alternative explanations.  
  Paul’s actions partially reflect a lack of trust in neophyte call-takers, such as 
myself, and his concern about the over-estimation of incident risk. In workplace chats, he 
had spoken to me about the costs that come from tying up police units on high-priority 
incidents and priming officers for overly aggressive encounters. Although we cannot 
know for sure whether Paul’s actions changed the outcome of the police encounter with 
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the Black man on the porch, unlike in the Gates’ incident, this encounter did not result in 
conflict or arrest.  
 Comparing and contrasting the Henry Louis Gates Jr. incident to this call, 
suggests that the risk appraisal process can vary between workers in meaningful ways. 
Paul’s decisions to de-escalate the incident type, probe the caller, and consider alternative 
hypotheses offer a window into how he would have handled the call if he had been on 
call-taker duty that day instead of me. Moreover, both of our decisions to refrain from 
escalating the incident beyond the caller’s statements suggest that the Gates’ incident 
could have played out differently. These kinds of variation between workers motivate 
two novel research questions that I address in Chapter 4. I ask 1) To what extent do 911 
call-takers vary in how they classify the same types of calls? 2) Does call-taker variation 
affect subsequent police officer action?  
 To systematically answer these questions, I analyze call-for-service administrative 
data and arrest records from my field site. I leverage a natural experiment using the quasi-
random assignment of call-takers to calls. I find that call-takers have different 
propensities for classifying incidents as high-priority and this variation has causal effects 
on police officer action. Using a two stage least squares model (2SLS), I find a seven-
percentage point difference between call-takers in their propensity to classify a call as 
high priority based solely on who happened to pick-up the phone. This discrepancy 
translates into a thirteen percent change in the average propensity of a police officer to 
verify the incident as high priority, and a thirty-four percent change in the average 
propensity of a police officer to make an arrest.  
 These findings fill gaps in the criminal justice literature about the role of dispatch 
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in policing by 1) systematically showing discretion among call-takers, 2) documenting 
variability in how discretion is exercised, and 3) reporting the effects of this variability on 
police officer behavior. This is the first study to causally link call-taker actions to 
policing outcomes.  
 
The Inclusion of Dispatch as a Factor Shaping Police Officer Behavior 
Scholars have long sought to understand police officer behavior and the factors 
that shape it. Albert Reiss and Donald Black led one of the first systematic social 
observation (SSO) studies in Chicago where researchers rode along with the police and 
observed that a suspect’s demeanor toward the police influenced the likelihood of 
juvenile arrest (Black and Reiss 1970). In the 1980s, policing scholar Lawrence Sherman 
expanded beyond “suspect demeanor” to develop a typology of factors that shape police 
action, including, 1) individual factors (e.g., officers’ characteristics, including gender, 
race, experience, training, attitudes, and demeanor); 2) situational factors (e.g., suspect, 
victim, and encounter characteristics); 3) organizational factors (e.g., agency size, 
supervision, and managerial styles); 4) community factors (e.g., neighborhood 
characteristics, and political contexts), and 5) legal factors (e.g., seriousness of the 
offense, strength of evidence). A 2018 report on arrests by the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police still uses Sherman’s framework to explain police behavior regarding 
arrests.    
 In addition, sociological scholarship highlights the importance of place in 
understanding police behavior. Ethnographic findings from the Los Angeles Police 
Department show that police officers construct narratives about places for their own 
personal safety. The LAPD differentiates between “pro-police” and “anti-police” areas, 
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and these spatial constructs lead to different styles of interaction. Indeed, police are 
“more suspicious of actors in anti-police areas than in pro-police ones, and are more 
likely to respond aggressively to challenges to their authority in anti-police areas” 
(Herbert 1997:21). Making broad generalizations about people in certain kinds of places 
can lead to what Frederick Schauer terms actuarial decision-making– “making decisions 
about large categories that have the effect of attributing to the entire category certain 
characteristics that are probabilistically indicated by membership in the category, but that 
still may not be possessed by a particular member of the category” (Schauer 2009:4). 
This type of place-based actuarial decision-making further shapes police behavior.  
 Missing from this typology are factors associated with dispatch, specifically the 
effects of risk appraisal on police officer action. Yet, much of police work is responding 
to calls-for-service and reacting to information from dispatchers. This information can 
have important consequences on police perceptions. The work on “priming” by Paul 
Taylor that I describe in Chapter 2, and my own analysis of the Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
incident, indicate that dispatch plays a critical role in setting initial police expectations. 
Dispatch is similar to other organizational settings where front-line workers dealing with 
crises “do more than set the tone; they determine the trajectory of the crisis” (Weick 
1995:309). Indeed, 911 call-takers’ initial actions, specifically around risk appraisal, 
influence incident trajectory by shaping the number of police cars dispatched, the speed 
at which officers drive to the scene, and the level of incident risk the police perceive.
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Variation in the Risk Appraisal Process 
Few scholars have examined the information production process undertaken by 
911 call-takers. Because of the legacy of police phone operators being conceived of as 
agents of transfer—or conduits passing along raw information from callers to the 
police—some scholars have assumed that incident classification is an objective process, 
based solely on a caller’s report. Under this assumption, information classification would 
not depend on which call-taker answered the phone because the content of the call would 
drive any variation. A literature review of the 911 system by Neusteter et al., (2019) 
highlights a body of research implicitly equating call-for-service administrative records 
with caller requests. These studies do not consider how the actions of call-takers—
particularly actions around risk appraisal—may shape and transform caller requests.  
However, the Henry Louis Gates Jr. incident described in Chapter 3 concretely 
showed that incident classification was not an objective reflection of the caller’s report. 
Rather, the incident was co-constructed by the call-taker and caller. The call-taker 
interpreted and reframed the caller’s request to minimize what he saw was the maximum 
risk—loss of property and potential life from a home invasion.  
Other scholars have found that call-takers engage in interpretive work when 
processing information—though not specifically around risk appraisal as I have shown. 
Gilsinan (1989) analyzes nearly three hundred 911 call and finds that call-takers 
transform callers’ complicated and sometimes hysterical requests into organizationally 
meaningful categories. Peter Manning’s 1988 study of an American and a British police 
dispatch center similarly finds that call-takers do more than pass on raw information; they 
“make sense” of a caller’s request. He describes a key function of call-taking as 
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involving, “Sensing, that is, deciding if a call is credible, deciding if the address or 
location is valid, and ascertaining what the nature of the problem is, selecting and sorting 
from the message” (Manning 1988:70). Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen (1988) 
analyze a single 911 call to highlight how misinterpretation between caller and call-taker 
can produce disastrous police outcomes. These studies highlight the innately human 
aspects of processing 911 calls.  
Although prominent studies speak to the co-construction of incidents between 
callers and call-takers, they do not systematically show whether, or to what extent, call-
takers differ in how they assess the same types of calls. Comparing and contrasting the 
Gates incident to the field note at the beginning of this chapter suggests that call-takers 
vary in how they make sense of caller requests and assess risk. The extent to which call-
taker behavior varies may depend on how influenced call-takers are by their own 
experiences and how transparent they are about sharing those experiences with co-
workers (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003:23). For instance, if a call-taker faced 
disciplinary action for under-estimating a caller’s request in the past, then that same call-
taker may be more risk-averse and initiate a heightened response when processing calls in 
the future, compared to others without such experiences. If that worker then shared his 
story with a co-worker, she then may learn to become more risk-averse too. On the other 
hand, perhaps more job experience makes call-takers become jaded and thus less likely to 
take a caller’s complaint seriously, regardless of disciplinary action.  
Variation in the information production process may be dampened by surveillance 
practices inside dispatch. Call-takers operate under high-levels of surveillance in which 
every phone interaction is recorded, saved, and subject to review. Agency rules may be 
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more closely followed than would be typical among other types of front-line workers 
(e.g., police, teachers, welfare case managers) where lack of supervision makes 
workplace discretion possible (Lipsky 1980).  
 
Organizational Context and Data 
This analysis relies on records of 911 and non-emergency calls entered into the 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system by call-takers at my field site in Southeast 
Michigan between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016. These data include the date 
and address of each call that received a police dispatch, a reported offense code 
determined by the call-taker, a verified offense code determined by the primary 
responding police officer, and the personal identity of the call-taker. Table 4-1 indicates 
that twenty-eight percent of all calls-for-service entered by Central Dispatch call-takers 
were in response to 911 calls, and seventy-two percent were in response to non-
emergency calls. 
Between one and four call-takers typically answer calls during each of the three 
shifts at Central Dispatch. Table 4-1 shows that in my analysis sample the 3 pm – 11 pm 
shift receives the largest share of calls (44%), followed by the 7 am – 3 pm shift (35%), 
and then the 11 pm – 7 am shift (21%). Weekends are typically the busiest part of the 
week with nearly forty-five percent of all calls-for-service being entered on Fridays, 
Saturdays, and Sundays. Summer months are also slightly busier with thirty percent of 
calls-for-service coming during June, July, August; however, accidents related to 
inclement winter weather in Michigan keeps calls-for-service fairly constant year-round.  
The call-takers in this dataset handle calls from racially and socioeconomically 
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diverse cities and townships. I merged American Community Survey (ACS) 2015 block-
group estimates to the call-for-service data based on the latitude and longitude of each 
call-for-service. There are 244 block groups—geographical units that are larger than 
census blocks but smaller than census tracts—represented in the call-for-service data. 
Table 4-1 indicates that the average block group is seventeen percent Black, has twenty-
three percent of households living below the federal poverty line, and has an 
unemployment rate of 5.4 percent.  
In 2016, Central Dispatch employed thirty-one call-takers. Table 4-1 shows that 
approximately fifty-three percent of call-takers have over 10 years of 911 job experience 
either from time at Central Dispatch or from another dispatch center. Central Dispatch 
employs both part-time call-takers and full-time call-takers/dispatchers. Part-time call-
takers only are trained to answer 911 and non-emergency calls, whereas full-time call-
takers/dispatchers rotate between call-taking and radio dispatching. Table 4-1 also 
indicates that about one-third of employees in the sample are part-time call-takers and 
two-thirds are full-time call-takers/dispatchers. On average, each of the thirty-one 911 
operators in the final analysis sample entered approximately 3,000 calls-for-service a year 














Call Characteristics  
  911 0.279 
  Non-Emergency Calls 0.728 
  Classified High Priority by Call-Taker 0.203 
  Received on Midnight Shift 11p-7a 0.212 
  Received on Day Shift 7a-3p  0.348 
  Received on Noon Shift 3p-11p 0.440 
  Received on a Weekend (Friday, Saturday, Sunday) 0.443 
  Received in Summer (June, July, August)     0.284 
Incident Characteristics  
  Classified High Priority by Police Officer  0.114 
  Arrest  0.026 
  Share of Arrests from 911 Calls  0.358 
  Share of Arrests from Non-Emergency Calls 0.642 
Call-Taker Characteristics  
  Part-Time Phone Operator 0.285 
  Female 0.751 
  10 Years+ Job Experience 0.539 
  Mean Number of Calls Processed 6,262 
Census Block Group Characteristics  
  Percent of Block Group Black 0.174 
  Percent of Block Group Living Below FPL 0.231 




Call-takers can select from 144 different offense codes when classifying calls-for-
service in CAD; however, only fifty-two offense codes appear in the analysis sample. 
Each offense code comes with a pre-determined priority level set by the Sheriff’s Office. 
All police agencies that contract with Central Dispatch use the same priority level coding 
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system. When a call-taker selects an incident code, the priority level is automatically 
assigned to the incident by the CAD software. For purposes of this analysis, priority 
levels run from zero to seven, with seven being the highest and zero being the lowest. See 
Table 4-2 for a list of incident types and corresponding priority levels. 
 
Table 4-2 Call-for-Service Incident Types by Priority Level 
Priority Level Incident Type  
Seven (high) Assault with a dangerous weapon, homicide, person seen with a gun, 
drug overdose, robbery, fleeing police, injury vehicle crash, ambulance 
requesting police assistance. 
Six (high) Alarms, physical assault, domestic violence, 911 hang-up call, indecent 
exposure, intoxicated person, sexual assault, shots heard, suicidal 
subject, found child. 
Five Sudden death, disorderly behavior, family trouble, missing person, 
welfare check. 
Four Breaking and entering, drugs, emotionally disturbed person, stolen 
vehicle, court violation, vehicle crash with no injury, harassment. 
Three Child abuse/neglect, larceny, neighbor trouble, noise, suspicious 
person, trespassing, found property, panhandling.  
Two Citizen assist, reckless driver, fraud, juvenile trouble, malicious 
destruction of property, disturbing the peace. 
One Abandoned vehicles, fireworks, parking complaints. 
Zero Animal complaints, civil standbys, code violations, information report, 
follow-up with person.  
 
Although the call-for-service data do not include a direct measure of risk 
appraisal, I operationalize this concept by measuring the prevalence of high priority 
incident classification. Coding an incident with a “high priority” incident type 
approximates the level of risk a call-taker perceives an incident will entail. I coded an 
incident “high priority” if the incident type received a six or seven on the priority scale, 
as these kinds of incidents are dispatched faster and involve more police units. Twenty 
percent of all calls-for-service in this sample are high priority.  
I focus on high priority incidents because it is in these situations that police 
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responses are most heightened. More police cars are dispatched, which results in heavier 
police presence in communities. Officers are speeding with lights and sirens to arrive at 
the incident scene, which puts other drivers and pedestrians at risk. And, police are being 
psychologically primed by dispatch for potentially high-risk, dangerous encounters. 
Precisely for these reasons, we would hope that any variation we find across call-takers in 
high priority incident classification is due to the nature of the call, not individual call-
taker characteristics.  
To measure how call-taker risk appraisal impacts policing in the field, I use two 
policing outcomes. First, whether the police officer verified the incident he/she was 
dispatched to as high priority. Second, whether he/she made an arrest. I merged arrest 
records to call-for-service data using unique incident identification numbers. Arrest 
records only are from one year (2015), rather than both 2015 and 2016, due to data 
gathering time constraints. Table 4-1 shows that about three percent of calls-for-service 
in the sample led to an arrest. Of those arrests, thirty-five percent stemmed from 911 calls 
and sixty-four percent from non-emergency calls. 
Refer to Figure 4-1 for a simplified call-taker and police officer decision-tree 
highlighting the outcomes of interest in this analysis.  
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To examine 1) variation across call-takers in how they appraise risk—specifically 
in their propensity to classify incidents as high-priority and 2) the casual effect of that 
variation on subsequent police officer incident classification and arrest, I use an examiner 
assignment research design. Although this design has been used in studies of 
incarceration (Harding et al. 2017; Mueller-Smith 2015), foster care (Gross 2020; Doyle 
2008; 2007), and auction markets (Lacetera et al. 2016), it is novel to dispatch and 
policing. I instrument for high-priority call classification using underlying tendencies of 
each call-taker’s level of alarm when processing calls, which I name call-taker alarmism. 
My strategy isolates only the variation in call classification that is related to the quasi-
randomly assigned call-taker.  
Like in other examiner assignment studies, I calculate the instrument as the 
fraction of all calls-for-service assigned to the same call-taker that resulted in a high-
priority classification. To predict a call-taker’s propensity to classify a given call as high 
priority, I use information from all prior and future calls a given call-taker handles. For 
call j assigned to call-taker k: 𝑍!"# = # $%!&$$∑ 𝐻𝑃'%!&$'(!  (1) 
 
where 𝑛" equals the total number of calls entered by call-taker k and 𝐻𝑃' is a binary 
indicator equal to one if the call was classified with a high priority incident type. This 
method is equivalent to call-taker fixed effects from a leave-out regression in which high-
priority call classification is the outcome variable. The instrument has a mean of 0.203 
and a standard deviation of 0.023.  
Using an Instrumental Variable (IV) design allows me to estimate the causal 
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effects of interest using only the variation in the “treatment” (i.e., call-taker propensity to 
classify a call with a high priority incident type). I use the following equations to measure 
the causal effects of high priority call classification on police officer incident 
classification and arrest: 𝐻𝑃!" =	𝛾) +	𝛾$𝑍!"# +	𝛾*𝑋!"+ +	𝜀!" (2) 𝑌!" =	𝛽) +	𝛽$	𝐻𝑃0!" +	𝛽*𝑋!"+ +	𝜇!" (3) 
where 𝑌!" is a policing outcome, either the likelihood of an officer classifying an incident 
as high priority once at the scene or the likelihood of arrest, and 𝑋!"+  includes a set of 
fixed effects to control for two features of call-taking that threaten the random 
assignment of call-takers to calls—the shift the call-taker works and the source of call 
(whether a 911 line or non-emergency line). Standard errors are clustered at the call-taker 
level because the treatment is assigned at the call-taker level and not the individual call 
level (McKenzie 2017).  
 
Identifying Assumptions    
 Two stage least squares regression requires that three assumptions be met to 
produce unbiased estimates. The first assumption is referred to as relevance. Relevance 
requires that the instrument predict high priority call classification. Refer to Table 4-3 for 
first stage regression estimates of high priority call classification on the call-taker 
alarmism instrument. The correlation between the instrument and high priority call 
classification is 0.908 (column 1). After including controls in the model, the model 
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in call-taker urgency (2.3 percentage 
point) significantly increased the likelihood of high priority call classification by 1.2 
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percentage points (column 7). An F-statistic on the model of 64.34 finds no weak 
instruments problem.   
Table 4-3 First Stage Effect of Call-Taker Urgency on Call Classification (“CC”) 























Alarmism 0.908*** 0.871*** 0.572*** 0.572** 0.508*** 0.514*** 0.520*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) 
        
Observations 158,918 158,918 158,828 158,828 158,828 158,828 158,828 
F-Statistic 974.93 649.23 78.62 84.03 63.63 66.11 64.34 
Call Source 
FE      P  P P P P P 
Shift FE    P P P P P 
Block Group 
FE    P P P P 
Day of 
Week FE     P P P 
Month FE      P P 
Year FE       P 
Notes: This table reports the results from regressions of call classification on the leave- out measure of call-taker 




 The second identifying assumption is referred to as exclusion. Exclusion requires 
that the instrument’s effect on the treatment must be the only pathway through which the 
instrument affects the outcome. This means no other unobserved variables are causing an 
association between the instrument and the outcome. This assumption would be violated 
if, for example, a police officer learns to trust or distrust information from specific call-
takers overtime. Although statistically untestable, the organizational structure of Central 
Dispatch supports the validity of the exclusion restriction. At Central Dispatch, police 
receive radio transmissions from dispatchers who are separate and distinct from call-
takers. It is highly unlikely police are aware of call-taker identity while driving to an 
incident since the call-takers are not on the radio with the police. Moreover, because 
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Central Dispatch is a consolidated dispatch center—they dispatch for six different police 
agencies—many police officers have never met dispatch staff and are not on a name-to-
name basis. 
The exclusion restriction also requires that the instrument is “as good as randomly 
assigned.” To test this assumption, I include a rich set of covariates —source of call, 
census block group characteristics, shift, month, day of week, and year—to see whether 
these variables predict the instrument. If call-takers are randomly assigned to calls, then 
these covariates should not predict the instrument. However, if the covariates do predict 
the instrument, then this would suggest that call-takers receive different compositions of 
calls which would threaten the study design (e.g., a threat would exist if some call-takers 
receive more calls during summer months than others and summer months are when 
more serious crimes occur). Table 4-4 indicates that call-takers are randomly assigned 
calls across census block group characteristics, month, day of week, and year (column 2). 
Random assignment across block groups is further supported by my first-hand knowledge 
that call-takers are unaware of a caller’s location prior to answering a call.  
Two covariates, however, threaten the random assignment of call-takers to calls—
shift and call source. Because call-takers bid for shifts based on seniority, some call-
takers are more likely to work during certain shifts and types of calls vary across shifts. 
Table 4-4 (column 2) shows that the coefficient on shift is significant, but small in 
magnitude (-0.006). Call source—whether the call comes in on a 911 or non-emergency 
line—also threatens the random assignment. Because 911 lines ring out in the dispatch 
center with different ring-tones than non-emergency calls, call-takers know the source of 
call before answering. Although in theory all call-takers should answer 911 calls first, it 
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is possible that some call-takers may break this rule and opt to answer more non-
emergency calls to avoid high stress situations. By doing this, they may alter the 
composition of calls each call-taker receives. Table 4-4 (column 2) shows that the 
coefficient on source is significant, but small in magnitude (0.009).  To address these two 
violations, I include fixed effects for shift and call source. This means the allocation of 
call-takers to calls is conditionally random after controlling for shift and call source.   
Table 4-4 Balance Tests for the Conditional Random Assignment of Call-Takers 
 (1) (2) 





Call Characteristics   
  Call Source 911    0.017*  0.009*** 
  (0.010) (0.003) 
Census Block Group Characteristics   
  Percent of Block Group Black  0.000***  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
  Percent of Block Group Living Below FPL -0.000***  0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  Percent of Block Group Unemployed  0.068***  0.002 
 (0.022) (0.001) 
Temporal Features of Calls   
  Shift -0.026*** -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
  Month -0.000  0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  Day of Week -0.000  0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  Year -0.009***  0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
   
F-Statistic from Joint Test  37.09  3.21 
P-Value from Joint Test  0.000  0.009 
Observations 158,918 158,918 
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The third identifying assumption is monotonicity. Monotonicity requires that 
harsher examiners are harsher across different sub-groups. For example, in the judge 
literature, harsher judges should be harsher for both black and white defendants to lend 
credence to the monotonicity assumption (Harding et al. 2017). In the case of call-taking, 
call-takers that are more alarmist for certain sub-groups should also be weakly more 
alarmist for other sub-groups. I probe this assumption in Table 4-5 where I run 
regressions of high priority call classification on the call-taker alarmism instrument by 
geographic area. The first stage estimates in Table 4-5 remain positive and statistically 
significant when I run regressions by geographic area. This suggests that the 
monotonicity assumption is met.   
Table 4-5 Testable Implications of Monotonicity for the Alarmism Instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
City A  City B 
County 
(excluding City A & 
City B) 
Call-Taker Alarmism 0.309*** 0.586*** 0.763*** 
   (0.116) (0.147) (0.114) 
    
F Statistic          7.14 15.95 44.96 




Call-Taker Variation in Call Classification 
Because discretion among call-takers has not previously been systemically 
documented in the literature, I report first stage results from the 2SLS model. Figure 4-2 
reveals that significant variation exists across call-takers in their average propensity to 
classify the same type of call, after controlling for shift and call source, as high priority. 
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Each vertical bar in Figure 4-2 represents a unique call-taker at Central Dispatch. The 
height of each bar records the deviation of that call-taker’s average propensity to classify 
a call as high priority from the average call-taker’s propensity to classify the same type of 
call as high priority. The vertical bars include 95 percent confidence intervals around 
each of the call-taker effect estimates. For 26 of the 31 call-takers, the confidence 
intervals on the effects exclude zero, meaning the effects are statistically significant. An 
F-test of the joint hypothesis that all the estimated call-taker effects are zero is rejected 
with a p-value<.001, meaning that call-taker variation is unlikely to be random.  
Figure 4-2 indicates that a 911 call-taker at the top of the distribution is nearly 
seven percentage points more likely to rank the same type of call as high priority than a 
911 operator at the bottom of the distribution. Relative to the average call-taker, the most 
alarmist call-taker is nearly four percentage points more likely to classify the same type 
of call high priority, and the least alarmist call-taker is nearly 4 percentage points less 
likely to classify the same type of call high priority. A one standard deviation increase in 
call-taker alarmism (2.3 percentage points) increases the likelihood of high priority call 
classification by 1.2 percentage points. This variation is based solely on which call-taker 
happens to pick up the phone. These findings suggest that call classification is neither an 
automated or uniform process. 
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Figure 4-2 Call-Taker Fixed Effects from IV First Stage 
  
Notes: Figure 4-2 plots the normalized fixed effects for each of the 31 operators along with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. The fixed effects are obtained by running a regression model with operator fixed effects, shift, and call source 
fixed effects (see equation (2)). 
 
To examine whether certain characteristics of call-takers predict placement on the 
alarmism scale, I present call-taker effect estimates by amount of job experience. In 
Figure 4-3, I differentiate between call-takers with ten or more years of experience 
working for 911—whether at Central Dispatch or another dispatch center—and those 
with less than ten years of experience. Although we might expect that call-takers with 
less job experience are more likely to enter calls as high priority because of the anxiety 
and apprehension that comes with inexperience—much like how my own excitability 
during the call in the opening field note led me to classify the incident as a breaking and 
entering and fail to probe the caller—Figure 4-3 does not show a clear pattern between 
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job experience and a call-taker’s propensity to classify a call high priority. It is simply not 
the case that employees with less experience treat calls differently than their co-workers.  
Figure 4-3 Call-Taker Fixed Effects from IV First Stage by Amount of Job Experience 
 
 
I also present call-taker estimates by job position to see whether being a part-time 
call-taker versus a full-time call-taker/dispatcher is associated with alarmism. In Figure 4-
4, I differentiate the seven part-timers who only answer phones from the twenty-four full-
timers who rotate between answering phones and dispatching the police. Figure 4-4 
suggests that relative to the average call-taker, part-time call-takers exhibit higher levels 
of alarmism when classifying calls. Given the differences in training between part-time 
and full-time call-takers, these findings strongly suggest that organizational practices play 
a role in shaping how call-takers appraise risk and classify calls.  
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Figure 4-4 Call-Taker Fixed Effects from IV First Stage by Job Position 
 
 
In addition to undergoing a shorter training period, part-timers also may be more 
alarmist because they do not deal with the consequences of entering high priority calls in 
the same way as dispatchers. Dispatchers understand that high priority calls pull police 
resources away from other incidents and elevate officer safety risks. Moreover, 
dispatchers bear the brunt of embarrassment over the radio when sending police to high 
priority calls that could have been avoided with more probing.    
It is difficult to ascertain from the model whether the part-time call-takers are 
actually more accurate in classifying calls than full-timers; however, experiences from 
Central Dispatch suggest this likely is not the case. Indeed, during my time at the 
dispatch center full-timers frequently voiced discontent about part-timers’ quality of 
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work. John, a full-timer with over ten years of job experience, expressed this frustration 
to me saying that part-timers lack knowledge about the laws and this causes them to 
“drop stupid shit in when our boards are full.” Lisa, another full-timer with over ten years 
of job experience, told me that part-timers put in wrong call types and are basically 
incompetent. These observations suggest that call-takers who escalate risk are recognized 
as less competent when carrying out key job functions.  
 
Causal Effects of Call Classification on Police Outcomes 
Table 4-6 reports the effects of call-taker alarmism on policing in the field. 
Column 1 shows the effects of call classification on the likelihood of a police officer 
verifying the incident as high priority once at the scene. The 2SLS estimates indicate that 
classifying a call as high priority increases the likelihood of police verifying the incident 
as high priority by 21.9 percentage points. This effect is significant and large in 
magnitude. In standard deviation terms, a one standard deviation increase in call-taker 
alarmism (2.3 percentage points) increases the likelihood the police classify the incident 
as high priority by 0.5 percentage points.  
Column 2 reports the effects of call classification on the likelihood of arrest. The 
2SLS estimates indicate that classifying a call as high priority significantly increases the 
likelihood of arrest by 12.8 percentage points. A one standard deviation increase in call-
taker alarmism (2.3 percentage points) increases the likelihood of arrest by 0.3 percentage 
points. Given how rare arrests are in the data—2.6 percent of calls-for-service result in 
arrest—these percentage point changes are substantial in magnitude. 
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Table 4-6 Effects of Call-Taker Alarmism on Police Outcomes from 2SLS 
 (1) (2) 






High Priority Call Classification 0.219** 0.128* 
   (0.109) (0.073) 
   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic          78.623 43.687 
Observations 158,918 74,653 
 
Table 4-7 calculates the maximal difference in police response depending on 
whether the officer is responding to a call processed by the least alarmist or most alarmist 
call-taker.5 I find that there is a thirteen percent change in the average propensity for a 
police officer to verify an incident as high priority, depending on whether the least 
alarmist or most alarmist call-taker processed the call. Moreover, there is a thirty-four 
percent change in the average propensity for a police officer to make an arrest depending 
on which type of call-taker processed the call. These are large and significant differences.  
  
 
5 Column 1 reports the unconditional probability of 1) the police verifying an incident as high 
priority (0.114) and 2) the police making an arrest (0.026). Column 2 reports the maximal range 
of call-taker fixed effects (0.070). Column 3 reports the coefficients from the second stage of the 
2SLS model. Column 4 calculates the outcome change by multiplying the 2SLS coefficients by 
the range of call-taker fixed effects. Column 5 generates percent changes in police behavior by 
dividing the outcome change by the unconditional probabilities in Column 1. 
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Table 4-7 Interpreting 2SLS Results- Percent Change in Police Behaviors if Responding to Most Alarmist v. Least 
Alarmist Call-Taker 


















0.114 0.070 0.219*** 0.015 13% 
        
Call-Driven 




This chapter offers three main contributions to our understanding of call-driven 
policing. First, I bring attention to the fact that 911 call-takers systematically differ in risk 
appraisal when handling the same types of calls. This variation supports the idea that call-
takers are more than “information-takers” passing along raw, unmediated information 
from caller to police, but rather are “information-makers” actively participating in the 
construction of events. Moreover, this variation is strong evidence that call-takers deploy 
discretion during the risk appraisal process, which has yet to be systematically 
documented in the literature. Future analyses would benefit from disaggregating high 
priority calls to determine which types are most likely to generate disagreement among 
call-takers. 
Second, documenting call-taker variability offers an important methodological 
contribution to scholars who use call-for-service data to address pressing research 
questions. Studies that use call-for-service data to predict policing hot-spots or 
community needs frequently assume that the data reflect the true nature of the caller’s 
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problem. My findings indicate that because call classification is a complex interactional 
process that reflects both a caller’s request and a call-taker’s discretion, scholars should 
consider including call-taker fixed effects in future analyses.   
 Third, the results presented in this paper strongly suggest that call-takers’ 
underlying level of alarmism when processing calls inside dispatch can impact police 
officer perceptions and behaviors in the field. By using an examiner assignment research 
design, I reveal a previously undocumented mechanism to further help explain police 
behavior. I find evidence that call classification variability impacts how police perceive 
of an incident, through incident verification, and how police behave, through arrest. 
Because the human interpretation of a phone call leads to some amount of imprecision, 
even if police receive information that is accurate on average, my findings imply that 
there is a substantial probability that police receive imprecise information. In the world of 
policing, this heterogeneity can have huge effects in terms of whether an officer draws a 
weapon, makes an arrest, or uses force.  
This chapter raises important normative questions about call-taking. Because the 
analysis uses an internal benchmark, in which call-taker effects are presented in relative 
terms, there is no absolute truth to dictate where call-takers’ average propensities should 
lie. It is possible that the average call-taker is not the desired call-taker. In fact, it is 
highly plausible that call-takers who are less alarmist are desired because they exercise 
restraint in the deployment of police, which is considered beneficial on the grounds of 
parsimony. Of course, the agency would not want to deprive people who need help from 
receiving police services, or underestimate the severity of an incident. But, the fact that 
the agency has rewarded more restrained call-takers suggests that their behavior is 
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desirable. Indeed, awards for “dispatch employee of the year” were presented two years 
in a row to two call-takers who are significantly less alarmist than the average call-taker. 
Moreover, the fact that more alarmist call-takers are overwhelmingly part-timers who 
receive less training and often frustrate their full-time co-workers further suggests that the 
ideal place for a call-taker to lie on the distribution is closer to the bottom.  
Documenting variability in call classification introduces the possibility for policy 
reforms inside dispatch. Because call-takers rarely learn the outcomes of calls, it is nearly 
impossible for call-takers who imprecisely classify calls to learn from their mistakes. One 
policy recommendation would be to check discretion by presenting call-takers with 
performance feedback, specifically by showing them their propensity to classify the same 
types of calls as high priority relative to their co-workers. It is possible that call-takers 
would change their behavior simply from seeing that they differ from the average. 
Another recommendation to check discretion would be to distribute knowledge from the 
less alarmist call-takers to others at the center. Enhanced training exercises in which call-
takers share their knowledge and expertise around call classification with co-workers 
could facilitate organizational learning and improve outcomes. Moreover, when mistakes 
are made, holding debriefing sessions with call-takers, dispatchers, and police could help 
bring call-takers more into line with one another.  
 In the next chapter, I will look more closely at what makes the practice of more 
restrained call-takers distinctive and why some call-takers are less so. I will explore the 
logic and justification for their call-taking practice. This analysis will make it possible to 




Chapter 5: The Organizational Construction of Discretion  
 
 Chapter 5 approaches this dissertation’s overarching research question—how call-
takers mediate caller demands and impact policing in the field—by focusing on the 
dispatch center’s role in shaping call-taker behavior. This chapter expands upon chapters 
3 and 4, which conceptualize the functions of call-taking as gatekeeping and risk 
appraisal, by examining the ways in which organizational rules and logics guide (or fail 
to guide) these critical call-taking functions. Analyzing the organization’s mandates 
reveals that they prioritize organizational goals, such as internal administrative control, 
the provision of customer service, and the protection of officer safety, over community 
goals, such as the appropriate use of police resources and the preservation of the civil 
liberties of the subject of a call. By applying the rules to a set of calls, I bring attention to 
the areas in which they are irrational and produce ethical dilemmas, classification 
struggles, and resource allocation concerns for call-takers. I also describe various forms 
of discretion that call-takers deploy in these complex situations.  
*** 
Complaints from passengers wishing to use the Bagnall to Greenfields bus service that 
“the drivers were speeding past queues of up to 30 people with a smile and a wave of a 
hand” have been met by a statement pointing out that “it is impossible for the drivers to 
keep their timetable if they have to stop for passengers.” – Herman Goldstein, 1979 
 
 Criminologist and law professor, Herman Goldstein, describes a newspaper report 
from the Midlands of England of a bus refusing to pick up passengers in order to stay on 
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schedule. He uses this anecdote to make the point that bureaucratic organizations can 
become so myopically focused on meeting their own internal goals that they lose sight of 
their broader mission. Police organizations, he argues, particularly are at-risk of engaging 
in this kind of narrow thinking.  
 Just as the bus drivers became obsessed with their timetable, so too can police 
become obsessed with operational goals, such as response times. Goldstein writes about 
the fact that police organizations invest heavily in technologies and personnel to reduce 
the amount of time it takes for police to respond to calls for service. He goes on to 
critique their efforts because they overlook the substance of police-work: “Much less 
attention was given in this same period to what the officer does in handling the variety of 
problems he confronts on arriving, albeit fast, where he is summoned” (Goldstein 1979). 
In other words, bureaucracies that value “means over ends” thinking discount substantive 
goals, such as whether an officer’s intervention resolves a caller’s problem or what the 
downstream consequences of an officer’s actions are on the public, in favor of 
accomplishing internal organizational goals.  
 Goldstein’s logic resonates not only with street-level policing, but also inside 
dispatch. As I will show through a detailed analysis of the rulebook in the next section of 
this chapter, dispatch also prioritizes internal goals, such as providing quality customer 
service and preserving officer safety. These certainly are commendable goals. Indeed, 
prior scholars have written about the importance of providing polite customer service to 
911 callers to encourage civic engagement and corporation with the police (Sharp 1985; 
Waste 1989).  
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 Although both goals are admirable pursuits aimed at providing callers with 
respectful interactions and preserving officer life, they can crowd out other call-taking 
functions. This is because calling 911 is not the same as calling a private business, where 
the adage “the customer is always right” holds supreme. Steven Clayman and John 
Heritage put it best when they write, “Calling 911 is not like ordering a pizza” (2002). 
What they mean is that call-taking requires careful assessment of citizen demands to 
properly allocate scarce resources. An outsized focus on customer service can constrain 
the gatekeeping function that is intended to prevent the worst excesses of the 911 system 
from entering the system, and undermine the accuracy of the risk appraisal function, by 
limiting the extent to which caller-takers probe and challenge callers’ requests. Moreover, 
a customer service focus speaks not at all to the ways in which 911 calls can threaten the 
civil liberties of innocent people who are the subject of misguided or malicious calls, or 
the ways call-takers could limit those misuses and abuses.  
 Much like in the case of the bus referenced at the start of this chapter, a 911 
system that is firmly focused on sending the police without serious consideration of the 
relative costs and benefits of doing so yields an unsophisticated public safety system; one 
that prioritizes the needs of the callers and the police over the wider public.  
 The question remains as to how the organization instills these internal goals in 
their workers and whether workers adhere to accomplishing them. Literature from 
organizational studies speaks to these questions. First, written rules are a defining feature 
of formal bureaucracies (Weber 1968). Rules guard against personalistic and ad-hoc 
decision-making by routinizing tasks (Mattson 1989; B. D. Jones 1980; Percy and Scott 
1985). Bryan Jones (1980) describes that organizational decision rules are intended “to 
 118 
codify the repetitive decisions it must make in dealing with recurring situations requiring 
service efforts.” Such rules help to routinize tasks in a “fair” or “just” manner.  
 Rules, however, do not always live up to their promises. First, they seldom cover 
all the complexities and uncertainties of human interactions (Zimmerman and Douglas 
1970). As a result, front-line workers frequently exercise discretion in the performance of 
their duties. Indeed, Michael Lipsky finds that front-line government workers exercise 
considerable discretion when carrying out the day-to-day implementation of public 
programs (1980). He writes that discretion arises under two conditions: 1) when the work 
is too complex to “reduce to programmatic formats,” and 2) when the work requires 
humanistic judgment to respond to unique circumstances. In these situations, rules and 
policies are abstract and fail to provide concrete instruction (Garfinkel 1967). As a result, 
workers may draw on personal attitudes, experiences, and membership in certain identity 
groups to guide their actions (Watkins-Hayes 2009).  
 Second, rules are not always adopted by organizations because they enhance 
performance, but rather because they are institutionalized practices. The key insight of 
the “new institutionalist” perspective in organizational studies is that organizations react 
to uncertainty by adopting organizational features (rules, practices, structure) that they 
see in their environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Some rules are widespread not 
because they are rational, but because they have become “taken for granted” ways of 
doing things (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Rules often become an end in themselves, 
shaping work at the expense of attaining an organization’s overarching purpose (Merton 
1940). It is likely that workers may also exercise discretion when they perceive that a rule 
is irrational or that it falls short. For instance, when internal administrative goals do not 
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align with broader community goals, workers may push back. A study of front-line 
community mental health workers find that they must negotiate competing institutional 
logics—or those packages of “taken for granted” practices and their corresponding 
norms—during service provision (Spitzmueller 2016). In the case of dispatch, call-takers 
who approach call-taking from a gatekeeping orientation might develop a specific set of 
tactics to negotiate accomplishing internal organizational goals, while also limiting the 
public’s latitude over what the police do and where they go. The remainder of this 
chapter investigates these hypotheses.  
 
Methodology  
 The analysis in this chapter relies upon the organization’s formal rulebook, a 
sample of 911 and non-emergency audio recordings, and participant observation field 
notes from my field site. To analyze the rulebook, I employ Strauss and Corbin’s “open 
coding” qualitative data system. Using this method, I generate descriptive codes for each 
rule in the rulebook and then combine similar descriptive codes into broader categories. 
Because I was interested in understanding the exact circumstances in which the rules 
provide sufficient guidance and those in which they do not, I next apply the categories of 
rules to a sample of 159 telephone recordings. This allows me to establish features of the 
contexts in which the rules provide sufficient (or insufficient) governance over call-
taking.  
 Audio recordings also offer insights into the discretionary strategies and tactics 
that call-takers deploy over the telephone. Recordings were transcribed using 
conversation analytic transcription conventions, which capture the details of talk and 
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interaction as it actually occurs, including emphasis, silence, and overlapping speech. 
Drawing from cultural sociology, I use the concept of repertoires, or strategies of action, 
to further analyze call-taker tactics (Swidler 1986). To supplement this analysis, I draw 
on participant observation field notes, which capture call-taker reactions to the kinds of 
challenges and dilemmas that can arise from selectively instructive rules.  
 
The Scope and Limits of Call-Taking Rules  
 Formal call-taking rules vary across dispatch centers because the 911 system does 
not have national standardized operating procedures. Dispatch centers can, however, 
register with the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) to access model 
policies and practices. NENA’s website includes over fifty links with such materials for 
local dispatch centers to adopt. The guidelines established by NENA are intended to 
create some consistency in how calls are handled across communities. My field site 
adopted many of NENA’s model call-taking policies, in addition to crafting supplemental 
organization-specific policies, all of which were provided to me in a rulebook that I was 
expected to study during training, and which served as the basis for discipline. The 
rulebook contained hundreds of pages of directives about uniforms, telephone 
technology, information gathering, and incident classification. 
 A close analysis of the rulebook reveals four primary categories of rules: those 
pertaining to physical appearance, administrative tasks, information extraction, and 
information classification. Appearance and administrative rules comprise a large portion 
of the rulebook and explicitly guide procedural aspects of call-taking. They provide the 
organization ample control over internal matters. In contrast, information extraction and 
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classification rules are only selectively instructive, despite involving the most substantive 
parts of call-taking.  
 This chapter argues that rules aimed at guiding the more substantive call-taking 
tasks fail to appreciate the critical gatekeeping and risk appraisal functions that call-takers 
play. This results in selectively instructive rules that do not encompass many of the 
complicated realities call-takers face. More specifically, the rules fail to instruct call-
takers to probe or challenge callers’ claims—a skill that prior scholars have shown call-
takers to use when determining whether a call requires police attention. Furthermore, the 
rules are silent about how call-takers can and should appraise risk in sophisticated ways. 
Instead, the rules encourage call-takers to send the police to nearly all requests and, at 
times, upgrade ambiguous responses. Moreover, the rules largely are focused on 
preserving officer safety relative to preserving the civil liberties of the subject of a call.  
   
Appearance Rules 
 Despite 911 call-takers invisibly operating with the public, rules about proper 
physical appearance are among the first taught to new hires. Rules about physical 
appearance are explicit, detailed, strict, and come with clear consequences if broken. 
Nearly every aspect of a call-taker’s appearance is governed by the formal rulebook.  
 During my first week of training, I sat in a small white-walled room inside 
Central Dispatch with my training supervisor Louis—a wiry 6’0” white male in his early 
thirties with buzzed blonde hair. With my long hair running down my back, I read aloud: 
“Long hair will be pinned or held back so as to not cover the eyes or eyebrow, or the 
collar in the back…long hair must be tied back so it doesn’t hang over the shoulder in 
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front or touch the uniform collar. Ribbons are not permitted.” I went on to read about 
hairstyles for male employees: “Hair will be maintained in a tapered and styled manner. 
When combed, hair may not fall over the eyes in the front, or over the ears on the side, or 
over the collar in the back. Afros two inches long or less are permitted.” Much to my 
surprise, I was also schooled in facial hair: “A neatly trimmed mustache is permitted. It 
may extend outward by ½ inch from the line separating the skin and the vermilion part of 
the lip. The mustache may fall to a line parallel with the bottom of the lower lip. Beards 
and goatees are not permitted.” The rulebook stated that compliance is mandatory and 
failure to comply may result in corrective discipline “up to and including discharge.” 
 The rulebook also provided specific dress standard guidelines. I read how all staff 
must wear department issued tactical shirts with agency shoulder patches, badges, and 
nametags, cargo pocket trousers, and black leather belts. Department issued uniforms 
must be purchased from a local uniform supply store. Uniform maintenance is the 
responsibility of the call-taker. For example, the black leather belts “must be maintained 
in good repair and kept polished.” In response to a slew of uniform infractions, 
management distributed the following list of appearance concerns to employees: 
  Areas of concern include: missing buttons need to be replaced, black  
  shoes/boots need to be in good order (polished/clean) and tied, shirts must  
  be tucked in regardless of hem length, belts need to be worn with  
  pants, uniform should be in clean, neat and serviceable condition (free  
  from stains, tears or signs of wear), and patches should be completely  
  sewn tightly to clothing.  
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Management reiterated the enforceability of appearance rules in the same 
correspondence. They wrote, “Supervisors will conduct regular and at times, random, 
uniform inspections. Staff will have an opportunity to correct the issue; however, 
continued non-compliance will result in disciplinary action.” I draw attention to this 
correspondence because it highlights the level of attention that the organization spends on 
having call-takers accomplish certain internal goals.   
 
Administrative Rules  
 Administrative rules instruct call-takers in the performance of tasks related to 
basic, mechanical 911 operations. Specifically, they include rules about the proper use of 
technology, phone etiquette, and law enforcement lingo. Directives are clear and 
thorough, and the tasks themselves relatively unambiguous.  
 A significant chunk of the rulebook includes detailed instructions and exercises 
aimed at instructing call-takers about how to operate the equipment and technology inside 
dispatch. The training manual contains 153 task modules that instruct call-takers on 
everything from turning on the wireless phone transmitter to logging into the computer to 
rebidding a phone number for more accurate location information. Each task module is 
straightforward with specific instructions on the more mechanical aspects of call-taking. 
For example, a typical directive might read as follows, “Attach the wireless headset to the 
matching remote unit. Check that the on-off indicator located at the top of the remote unit 
is flashing green. If the on-off indicator is not flashing green, press the on-off indicator 
and wait up to 45 seconds for the unit to connect.” A call-taker would then practice this 
skill multiple times to learn how to properly operate their wireless phone transmitter. 
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 Administrative rules also instruct call-takers in proper phone etiquette. The 
rulebook provides directions with specific language call-takers must use when answering 
calls. For example, the rules read that a call-taker “shall answer 911 calls with ‘911, 
where is your emergency?’ and non-emergency calls with, “Central Dispatch, last name 
or badge number.” Proper phone etiquette also involves speaking politely and 
courteously. Specifically, the rules read, “Employees shall be courteous, informative, and 
attentive when answering and responding to telephone calls and inquiries. Employees are 
required to be as helpful and attentive as necessary to properly process requests, referrals, 
questions and information.” The key adjectives in this directive—such as “courteous,” 
“informative,” “attentive,” and “helpful”— signal to call-takers that the organization 
values the provision of customer service.  
 The rules also teach call-takers to use police lingo. One of the first things call-
takers must memorize is the Los Angeles Police Department phonetic alphabet. The 
phonetic alphabet is used to make communications uniform and reduce 
misunderstandings. A call-taker may confirm a caller’s last name “Hall” by repeating 
Henry-Adam-Lincoln-Lincoln, rather than H-A-L-L. This style of speaking differentiates 
call-takers from the regular public and increases their identification with the police. Call-
takers are also instructed to use appropriate abbreviations when recording information in 
the CAD system. For example, phrases like OTW (i.e. on the way), TOT (i.e. transferred 
caller), CONS/ALERT/BREATHING (i.e. it is not a life or death medical emergency), 
OCC X1 (i.e., a vehicle has one occupant) are frequently used by call-takers to efficiently 
transfer information. Improper use of abbreviations creates confusion and frustration 
inside dispatch.  
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 Thus far, I have shown that the rulebook provides call-takers with strict and 
specific guidance concerning a wide-range of administrative tasks—such as how to dress 
as members of law enforcement, successfully transfer a caller, and properly abbreviate 
important phrases. However, as evidenced by the analysis of the Gates’ 911 call in 
Chapter 3, often the most challenging aspects of call-taking arise not over procedural 
tasks, but over tasks related to the substance of a call. One such task involves extracting 
information from callers.  
 
Extraction Rules  
 The rulebook recognizes information extraction as a critical call-taking duty and 
includes several directives instructing call-takers to extract routine incident information. 
Routine incident information includes the location of the emergency, the caller’s name 
and phone number, the time of the emergency, suspect descriptions (if there are any 
suspects), the type of incident, and whether the caller wants contact with the police. 
These are critical pieces of information for responding police officers; so critical that 
even when a caller is hysterical, angry, confused, or unable to speak freely, call-takers are 
taught that they still should endeavor to extract such information.   
 Although the rulebook provides some important guidance about the extraction of 
routine incident information, it remains silent on investigatory questioning. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, scholars primarily have conceived of the call-taking function as involving 
gatekeeping. Gatekeeping involves preventing inappropriate or misguided requests from 
receiving police attention. In order to carry out the gatekeeping function, prior research 
finds that call-takers engage in investigatory questioning when on the telephone. 
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Investigatory questions are aimed at determining why police assistance is required and 
“enable the call-taker to determine whether the problem is actionable, and hence whether 
the request should be granted in the first place” (Heritage and Clayman 2010; Whalen, 
Zimmerman, and Whalen 1988). Because callers can make malicious, irrational, and 
mistaken reports to 911, scholars find that call-takers “probe reports that are excessively 
vague” (Heritage and Clayman 2010). Despite the important role investigatory 
questioning can play in call-taking, the rulebook at my field site does not provide formal 
guidance about how or when to engage in this work.  
 The rulebook’s only mention of extracting information beyond that gathered 
during routine questioning involves questions related to protecting the safety of the 
responding officer. This information is referred to as officer safety information and is 
used to prepare officers for potential risks at the scene. The rulebook instructs call-takers 
to ask questions about whether anyone has been drinking or taking drugs, if anyone has a 
weapon, whether anyone will be combative with the police, and if there is any other 
information that could help keep the responding officers safe. Moreover, call-takers are 
instructed to document any pertinent information regarding previous calls from a caller’s 
location—such as whether the caller owns a gun or was combative with police in the 
past—to further promote officer safety.  
 Officer safety information is undoubtedly important for protecting the lives of 
first-responders, but the rulebook’s preoccupation with officer safety does not carry over 
to subject safety. During training, I was presented with sobering statistics on the number 
of officers killed in the line of duty and frequently reminded of the risks officers face in 
the field. Notably missing from training was any discussion about the frequency with 
 127 
which police are summoned by callers to check on innocent individuals or how such calls 
might contribute to racial and socioeconomic disparities in who receives police attention. 
Also missing was any mention of tactics call-takers might deploy to protect people from 
unnecessary police contact. Although my field site offered training around issues of race 
and civil liberties to deputies, during my time in the field such training did not extend to 
the call center (since my departure from the field in 2018 the organization has 
implemented implicit bias training for call-takers and dispatchers).  
 The lack of rulebook guidance on investigatory questioning and subject safety 
reflects an organizational logic centered not on gatekeeping, but on customer service. A 
customer service orientation to call-taking presumes a high level of caller entitlement to 
police services and does not encourage probing or challenging of callers’ claims. This 
orientation is captured in the rulebook language, which states that call-takers, “Shall 
make every reasonable attempt to satisfy the caller’s request.” This customer service 
focus is reinforced during training both by an absence of discussion about the 
gatekeeping function, and by explicit talk from supervisors about the importance of 
providing quality service to callers.  
 A customer service culture does not mean that no call-takers engage in 
investigatory questioning, but if they do it is the result of on-the-job experience instead of 
formal rules or policies. Indeed, I find that a subset of call-takers approach callers with a 
high level of skepticism and expect callers to provide justification before sending police 
services. These call-takers reject the notion that police can solve every problem. Laurie, a 
veteran call-taker, captured this sentiment when explaining, “Some things you just have 
to solve by yourself and the police can’t help you.” Paul, another veteran dispatcher 
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explained, “A lot of time we are just passing the buck by saying ‘oh yeah the police will 
respond’ and the police get there and say ‘look we can’t help you.’” He cautioned me 
against embracing the “pass the buck” mentality as it wastes resources and can lead to 
negative experiences for callers who wait for the police only to be told that the police 
cannot help them. According to Paul, the organization used to embrace more of a 
gatekeeping orientation toward call-taking: “Four or five years ago training was really 
different. People were trained to put in the least possible calls. Now we are trained to 
drop all the calls in, and that creates tension between call-takers and dispatchers because 
they have to dispatch calls they don’t want to dispatch.” I will describe some of these 
tensions later in the chapter when I apply the rules to calls from the field.  
 In the case of a call-taker being skeptical or concerned about a caller’s request for 
police services, formal policies do not encourage call-takers to do anything beyond 
simply sending the police. Aside from civil calls (i.e., a call involving a private dispute 
between individuals and businesses), misdials, and prank calls, the rulebook does not 
explicate other scenarios in which police services can or should be denied or challenged. 
Rather, the rulebook encourages call-takers to use their discretion to send the police “in 
any situation where the call-taker believes an emergency situation may exist.” The 
organization stresses that liability can arise from not sending the police and advances the 
motto, “When in doubt, send them out” (them being the police). Call-takers who embrace 
a gatekeeping orientation, like Paul and Laurie, informally push back against 
management’s motto with their own motto, “When in doubt, close it out” (it being the 
incident).  
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Classification Rules  
 Another critical call-taking task involves distilling extracted information into a 
single incident type. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, an incident type captures both the 
nature and severity of a caller’s problem and shapes police responses. The formal 
rulebook defines each incident type. Full definitions can be found in Table 2 in the 
Appendix.  
 The rulebook includes definitions for over one hundred incident types to guide 
call-taker incident classification, but only a small fraction provides call-takers with 
specific criteria to assist in this process. Rulebook definitions are clear and concrete for a 
select number of incident types, often those involving serious crime or quality of life 
issues. For example, the rulebook states that for a call-taker to classify an incident as a 
“felonious assault” the caller must express that a deadly weapon is present. If a deadly 
weapon—such as a gun or knife—is not present, then the call would not meet the criteria 
for a felonious assault classification. Similarly, for a call to be classified as a “domestic” 
it requires a physical assault and an established relationship between the two parties (e.g., 
spouse, ex-spouse, child in common, dating, resident or former resident of the same 
household). If a physical assault occurred, but no domestic relationship exists between 
the two parties, then the rulebook indicates that the call should be classified as an “assault 
and battery.” Quality of life incidents such as blocked driveways, barking dogs, or loud 
music are also well-defined in the rulebook and leave little space for interpretation. In 
these kinds of situations, the rulebook provides sufficient guidance by introducing a 
degree of objectivity into the classification process.  
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 Many incident types, however, do not include clear-cut criteria and this can result 
in caller biases entering the call-taking process. This issue is particularly acute when 
considering suspicious person calls. By defining a “suspicious” as “any 
incident/situation/person/vehicle that is determined to be suspicious in nature by the 
caller,” the rulebook explicitly delegates classification authority away from the call-taker 
and towards the caller. In some situations, deferring to the caller, who is at the scene and 
can observe firsthand what is happening, is perfectly logical. But, the rules provide little 
recourse for call-takers who may become wary of a caller’s motivation. The “suspicious” 
definition leaves call-takers with no method of preventing calls involving children 
mowing lawns, students napping in common rooms, or politicians canvassing 
neighborhoods from receiving police dispatches—all which callers found suspicious and 
police responded to in recent years.  
 Incident types such as family troubles, disorderly behavior, emotionally disturbed 
persons, welfare checks, and neighbor troubles also can introduce high levels of caller 
subjectivity to the classification process. For example, the rulebook defines a 
“disorderly” as “any situation that threatens to disturb the public peace or a subject(s) 
behaving in a disruptive manner to themselves or others.” Because this definition is 
relatively vague and lacks criteria around “disturbing the public peace” or “being 
disruptive,” a disorderly can include a wide variety of activities. The controversial 
Philadelphia Starbucks incident described in Chapter 1 highlights how something as 
benign as waiting in a coffee shop can be considered disorderly. Moreover, welfare 
checks—defined as “requests to check the well-being of a citizen based on a possibility 
of endangerment not directly involved in a crime”—also introduce a degree of 
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subjectivity into classification. The possibility of endangerment can be widely interpreted 
by callers and call-takers. Indeed, the wide scope of this definition led me to classify a 
report of a male walking on the side of the road in pajamas as a welfare check, despite 
my concerns over whether the call warranted police attention.  
Training about classification rules encourages call-takers to apply the highest 
priority incident type when there is a possibility of escalation. Potential for incident 
escalation is shaped by caller statements, prior call history, and caller location. Though 
not part of the formal rulebook, training materials at my field site encouraged using caller 
location to guide incident classification. My training supervisor spoke about how 
majority black and low-income areas of the county have the highest volume of calls and 
have “a higher chance of escalation because people have guns and stuff.” Despite 
comprising a relatively modest share of the county’s geography, these majority black and 
low-income neighborhoods dominated my training. Six of the nine neighborhood maps 
that I was instructed to memorize were of these areas. Furthermore, at least half of a 
mandatory eight-hour geography tour of the county was spent driving through these 
neighborhoods with supervisors pointing out specific addresses where police had trouble 
with violent crime, gang activity, and drug use. I observed how their notions of place, 
which were not unfounded given prior events, could lead call-takers to make broad 
generalizations about the people and incidents in these neighborhoods.  
 In the next section, I apply the extraction and classification rules to a set of calls 
from the field to illuminate the moral dilemmas, resource allocation problems, and uses 
of discretion that can arise. 
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Applying the Rulebook to Calls from the Field 
 
Contexts in which Call-Taking Dilemmas are Rare 
 Extraction and assessment rules are particularly instructive under three 
conditions: 1) when the nature of a caller’s problem is presented as an organizationally 
relevant category, 2) when the categories themselves have criteria driven definitions that 
limit caller subjectivity, and 3) when the caller is asking for direct assistance for 
themselves. These conditions are not specific to any one incident type, rather they can 
exist under a wide range of incident types and across priority levels—from felonious 
assaults to parking complaints. In these situations, rules that guide call-takers to extract 
routine information are more than sufficient to help them process and classify incidents. 
The examples below showcase a set of calls that meet the conditions listed above. 
Analysis of these calls will reveal that the rules are effective because the calls are 
processed efficiently and interactional troubles between the caller and call-taker do not 
arise.  
 In the following extract, a woman calls 911 to report that her car was broken into 
while she was out shopping.  
Extract 01: The Larceny from Auto 
 
01    911:      Nine one one where is your emergency, 
02    CLR:      Hi. I’m uh on (beep) my car was just broken into  
03      while I was in a store, 
04    911:      Mmkay. Where (.) did this happen=what address 
05    CLR:      I’m at Sally Beauty Supply ((redaction beeping)) 
06    911:      <Sally Beauty Supply> ((typing)) What kind of car is  
07                 it, 
08    CLR:      It’s a green Toyota Camry, 
09    911:      °Green° (.) ((typing))  
10                (…) 
28    911:      Ohkay, well we will have the police drive over there  
29              and they can meet you:: um near the vehicle. 
30    CLR:      Okay.  
                (…) 
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In line 02, the caller states the nature of her problem in language that is congruent with 
the rulebook definition of a “larceny from auto.” The rulebook defines a larceny from 
auto as the “taking and carrying away of the tangible personal property from the 
automobile of another with the intent to deprive him or her of its possession 
permanently.” Because a larceny from auto is a criminal act and within the purview of the 
police, the call-taker immediately affirms the nature of the caller’s problem with an 
“mmkay” in line 03. The call-taker then launches into a series of routine questions about 
the location of the incident and vehicle description for the responding officers to contact 
the caller. She ends the call with a promise of police assistance.  
 The call-taker does not need to exert any effort to interpret or transform the 
caller’s problem into an organizationally relevant category because the caller has done so 
for her. Moreover, because the caller is directly involved in the problem the call-taker has 
little reason to question the caller’s legitimacy. She is not a bystander who happened to 
notice a car in the parking lot with its door open, rather it is her vehicle and she knows 
that it was broken into. For these reasons, following the extraction and classification rules 
is sufficient to smoothly process this caller’s request. 
 In the next extract, a male calls the non-emergency line to report a car blocking a 
driveway.  
Extract 02: The Blocked Driveway 
 
01    CLR:      Yah we have a car blocking the driveway. 
02    911:      Whatsa address hhh.  
03    CLR:      ((Redaction beep::)) 
04    911:      Yer name. 
05    CLR:      ((Redaction beep:::)) 
06    911:      D’you want the vehicle towed or ticketed. 
07    CLR:      Well let’s start with a ticket=if it’s still here later 
08              in the day we’l-I’ll call ya back for a tow job:.  
09    911:      K:: What kinda car is it hhhh 
10    CLR:      Its ah:: sil:ver Saa:b S:U:V:. 
11    911:      A’right. >We’ll get ^some:body out there< 
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12    CLR:      Th’you. 
13    911:      Thanks=bye. 
 
 
Much like the vehicle break-in above, the caller in this extract also presents his problem 
using language that aligns with a pre-existing incident type. Because of the congruence 
between the caller’s problem and the rulebook definition of a “parking complaint,” the 
call-taker moves the call forward and initiates routine information extraction. Even 
though the caller does not specify whether the blocked driveway is his own or 
another’s—he says “we have a car blocking the driveway”—the call-taker does not stop 
to clarify the point as the rules do not require the caller’s own driveway be blocked for a 
police dispatch. Instead, she moves forward and asks for the address, the caller’s name, 
and then provides the caller with an option for the police to ticket or tow the car. It is 
interesting to note that the call-taker defers to the caller about how the police should 
handle the illegally parked car. The call-taker does not need to exercise judgment in this 
call. 
 The following non-emergency call is from a woman who returned home and 
found her apartment broken into and her items moved and missing.   
Extract 03: The Break-In 
              
01    911:      Central Dispatch ((redaction)) 
02    CLR:      .hh Hi ((redaction beep)) home in my apartment complex  
03              and someone has broken in, they’re no longer here: but 
04              I jus kinda want to make a report about it an shits all  
05              over the place. 
06    911:      What is your address. 
07    CLR:      ((redaction beep)) (.3) Nothings like dam:aged but   
08              shits   
09              definitely moved and mis:sing, 
10    911:      Ohkay: yup we can definitely send out the p’lice=you’re   
11              in (beep) township? 
                (…) 
 
 In lines 02-04, the caller both defines the nature of her problem and severity of 
her problem in organizationally relevant terms. She explains that her apartment was 
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broken into, which helps the call-taker to classify the incident as a “breaking and 
entering,” and she makes clear that the intruders are no longer in the house, which lowers 
the priority level. In line 06, the call-taker moves forward with routine questions and asks 
for the caller’s address. The caller elaborates on the condition of her apartment to further 
justify her problem description, but because the call has already met the threshold for a 
breaking and entering the call-taker assures her that the police will “definitely” be sent 
out. This is another situation in which we see little need for call-taker judgment or 
discretion as the rules are highly effective.  
 Although the examples above highlight low difficulty situations that come from 
callers immediately presenting their problems in organizationally relevant ways, the next 
extract shows how even when callers do not do this call-takers can use criteria to quickly 
align with callers. In extract 04, a man calls 911 to report that the mother of his child just 
attacked him.  
Extract 04: The Attack 
 
                (…)  
01    911:      Sir what’s going on? 
02    CLR:      Uh:: (.) I jus got into it with my my baby motha. 
03    911:      You jus did what? 
04    CLR:      I I I got into an argument with baby motha. 
05    911:      Oh:kay what what happened? 
06    CLR:      She she attacked me.  
07    911:      Whadya mean attacked you? 
08    CLR:      She attacked me uh physically attacked me and my my  
09              mother. 
10    911:      Okay. What’s your [name?  
11    CLR:                        [Mah nephew] and mah sister 
12    911:      What’s your name.               
                (…) 
 
This caller does not initially present his problem in way that aligns with pre-existing 
incident types. In line 01, the call-taker asks about the nature of the problem and the 
caller responds that he “just got into it” with the mother of his child. The call-taker 
invites clarification by asking about the nature of the problem again. This time the caller 
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responds that he got into an “argument,” but again “argument” is not congruent with an 
existing incident type. The caller then says he was attacked and uses the word 
“physically.” At this point, the caller’s problem aligns with a pre-existing category 
because it involves a physical assault and the two parties have a child in common. 
Despite the call-taker having to ask clarifying questions in this call, ultimately the criteria 
in the rulebook around domestic violence incidents provide her the guidance she needs to 
appropriately classify the caller’s problem.  
 Occasionally, a caller’s request is so beyond the pale that even though the 
rulebook does not offer specific guidance, and the call does not meet the three criteria 
established at the start of this section, it is still clear to the call-taker that a dispatch is not 
appropriate. For example, I denied a request from a caller to have the police review video 
footage from a local grocery store to prove his wife’s innocence after she was accused by 
a store clerk of opening a rotisserie chicken container and taking a bite out of the bird 
while shopping; from a caller claiming her house was inhabited by ghosts; and from a 
caller scared of a possum outside his front door. In each of these situations, I felt 
comfortable rejecting requests for assistance because the nature of the request was far 
outside the purview of the police.  
 
Contexts in which Call-Taking Dilemmas Arise 
 Not all calls progress as smoothly and efficiently as the ones outlined above. 
Indeed, many calls raise issues for call-takers, such as classification conundrums, moral 
dilemmas, and resource allocation problems. In the following section, I present a series of 
field notes and call extracts that highlight how the rules can contribute to such issues and 
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the ways in which call-takers use their discretion to manage them. I find that some call-
takers engage in a series of discretionary tactics, including, asking investigatory 
questions, proposing alternate hypotheses about an incident, writing an incident narrative 
that conveys a call-taker’s uncertainty or concern to a dispatcher, downgrading an 
incident, or simply not promising police assistance. Deploying these tactics takes 
additional work on the part of the call-taker; work that the organization does not formally 
govern or explicitly embrace. 
 I open this section by describing an incident in which my own failure to probe a 
caller’s claim about two stolen bicycles contributed to an unnecessary encounter between 
an innocent Black man and the police. This incident occurred towards the end of my first 
year working as a call-taker; a period when I still fastidiously followed the rules and 
prioritized customer service.  
 A call came in Friday afternoon from a white male (based on verbal cues) 
in a predominately white neighborhood who said he just saw a guy steal two bikes 
and then hop on a city bus headed downtown. I followed call-taker protocol 
asking routine questions such as the suspect’s race, age, clothing description, and 
direction of travel. The caller said the man looked to be a Black male in his 
twenties. I dropped the call in the screen as a larceny in progress. 
 The dispatcher immediately assigned officers to the call and then yelled 
over to verify that I had spoken with the victim of the crime. I realized that I had 
not spoken to the victim, but rather a neighbor who happened to be looking out 
his window and saw this happen. The dispatcher asked me, “How does he know 
the bikes were being stolen?” I got flustered because I knew I didn’t have a good 
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response other than that the caller said, “It looks like he’s stealing them.” The 
dispatcher asked if the caller had seen any tools like bolt cutters. I again had no 
response. Laurie yelled out that it was a call about someone being of a “darker 
persuasion.” In other words, in her mind it was a racist, bullshit call. Minutes 
later the officers stopped the man at the bus station and then radioed in that the 
bikes belonged to the “suspect.” (Field notes 6/2/2017) 
 Although it was not irrational for the police to check on this situation given the 
caller’s statements, my handling of the call may have been. By extracting only routine 
information and failing to pause and investigate the caller’s assertions, I initiated an 
unnecessary, emergent “lights and sirens” response with multiple police units following a 
bus through City A. My veteran co-workers were frustrated because in their eyes I could 
have handled the call differently. I had the power to clarify the caller’s relation to the 
problem, to ask what made him think the bicycles were being stolen, and to enter the 
incident as a lower priority incident like a suspicious circumstance. As a novice call-
taker, my reactions to this call were informed by the rulebook and training, neither of 
which empowered me to act in the ways my senior colleagues desired and instead taught 
me to defer to the caller. Only after the incident ended did I realize how the rules and 
training exacerbated the caller’s report.    
 As I gained job experience, I started to become more skeptical of caller demands, 
especially those that involved complaints about suspicious persons. This skepticism 
prompted me to work harder to investigate callers’ claim and classify incidents 
differently. The next field note captures aspects of my growth.  
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I was working the 3 pm to 3 am shift one night in late February when a guy called 
from downtown to report a black man acting “suspiciously.” The caller sounded like he 
was a young, white male. I asked him what was going on and he replied that a 300-pound 
black man was holding a plastic bag and ducking in and out of alleyways. He found this 
behavior odd. I briefly wondered to myself if the reason he found this behavior odd had 
to do with the race of the man, but before I could question the caller’s motives he stated 
that the man “possibly had a gun.” 
Entering a suspicious person call is one thing, but entering a man gun call, the 
highest priority of calls, is a big deal. I knew by now that it wasn’t part of my job to 
consider the safety or civil liberties of the subject of the call—we really were only 
accountable to the caller—but I was still cautious before entering a man gun call. It 
would set in motion a “lights and sirens” response with five to seven police cars and 
officers who were primed for a more intense encounter. Before making a classification 
decision, I tried to extract more information from the caller. I asked, “Did you see a 
gun?” to which the caller replied, “No, but he could have one.” I thought to myself he 
COULD have one. Anyone COULD have a gun. The caller did not provide any further 
evidence to support his assertion.  
I hung up and faced a classification dilemma. The caller had said, on a recorded 
line, that the man might have a gun. I would be remiss to overlook his statement. But, at 
the same time, sending the police to a man gun call without the caller being able to 
describe the gun or having actually seen it ran the risk of priming the police for an overly 
aggressive encounter with a Black man. I decided to opt for a lower-priority 
“suspicious” classification because no gun was visible. Though, I was careful to type 
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into the narrative report for the dispatcher and responding officers that the, “Caller 
stated the subject possibly had a gun, but did not see any gun.” I also yelled over to the 
dispatcher to double-check that she saw my message about the gun, and reiterated that it 
was unlikely the subject had one.  
Unlike in the bicycle call described above, in this incident I paused to consider the 
potential consequences of my actions on the safety of the subject of the call. Although the 
lessons from formal training, and my own inexperience as a part-time call-taker, would 
likely have led me to enter the call as a high-priority “man gun”—especially because the 
incident was in an area of the county prone to violent crime—I instead deployed several 
tactics to de-escalate the incident. First, I questioned the caller about whether he had seen 
the purported gun. With hindsight, I also should have asked why the caller believed that 
the man had a gun. Second, I chose to downgrade the incident to a suspicious incident. 
Third, I used the narrative screen to clarify that the caller mentioned a gun but did not see 
one. The strategies I used came not from formal training or rulebooks, but from observing 
senior colleagues and learning from my own mistakes. This incident illuminates several 
ways in which call-takers can limit the extent of authority the 911 system delegates to 
callers and shape police responses.  
 Calls about suspicious persons, like the one described above, are not aberrations. 
In 2015, suspicious person calls were the fourth most common call at my field site, 
following reckless drivers, car crashes, and disorderly behavior. The next call describes 
another purported suspicious circumstance involving possible drug activity at a local 
park. Because the caller provides scant evidence to support her assertion that a Black 
woman is using the park grill to cook drugs, the call raises moral dilemmas and resource 
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allocation issues for the call-taker about whether the police should be sent at all. Despite 
the call-taker’s fears that sending the police will generate a racially biased police 
encounter, and that it will waste police resources, the call-taker ultimately decides to send 
the police.  
Extract 05: The Woman Grilling 
            
01    911:      Nine one one: where is your emergency, 
02    CLR:      Uhm: (beep) Park:=actually I don’t know if it’s an  
03              emergency .hh 
04    911:      Oh::kay:: (beep) Park in (beep)? 
05 CLR:      Yes hh. 
06    911:      What’s going on there. 
07    CLR:      Um there’s a woman ah using the park grill to cook (.)   
08              something that m:ight be drugs. 
09              (…) 
10    CLR:      Um I’ve seen her here before and I thought it was weird 
11              and ah its cold out and um so it looks it looks   
12              suspicious l-last time I saw her but now it looks (.)  
13              more suspicious ((sniff)) 
           (…) (physical description sequence) 
14    911:      ((typing)) What makes you think its drugs.  
15              (…) 
16    911:      Like do you see:: needles:: [or: any I mean it’s  
17              definitely not foo:d, 
18    CLR:                                  [No.] I don’t I can’t see  
19              it that close. 
20    911:      Ohkay.  
21              (…) 
 
 
 Although the caller dialed 911, she immediately clarifies in line 02 that her 
request likely is not an emergency. The call-taker responds with a drawn out “okay” and 
moves the call forward by asking about the nature of her problem. In lines 07-08, the 
caller explains that a woman is using the park grill and proposes it is to “cook something 
that might be drugs.” The caller justifies this assertion by drawing on prior experiences in 
which she saw the same woman in the park and thought “it was weird.” She further 
advances her claim by saying that the woman looks “more suspicious” than in her 
previous encounter.  
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 In response to this caller’s unconvincing claims, the call-taker attempts to engage 
in investigative questioning. In lines 14-17, the call-taker asks a series of questions 
geared at determining how the caller has come to believe the woman is cooking drugs. 
She first asks the caller, “What makes you think its drugs?” Before waiting for a response 
(which she likely should have done), she launches into a problematizing question—
defined as a question that moves the call in the direction of a bona fide problem for the 
police—and asks whether the caller had observed any drug paraphernalia. She then pivots 
and asks a normalizing question—defined as a question that moves the call in the 
direction of a routine activity that does not require police attention—by asking whether 
the woman simply might be cooking food. The call-taker’s attempt to move the call either 
towards or away from suspicious drug activity fails because the caller responds that she is 
too far away from the grill to observe the items on it. 
 The call-taker must decide whether to mobilize the police because a caller finds a 
Black woman using a grill in a public park in broad daylight to be suspicious, or risk 
disciplinary action for closing out the call without passing it through for a dispatch. 
Despite the caller’s weak justification, especially after admitting that she was not close 
enough to the see the grill’s contents, the call-taker follows the formal rules and customer 
service norms and enters the call for a dispatch. She recognizes the potential social costs 
of the call, but ignores them in an effort to avoid disciplinary action and liability. 
 Minutes after she enters the call into the system, the dispatcher reads the screen 
and is visibly displeased. He yells out, “Are you f’ing kidding me?” From the 
dispatcher’s perspective, the call is “bullshit” and a waste of police resources. He is 
astounded that the call-taker failed so miserably to act as a gatekeeper, especially given 
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the caller’s admission that she could not see what was on the grill. Moreover, he is 
frustrated because now that that call-taker let the request through and generated a call-
for-service record in the computer system, the dispatcher will risk disciplinary action if 
he refuses to send police. The digital records trail will hold him accountable.  
  Despite suspecting that the grill call was going to upset the dispatcher, the call-
taker nevertheless allowed the call through. Fresh in her mind was her co-worker’s 
experience of being disciplined after closing out a call without sending the police. In that 
case, a caller had reported a Black man walking down the street and claimed it was 
suspicious, but did not provide any evidence of suspicious behavior. Management did not 
condone the call-taker’s actions to close the call without a dispatch and communicated as 
such to him. This call-taker did not want to go through a similar experience and, thus, 
erred on the side of caution and sent the police, regardless of the social implications of 
her decision.   
 The next extract also involves a caller summoning the police about suspicious 
behavior. This caller dials 911 to report a “couple of sketchy guys” hanging around his 
neighborhood. The call-taker pushes back before promising assistance, but eventually 
enters the call for a dispatch.  
Extract 07: The Sketchy Guys6 
01    911:      Nine one one what’s the location of your emergency?  
02    CLR:      Yeah. It’s (beep) apartments. I’m calling because   
03              there’s uh a couple of sketchy guys. I called earlier  
04              about this and there are still a couple of sketchy guys  
05              walking around the neighborhood. I don’t know why. They 
06              don’t live here. And no one knows them. And I would   
07              like for you guys to do something cause 
08    911:      Okay, what do they look like?  
09    CLR:      Uh they’re African American. And one has a black hoodie 
10              on and one has a uh gray and black hoodie on, 
 
6 Note that extract 07 is not transcribed in conversation analytic style. This is because I left the 
field with only a conventional transcript of the call, and not with the audio recording. 
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                (…) 
11    911:      Okay. And they’re just in the area? 
12    CLR:      Ya. I don’t know why they’re here. No one knows them  
13              and they’ve been like I think they’re trying to steal 
14              or do something because they aren’t leaving. They lived  
15              behind where I live. Uh. They live in the neighborhood. 
16              The set of apartments next to me. Pretty much the same  
17              neighborhood, but ya know.  
18    911:      Okay. Are they doing anything though besides just  
19              walking or milling around in the area?  
20    CLR:      No. They’re just looking around and I don’t know why.  
21              They’re looking around the neighborhood. I think   
22              they’re waiting for someone to leave or something ya  
23              know. It’s kinda sketchy.  
24              That’s why I’m calling.  
25    911:      Alright. Alright. We’ll have someone head out to that 
26              area.  
 
 
 In line 02, the caller explains that he is calling 911 back because a group of 
“sketchy guys” still is in his neighborhood. He claims that no one knows the men and that 
they do not live in his apartment complex, and then tells the call-taker that he would like 
the police to take care of the matter. The call-taker interrupts the caller in line 08 and asks 
for a physical description of the men. The caller responds that the men are African 
American and wearing hoodies.  
 In response to the caller providing no evidence of actual suspicious behavior, the 
call-taker launches into a series of investigative questions. In line 12, the call-taker 
recycles back the caller’s information in the form of a normalizing question by asking, 
“And they’re just in the area?” His question both prevents the call from moving forward 
and implies that the information the caller has provided thus far does not rise to the level 
of a suspicious incident. The caller then tries to amplify the problem by raising the 
possibility that the men are lingering in the area to steal something. The call-taker does 
not take-up the caller’s mention of a future crime, and instead offers the caller an 
opportunity to clarify whether the men currently are behaving in a suspicious manner: 
“Are they doing anything though besides just walking or milling around in the area?” The 
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call-taker’s use of “though” and “just” suggest that walking and milling around are not 
sufficiently suspicious. The caller responds that the men are “looking around” and 
reiterates that he finds them sketchy. Despite the call-taker’s hesitancy, he relents and 
ends the call by saying that the police will be sent out.   
 Although the caller provides little rationale for why the men are suspicious, other 
than the fact that they exist in his space, the call-taker follows the rules and enters the call 
for service. He faces a difficult choice between promising the police, which can generate 
social costs from unnecessary police contact, and not promising the police, which can 
undermine a potentially legitimate call about a future crime. After disconnecting with the 
caller, both the call-taker, who was in training, and his training supervisor expressed 
frustration. I overheard the training supervisor say, “I hate those calls…So they aren’t 
doing anything but they want us to go out there anyway.” Her comment exemplifies how 
delegating authority to callers to decide what is suspicious can create tension within the 
call center.  
 Even though the call-taker promises the police in this situation, he exercises a 
different form of discretion to make clear that the call likely is inappropriate. He types 
into the narrative screen, “2 BMs (black males) wearing hoodies are loitering in the area. 
Caller thinks they live in a nearby apartment complex but thinks it’s suspicious because 
they keep ‘looking around’. Caller doesn’t want contact.” The call-taker’s wording, 
especially the use of direct quotes from the caller, makes clear to the dispatcher and 
responding officer that the call-taker believes this call lacks legitimacy.  
 The next caller also reports something that she finds odd, but this time the call-
taker finds her request so improbable that he makes no promise of police assistance.  
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Extract 08: The Sleeping Girl 
 
 
01    911:      911 whatsa the location of the emergency? 
02    CLR:      Hi um I didn’t know who to call=this isn’t like an   
03              urgent emergency?  Um (.) I just saw something funny so  
04              I wanted to like call. 
05    911:      Okay what happened? 
06    CLR:      .hh um, it could be nothing=I was in Kroger parking lot   
07              and there were these two guys that got in a car: and it 
08              looked there was um a girl with her head against the  
09              seat passed out:?  So I took the it just looked  
10              funny so I took their license plate number. 
                (…) 
11    911:      And what did you see? 
12    CLR:      Um there was there was two guys getting in the car 
13              and in the back seat there was um it looked like a   
14              girl she had a hood on.  It was a pink coat.  And     
15              like she was fully leaned against the back seat and  
16              like I thought--it looked like she looked passed out. 
                (…) 
17    911:      And did the guys look like they were being suspicious  
18              in any way, or they just went into the store and left  
19              their friend in the car that was sleeping? 
20    CLR:      .hh Uhm: I just saw them like getting in the car  
21              leaving.   
22              (.4) 
23    911:      So they weren’t doing anything suspicious.=They weren’t  
24              like looking around or doing anything they were just  
25              getting in the car?  
26    CLR:      Yeh yeah (short laugh) just getting in the car. 
                (…) 
27    911:      Ohkay.  Thanks for the call. 
28    CLR:      Yep, you’re welcome. 
29    911:      Alright. 
 
In extract 08, the caller reports a woman asleep in the backseat of a car at a local grocery 
story. Before stating the problem, the caller provides several disclaimers—“I didn’t know 
who to call,” “this isn’t like an urgent emergency,” and “I just saw something funny”—
all of which suggests that she realizes her problem likely falls short of what is required to 
mobilize the police. Despite these disclaimers, the call-taker pushes the call forward 
under the presumption that it may still demand police attention. By line 16, the caller 
finally expresses her underlying concern, which is that the woman in the car is 
unconscious and the men may be responsible.     
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 The call-taker reacts to the caller’s claim that the woman is unconscious by 
explicitly asking if the men who exited the car were “being suspicious in any way.” The 
call-taker invites the caller to offer any additional evidence to support her hypothesis. He 
then proposes his own alternate hypothesis that the men simply left their sleeping friend 
in the car while they went grocery shopping. The caller avoids answering his questions 
and instead responds that the men are about to leave. Her attempt to intensify the urgency 
of the call by pointing out that time is running out for the police to arrive does not work. 
The call-taker refuses to move the call forward. Instead, he continues to probe the 
legitimacy of the caller’s problem.  
 In line 23, the call-taker reframes the caller’s problem as entirely innocuous and 
strongly suggests that the men are not behaving suspiciously. He says, “So, they weren’t 
doing anything suspicious.” His downward intonation means that he is making a 
statement, not posing a question. He then offers the caller another opportunity to make 
her case by asking if the men are doing anything strange such as “looking around.” In the 
same turn of talk, he rephrases her observation about the men getting into the car as a 
normalizing question: “They were just getting into the car?” The caller affirms his 
question and then lets out a short chuckle, which suggests she likely is embarrassed by 
the nature of her request after hearing how the call-taker has transformed it into a benign 
occurrence. The call-taker ends the call by thanking her for the information, but making 
no promise of police assistance.  
 Even though the rulebook’s “suspicious” definition encompasses this caller’s 
problem, the call-taker deems it not worthy of police attention. Not only has the caller 
offered no evidence of suspicious behavior, but the fact that the vehicle is leaving the 
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area makes it improbable that the police will arrive in time to check the situation. To limit 
potential fallout from denying the request, the call-taker uses two tactics. First, he 
recycles the caller’s own statements back to her on a recorded line to have her verbally 
agree that the men, in fact, are not acting suspiciously. Second, he avoids explicitly 
saying that the police will not be dispatched, but rather thanks the caller and omits the 
conventional 911 closing that guarantees police response. Again, these tactics are not part 
of any formal instruction, but tools he has developed in service of achieving gatekeeping 
goals.  
 Unlike the call-taker above who refuses a promise of assistance, the next call-
taker sends the police despite being entirely confused as to the nature of the caller’s 
problem. The next extract illustrates an ambiguous situation in which the call-taker has 
difficulty grasping the nature of the caller’s problem. In this rather lengthy exchange, the 
caller dials the non-emergency line to report a man walking near an Applebee’s with a 
box shaped like a gun. The caller presents a problem that could be interpreted as entirely 
innocuous or as extremely serious. 
Extract 09: The Man with the Gun Box 
01    911:      >((redaction beep)) Dispa:tch< ((redaction beep)) 
02    CLR:      Hi ((redaction beep)) .hh uh: there’s a guy uh walkin  
03              right here by Applebee’s=it looks like he just (.)    
04              bought a- (.)bought a gun or sumthing there’s a gun-  
05              gun box. .hh (.) [I just see a 
06    911:                       [It’s a gun] bo::x? 
07    CLR:      A gu- a- a box, 
08    911:      A wh:at? 
09    CLR:      Uh um a- a- bo it’s in the bo:x in the shape of a gun 
10              but he’s walk:in. Eh ah I can’t I can’t tell if it’s a 
11              gun, but it looks like it’s ah .h a bo:x with a gun (.) 
12              (heh) a gun safe in it.  
13    911:      With a gu:n: wha:t? In it? 
14    CLR:      I don’t know if there’s a gun. It’s just a bo:x but it 
15              looks the shape of a gun bo:x (.) It jus seems like if 
16              you just bought a gun you wouldn’t be walkin (.) home 
17              with it. (.5) He’s in ah blue hooded sweatshirt (.)   
18              co:at 
      (…) Locational and physical description questions  
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19    911:      And what uh eh uh and uh what I don’t understand the        
20              what do you mean a gun like a rifle:: type: gun: box::? 
21              Or what size? 
22    CLR:      I’ve I’ve bought guns [and heh heh 
23    911:                            [Okay] 
24    CLR:      It’s a box it looks like what you would buy a gun in               
25              hh. 
                (…) 
26    911:      Yeah. But he wasn’t in Applebee’s or anything right?   
27              [He was just walking by 
28    CLR:      [No. He’s walking] right where the the beggar always  
29              begs for mon:ey.  
30    911:      Ohkay. .hh alright. We can go check em out.((redaction    
31              beep)) 
32              Alright. And what makes you think he’s suspicious other 
33              than that=anything else he was doing that seemed [odd     
34              or unusual? 
35    CLR:                [No.]    
36              I:: just if you’re gonna go buy a gun somewhere I     
37              wouldn’t think that you’d walk to do it.   
                (…) 
 
 In lines 02-04, the caller reports that he sees a man walking near Applebee’s and 
posits that the man just bought a gun because he is walking with a gun-shaped box. The 
call-taker immediately is confused by the term “gun box” and asks for further 
clarification. Interactional troubles ensue in lines 06-18 because the call-taker does not 
grasp whether the subject has a gun or simply a box. Nor, does she understand how the 
man can know what is inside the box.  
 After extracting routine location information and a physical description of the 
man (not shown in the extract), the call-taker returns to the matter of the gun box in lines 
19-20. She explicitly states that she does not understand how the caller can know that the 
box contains a gun. She invites clarification by asking whether it is a “rifle type gun 
box,” as a distinct rifle shape might lend support to the caller’s assertion. The caller 
responds by drawing on his personal experience of gun buying as reason for why the call-
taker should trust his assessment.   
 The caller’s problem creates further confusion for the call-taker because Michigan 
is an open carry state, meaning residents can open carry a gun without a concealed carry 
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permit. This means that it is not necessarily criminal for the man to be walking with a 
gun, especially if it is in a secured box, and thus the entire call is potentially irrelevant to 
the police. However, because there is a possibility that the man is on his way to shoot 
someone, or shoot several people inside the Applebee’s, the call-taker is wary and 
engages in a series of investigatory questions. In line 26, she tests out her active shooter 
hypothesis by clarifying that, “He wasn’t in Applebee’s or anything right?” This 
question, while seeming to be a routine location question, likely is geared at assessing the 
potential safety risk the man poses. The caller responds that the man is not inside the 
business.  
 Line 30 appears to be the close of the call because the call-taker makes a promise 
of assistance; however, evidently, the call-taker still is unsure of the risk the man poses 
because she returns to clarifying the nature of the problem one last time. In lines 32-34, 
the call-taker asks another investigative question: “What makes you think he’s 
suspicious?” She invites the caller to offer any additional behavior (other than walking) 
that might be “odd or unusual.” The caller does not provide any further reason for the 
call-taker to believe the man is suspicious.  
 By asking these additional questions, the call-taker can de-escalate the situation in 
two ways. First, she can write in the narrative screen that the man is not engaging in high 
risk behavior, such as brandishing a gun. Second, she can exercise restraint and classify 
the incident as a lower priority suspicious—even though it is unclear whether his 
behavior even rises to the level of suspicious—rather than as a higher priority incident 
type. Both strategies prevent an inflated response to an ambiguous situation.  
 The final example brings up a different kind of dilemma for the call-taker— 
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a resource allocation problem due to the problem being in a remote area of the county. In 
Extract 10, a male reports a truck in a precarious location, but his distant stance to the 
incident makes the call-taker question whether his observations are accurate.    
Extract 10: The Truck on the Tracks 
01    911:      Nine one=one what is your emergency, 
02    911:      I was (.) drivin I’m drivin down (beep) by mile   
03              marker (beep) and there’s a railroad track   
04              trestle that goes over the highway? And there’s a white  
05              Suburban or Yukon sitting on the tracks. And h I don’t  
06              think that’s a good spot for a truck h to be sittin.  
                (…) 
07    911:      Is there any markings on it?=Like maybe they’re workin  
08              on .hh the railroad tracks or something? 
09    CLR:      Uh:: I did not see any markings? 
10    911:      Are you sure those are railroad tracks over the highway  
11              there? 
12    CLR:      Uhm:: I’m like [ninety nine point nine percent. Uh just  
13              south of (beep) road exit is like mile marker (beep) 
14              (.) Usually the railroad track is I mean the train   
15              er or workers their stuff is marked pretty well and I  
16              did not see any markings on it, I know their vehicles 
17              are usually white but they’re usually tru:cks and eh  
18              it’s a Suburban. (.2) It it doesn’t look like a work  
19              truck.  I mean 
20      (…)    
21    911:      .hhhhh hhhh. Uhm okay. We’ll have someone check it out 
22              hhh. 
  
 In lines 02-06, the caller explains that he is driving on the highway and claims to 
see a large white vehicle parked on a railroad trestle. His upward intonation in line 04 
implies that he is uncertain whether there actually is a railroad trestle at that location. He 
then proceeds to justify his call by saying that the truck is not in a “good spot.”  
 In response to the caller’s problem presentation, the call-taker launches into a 
series of investigative questions. He first asks whether the truck has any markings on it. 
He then invites the caller to consider an alternate hypothesis that perhaps the vehicle is a 
work truck and involved in railroad maintenance. Neither tactic works at normalizing the 
truck because the caller responds that he does not see any markings. The call-taker then 
pivots to test out whether the caller’s location description is accurate. He asks if the caller 
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is sure that railroad tracks run over that part of the roadway, again indicating his 
skepticism of the caller’s problem. The caller maintains that the circumstance is 
suspicious and explains that he knows the difference between work trucks and this 
vehicle. The call-taker ends the interaction by expelling a lengthy sigh, saying “um 
okay,” and then entering the call for service.  
 This caller’s request creates two issues for the call-taker. First, the call raises 
legitimacy concerns, not because of potential racial bias like some of the calls described 
above, but because the caller is not physically proximate enough to the problem to know 
whether the truck is on railroad tracks or what the truck is doing. Second, the location the 
caller provides is in a rural western part of the county that does not contract with the local 
police. This means that a state trooper is required to respond. Because the number of state 
troopers per shift are limited, there is more pressure to avoid unnecessary dispatches that 
pull their time away from responding to other calls or patrolling for reckless drivers on 
the highways. Because of these features of the call, the call-taker expends additional 
effort to try and act as a gatekeeper.  
 
 The myriad examples described above are intended to illuminate the practice of 
call-taking at a granular level to document forms of intelligent use of call-taker 
discretion. Refer to Table 5-1 for a summary of the analyses in this chapter, which 
highlight the key organizational norms that guide call-taking, the major situations in 
which dilemmas arise, and the tactics call-takers deploy to manage these dilemmas. The 
extracts above show that many call-takers engage in investigatory questioning—despite 
not receiving formal training in this practice—but few use the information they acquire to 
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act as traditional gatekeepers and reject calls-for-service. Instead, call-takers extract 
additional information to shift incident classification, and frame and communicate calls 
that they enter reluctantly in such a way as to convey their skepticism to dispatchers and 
police. These behaviors may not change whether an incident receives police attention, but 
they may change the nature of that attention. 




Situations in which 
Dilemmas Arise 
Call-Taker Tactics 
Customer Service  
 
 






Nature of Caller’s Problem 
Highly Subjective 
 










• Problematizing Questions 
• Normalizing Questions 
 
Propose Alternate Hypotheses 
 
Use Narrative Screen to Pass on 
Call-Taker Concerns 
    
Downgrade Incident 
 
No promise of assistance  
 
Discussion 
 This chapter aims to show how an organization’s rules and logics shape call-taker 
behavior. A detailed analysis of the formal rulebook reveals selectively instructive rules. 
The rules closely guide call-takers in accomplishing administrative, customer service, and 
officer safety goals. They do not closely guide call-takers in accomplishing community 
goals, such as efficiently and appropriately allocating police resources or preserving the 
civil liberties of the subject of a call. By directing call-takers to extract only routine 
incident information, prioritize customer service, and, in many cases, delegate 
classification authority to callers, this chapter argues that the organization’s rules and 
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logics undermine critical gatekeeping and risk appraisal call-taking functions. In 
response, I find that several call-takers deploy a range of discretionary tactics to try and 
push back against official mandates.  
 By applying the rules to a set of calls, the chapter reveals specific conditions 
under which the rulebook offers adequate substantive guidance. The conditions include a) 
when a caller presents their problem in an organizationally relevant way, b) when the 
rulebook includes well-defined incident criteria to limit caller subjectivity, and c) when a 
caller asks for direct assistance for themselves. Under these conditions, I find that moral 
concerns, resource allocation issues, and classification dilemmas rarely arise among call-
takers.  
 However, the analysis of Henry Louis Gates’ arrest in Chapter 3 and several 
emergency and non-emergency calls in this chapter shine a light on how much more 
complicated call-taking is than the rules imply. In most cases, call-takers are not simply 
agents of information transfer passing raw information from caller to police. They are co-
constructing incidents with callers and troubles can arise when the nature of caller’s 
problem is ambiguous, misappropriate, or overly subjective. Chapter 5 highlights 
precisely how callers’ demands to harass racial minorities, put law-abiding gun owners 
under scrutiny, and expend limited police resources checking routine maintenance 
vehicles can create dilemmas for call-takers.  
 Certainly, some of the calls I highlight in Chapter 5 may turn out to be legitimate, 
but sending the police to them, or to similar kinds of calls, is not without cost. First, 
police are a scarce resource and sending them to one incident means there are fewer 
officers available to respond to another. Second, officer stops of innocent individuals can 
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erode an individual’s trust in the police, increase their level of psychological stress, and 
reinforce the state’s authority to interfere in daily life (Landers et al. 2011; Harcourt 
2007). Third, police primarily are trained in force and law meaning that even the most 
benign requests can result in arrest or use of force (Friedman 2020). The rulebook is 
silent on these, and other, potential costs—aside from officer injury or death—from 
giving the public broad latitude over what the police do and where they go.  
 Despite the organization’s silence about the risks associated with an expansive 
call-driven policing system, this chapter describes various ways in which call-takers 
recognize and tacitly object to rules they find irrational. In many of the examples in this 
chapter, call-takers deploy discretionary tactics to push themselves, and each other, from 
entering troubling police dispatches. By asking normalizing and problematizing 
questions, proposing alternate hypotheses, using the narrative screen to clarify and frame 
calls that they enter reluctantly, downgrading incidents, or in extreme cases denying 
service, call-takers attempt to act as effective gatekeeping and risk appraisers. Although 
their efforts do not often change whether a call receives a dispatch, they do shape the 
quality of information the police receive and level of response. Moreover, failure to 
perform these additional tasks can lead to disturbing police-public encounters, as 
evidenced by my own outsized response to the call about the man supposedly stealing 
bicycles.  
 This chapter help generates new insights into the dilemmas and challenges that 
arise in call-taking and the processes that underlie them. It is my hope that they are one 
phase in a larger scholarly line of research around dispatch-and-response, and that other 
researchers might do large N studies, or multiple case studies, to test the generalizability 
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of these findings. In particular, future studies would benefit from linking audio recordings 
to CAD and call-for-service records to a) demonstrate more ways in which call-takers use 
narrative screens to frame callers’ problems, b) document the call rejection process, and 
c) examine how the location of a caller shapes the nature of call-taker discretion.  
 The analyses in Chapter 5 point to two areas for policy reform. One set of reforms 
involve expanding the rulebook and creating more specific definitions and criteria for 
subjective incident types. Suspicious person calls are one type of incident especially ripe 
for reform. Other agencies could learn from Seattle 911 where the organization 
introduced a policy to differentiate suspicious behavior from suspicious persons (Vera 
Institute of Justice 2019). A caller reporting a person trying car doors or looking in 
windows would qualify for a dispatch, whereas a caller reporting a person who simply 
looks suspicious would not. Adding criteria to subjective incident types empowers call-
takers to deny requests that raise serious concerns about caller legitimacy. Indeed, such a 
policy would have given the call-taker handling the call about “sketchy guys” permission 
to deny the request.    
 No matter how detailed rules become, however, because of the variety of 
situations call-takers face they simply cannot cover every situation. Therefore, a second, 
complementary policy recommendation involves distributing call-taker best practices 
throughout the dispatch center. The various tactics described in this chapter currently are 
not written down or formalized by the organization. Codifying these intelligent uses of 
discretion, and the rationale behind them, could help to unify call-taker approaches.  
 A related third recommendation involves shaping call-taker discretion through the 
creation of an operational philosophy. Organizations use operational philosophies to lay 
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out core values and guide worker behavior in situations where rules may be incomplete or 
too general. The police at my field site have an operational philosophy to bracket their 
discretion; however, call-takers and dispatchers do not. This chapter recommends that 
discussions take place among police leadership and dispatch personnel to clarify the core 
values of 911 and dispatch. These discussions ought to take into account the risks that an 
overly inclusive dispatch-and-response system can pose to public safety. Moreover, this 
chapter calls for police leadership to recognize the dilemmas call-takers face when 
operating within an organization with competing and disparate goals, and advocates for 
an operational philosophy that considers both internal organizational goals and 
community goals.  







Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
 
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) occupational handbook 
classifies 911 call-taking as an “Office and Administrative Support Occupation.” 
California Congresswoman Norma Torres has been leading a movement to reclassify 
call-taking under OMB’s “Protective Service Occupation,” but such a reclassification has 
yet to happen (Torres 2016). This dissertation has sought to directly challenge long-held 
conceptions of 911 call-takers as “agents of information transfer” or “complaint clerks” 
by dissecting their function in policing.  
Through unpacking the functions of call-taking, this dissertation sheds light on the 
complex process by which call-takers enact call-driven policing. First, this dissertation 
reveals an overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal. Second, this dissertation 
complicates the previously documented gatekeeping function by describing how 
organizational rules and norms can constrain the ability of 911 call-takers to limit the 
public’s heavy reliance on the system. The vivid descriptions of the kinds of troubling 
demands that 911 callers can make on the police substantiate the need for call-takers to 
be effective at preventing misuse and abuse of the system and appropriately setting the 
initial expectations of the police. How they carry out these functions has important 
implications for whether the work they do ameliorates or exacerbates police overreach in 
society.  
This dissertation makes three key theoretical contributions. First, it complicates 
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the notion that call-driven policing is relatively unproblematic by documenting a host of 
complex challenges that can arise and are distinct from those present in proactive 
policing. Under call-driven policing, officers are responsive to community demands, 
which scholars and policymakers assume produce less pernicious police encounters. Yet, 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 highlight various contexts in which call-takers face serious 
challenges and dilemmas when processing ambiguous, uncertain, misguided, and 
malicious demands. Chapter 2 helps to explain how these complex challenges have come 
to be by describing the public’s growing reliance on 911 and police leadership’s 
reluctance to formally empower call-takers to offer checks and balances over the system. 
These features of call-driven policing undermine assumptions that it is relatively 
legitimate and unproblematic.   
 Second, this dissertation documents that decisions by 911 call-takers directly 
shape police expectations. This is the first study to causally link the effects of call-taker 
behavior on downstream criminal justice outcomes. The Gates arrest described in Chapter 
3 provides a conceptual framework to better understand the practice of call-taking by 
highlighting the risk appraisal function. Chapter 4 then uses this concept of risk appraisal 
to show that call classification decisions by call-takers directly influence the likelihood an 
officer makes an arrest.    
 Third, this dissertation reveals that not all 911 call-takers are created equal; their 
behavior significantly varies. Using an examiner assignment research design in Chapter 
4, I find that call-takers vary in how they appraise risk and classify the same types of 
calls, which provides systematic evidence of discretion. Furthermore, analyzing audio 
recordings of emergency and non-emergency calls in Chapter 5 reveals that call-takers 
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deploy various discretionary tactics when faced with uncertain, biased, or misinformed 
callers. However, unlike the American Bar Foundation survey that found police engaging 
in haphazard, idiosyncratic decision-making, this dissertation finds that call-taker 
discretion is deployed along some predictable dimensions. Indeed, Chapter 5 suggests 
that behavior is largely shaped by whether call-takers work to accomplish internal 
organizational goals or community goals. Call-takers who endeavor to achieve 
community goals are more attentive to the downstream social costs and implications of 
their actions. 
 
Policy Recommendations   
 This dissertation puts forth three sets of recommendations aimed to help guide 
policymakers. At an institutional level, it recommends that police leaders should formally 
acknowledge the functions call-takers play in policing. It is my hope that the findings 
presented here aid in this process by reconceptualizing call-takers as risk appraisers and 
guardians of a scarce public resource. Rules and training should explicitly recognize 
these functions and provide call-takers with more specific and reflective guidance about 
how they can and should mediate citizens’ requests. For instance, the organization should 
take into account the social costs that come from an expansive 911 system and include 
trainings about how to protect the civil liberties of subjects being called on, establish 
more specific criteria for ambiguous incident types, and provide call-takers with greater 
guidance about when not to dispatch the police. Less experienced call-takers would 
benefit from formal training in investigatory questioning to make them more effective at 
assessing risk from the outset. Institutional changes such as these would help to 
 161 
crystallize the role of call-takers as decision-makers in the criminal justice system.  
 Because Chapter 5 highlights some of the ways in which call-takers already 
wisely exercise discretion, this dissertation also recommends codifying their tactics and 
distributing them widely. The administrative rulemaking movement that came out of the 
American Bar Foundation survey on police officer discretion spoke of the importance of 
confining it—creating written policies to define acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
By describing the tactics of effective call-takers in Chapter 5, this dissertation takes a step 
towards confining call-taker discretion. The organization, however, must embrace these 
tactics as acceptable before this step can be accomplished.  
 In addition to institutional reforms, the findings in this dissertation suggest that 
technological reforms could assist call-takers in performing their key functions. In the 
case of Henry Louis Gate Jr. and Tamir Rice, capturing caller uncertainty would have 
more appropriately primed the responding officers and may have altered the entire 
incident trajectory. Perhaps Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems could be designed 
to allow call-takers to check a box if a caller presents high levels of uncertainty when 
reporting high-priority incidents. This feature would allow call-takers to quickly signal to 
the dispatcher and police that their information classification choice may be over-
estimated. With such technology, the call-taker in the Gates case could have still 
classified the incident as a breaking and entering, but made clear that the caller was 
entirely unsure of whether the men were breaking into the house.   
   
Future Research Directions  
 This dissertation takes an important step towards opening the “black box” of 
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dispatch. Future scholarship would benefit from more scholars widening the scope of 
study beyond the police, courts, and jails to include call-takers and dispatchers. Research 
ought to continue to challenge the 1970s assumption that call-driven policing is relatively 
unproblematic and legitimate, and open lines of inquiry into 1) whether an unchecked 
call-driven policing system maximizes public safety, 2) how it might contribute to the 
overreach of police in society, and 3) what alternatives could be implemented to address 
callers’ problems. 
 Given that much of the data in this dissertation come from one field site, future 
research projects should test whether the findings presented here can be generalized to 
different kinds of dispatch centers across varying geographic areas. Despite 911 being a 
national number, the system is enacted on a local level. There are over 6,000 Public 
Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) across the U.S. and each have their own policies and 
practices. Some agencies train their call-takers for thirty days; others for six months 
(Vera Institute of Justice 2019). These differences mean that the challenges call-takers 
face, and especially how they are trained to handle them, likely vary. Collecting and 
analyzing observational data, administrative records, and audio recordings from a variety 
of sites would help to bolster the findings in this dissertation.  
Additionally, studies should continue to link dispatch records to arrest records 
and, ultimately, sentencing outcomes to further examine how call-driven policing 
contributes to an oversized criminal justice system. Scholars have long documented how 
haphazard judgments by police contribute to arrests. Although relatively speaking 911 
does not produce many arrests, it can produce arbitrary arrests. Citizens can summon the 
police for nearly any reason, regardless of whether a crime was committed, and police, 
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who are primarily trained in force and law, will respond. This means that seemingly 
benign requests can result in arrest. Moreover, because of the prevalence of warrants 
among community members, these benign requests can result in warrant arrests that are 
entirely unrelated to the original nature of the call. More work is needed about the types 
and frequency of arrests, and sentencing outcomes, that stem from 911 calls.  
For criminal justice reformers to seriously consider alternatives to police 
response, researchers must provide nuanced accounts of not only the nature of citizen 
requests, but also the tools and skills it takes to resolve them. Existing survey data from 
early systematic social observation (SSO) studies capture how police resolved situations, 
be it through use of force, arrest, mediation, or referrals to other service providers 
(Mastrofski et al. 2000; Liederbach 2005; Liederbach and Frank 2003). Law professor 
Barry Friedman is reviving these data to reimagine current public safety responses and 
consider potential alternatives. Future observational studies should pay close attention to 
the tools and skills police have at their disposal to address caller requests, and document 
instances in which those tools are mismatched to the nature of the problem. With such 
observations, reformers could pinpoint situations in which police are not the most 
effective service providers and further empower call-takers to redirect certain types of 
calls away from the police.  
Future work ought also to consider how police will spend their time if more calls 
are diverted away from them. If police simply use uncommitted time to engage in greater 
levels of proactive enforcement, then this would undermine the goal of reducing police 
overreach in society. If instead, police use this time to solve callers’ underlying problems 
and prevent future calls-for-service then diversion and triage efforts could truly work to 
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diminish this overreach (Lum et al. 2020). Or, if some amount of funding for police was 
redirected into other public services, such as schools, public housing, and mental health 
provision, then there likely would be fewer police on the streets engaging in proactive 
enforcement (Vitale 2017). 
 Reducing the mark of the criminal justice system on society requires holistic 
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Left square brackets capture overlapping or simultaneous talk. Left brackets 
above one another capture the start of the overlapping talk. 
] 
] 
Right square brackets above one another capture the end of the overlapping 
talk. 
= Equal signs indicate no gap or pause between lines of talk.  
(0.5) Numbers in parentheses mark lengths of silence, represented in tenths of a second. A (0.5) silence would last 5/10 of a second.  
(.) A period in a parenthesis marks a length of silence less than 2/10 of a second. 
- A hyphen indicates a self-interruption or glottal stop. 
: A colon is used to capture elongated vowels or consonants. The number of colons used indicate how stretched the talk sounds.  
↑ 
↓ Up and down arrows indicate an upward or downward shift in pitch.  
. A period at the end of a phrase marks downward intonation. This is used to signify a statement. 
, A comma at the end of a phrase marks slight upward intonation.  
? A question mark at the end of a phrase marks upward intonation. This is used to signify a question. 
YES Uppercase letters are used for parts of speech that are louder than the rest of the talk.   
< > 
The combination of less than and greater than symbols are used to indicate 
rushed talk. In the reverse order, they indicate drawn out or unusually slow 
talk.  
_____ Underscored utterances are said with some stress or emphasis. 
.hhh A period followed by the letter “h” marks an in-breath. The length of the in-breath is reflected in the number of h’s. 
hhh The letter “h” with no period marks an out-breath. Again, the length of the out-breath is reflected in the number of h’s.  
(( )) Double parenthesis are used by the transcriber to capture descriptions of circumstances, such as ((cough)) ((typing)) etc… 
( ) Single parenthesis are used when an utterance is indecipherable to the transcriptionist.  
 
Source: Adapted from Jefferson, Gail. 2004. “Glossary of Transcript Symbols with an Introduction.” In Conversation 
Analysis: Studies from the First Generation, by Gene H. Lerner, 13–41. John Benjamins Publishing 
Company.  
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Appendix Table 2 Incident Types and Definitions 
Incident Type Incident Definition 
Violent Crimes  
Assault and 
battery 




Act of assaulting another person with a dangerous weapon; the intent 





An assault where a certain relationship exists between the victim and 
assailant. Relationship include: spouse or ex-spouse, child in 







Any non-accidental injury to the child. Or any action that results in a 
physical impairment of the child. Failure of a parent or responsible 
party to provide needed food, clothing, shelter, medical care. Issues 
with supervision to the degree that the child’s health, safety and well 






An assault of a sexual nature on another person. Or any sexual act 
committed without consent. 
 
Robbery Taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of 
force and/or putting the victim in fear. Armed – weapon is used or 




Stealing a car with the use of force or violence or the threat of force 
or violence, or putting in fear any operator, passenger, or person in 
lawful possession of the motor vehicle, or any person lawfully 




Causing death by intending to kill or do great bodily harm or 
knowingly creating a very high risk of death or great bodily harm 








The taking away or transportation of a person against that person’s 
will, usually to hold the person in false imprisonment, a confinement 
without legal authority.  
Shots fired 
 





The act or threat of intentionally causing one’s own death regardless 







Taking a carrying away tangible personal property or another WITH 
the intent to deprive him or her of its possession permanently.  
 
Retail fraud Act of stealing merchandise while the store is open and/or price 




To illicit entry into a building/private and or occupied dwelling for 





Taking and carrying away of the tangible personal property from the 
automobile of another with the intent to deprive him or her of its 




An act where a person willfully and maliciously destroys or injures 





Engage in car theft by willing and without authority taking 
possession of and driving away; taking away, assisting in or being 
party to such taking possession, driving or taking away of any motor 









Acquisition or attempted acquisition, or aiding and abetting 
acquisition or attempted, of property, income, rights or legal privilege 
by means of willful false statement, false representative or 




The crime of maliciously, voluntarily, and willfully setting fire to the 
building, buildings, or other property of another or of burning one’s 




Theft that occurs through deception or fraud, or abuse or a position or 
relationship of trust. Most commonly refers to employees stealing 
from employers.  
 




Refusal to return a vehicle which was originally taken with the 











Knowingly to receive, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property 
knowing that it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the 
same to the use of any person other than the true owner or person 
entitled thereto. 
Most Common  
Family trouble 
 
Not to be confused with domestic violence, family trouble is used in 
situations where related subjects are engaged in a verbal 
confrontation where no assaults are reported. Typically, no crime has 
occurred at initial time of call however the potential for violence 
requires a Law Enforcement response. 
Disorderly 
 
Any situation that threatens to disturb the public peace or a subject(s) 





Reported traffic crash that occurred on a public roadway where all 
involved parties are on scene and without injury. 
Personal Injury 
Accident 
Crash where injuries are present and medical response is required. 
Unknown 
Crash 
Crash where injuries cannot be directly confirmed by a subject on 
scene (medical response is required). 
Hit and Run The crime of a driver of a vehicle who is involved in a collision with 
another vehicle, property, or human being, who knowingly fails to 
stop to give his/her name, license number, and other information as 




Reported traffic crash that occurred on private property where all 
involved parties are on scene and without injury. Response is dictated 




Any incident/situation/person/vehicle that is determined to be 




Any situation where a subject diagnosed or suspected of a social, 
mental, or emotional problem is the direct result of a situation that 
requires a law enforcement response to ensure life and property are 
protected.  
Not to be confused with a suicidal person where direct and/or indirect 




All loud or unusual noises or sounds which offend the peace and 
quiet of persons of ordinary sensibilities.  
 
Be on the 
Lookout 
A radio broadcast given to area police jurisdictions containing 
information for a subject or vehicle involved in a crime or posing a 
threat the public safety. This incident type is generally used for traffic 
offenses where there is no complaining witness. However it may be 
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used for any situation where information must be relayed to law 




Motion or location activated alarm. 
Panic Alarm Alarm that is activated directly by an employee of a business to 
indicate a possible robbery of the business.  
Audible Alarm Alarms reported by a third party who hears an audible alarm but has 
no means to determine the cause.  
Car assist  
 
Situation directly resulting from a mechanical failure which has left a 
motorist’s vehicle disabled and in need of aid. May also cause a 




Any object in or near the roadway that causes a hazard for motorists. 
Michigan Department of Transportation Courtesy Patrol will respond 
to highway debris.  
 
911 Hang Up Refers to situations where 911 is dialed but the caller disconnects 





Any situation that requires law enforcement personnel to assist a 
citizen where no crime is being reported. Often refers to situations 




Citizen request for law enforcement to “standby” during a civil 
situation to assure that all parties involved do not engage in physical 















Non-canine animals which requires police response to assure the 














A vehicle on public property for at least 48 hours, on a state road or 
highway for at least 18 hours, or on a state road or highway for any 
period of time if valid plate is not on the vehicle. If the vehicle is on 
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private property without the owner’s consent, the owner can call and 





Any situation where the Fire Department request law enforcement 
assistance. Includes traffic routing, building entry, and disorderly 










Any situation where another law enforcement agency requests law 





Used improperly, unsafe manner, or illegally. 
Boating 
accident 
Any reported accident involving a watercraft. 
Bomb threat 
 
A threat, usually verbal or written, to detonate an explosive or 
incendiary device to cause property damage, death, injuries whether 





Violation of Michigan’s CCW laws which include carrying a 
concealed pistol, without a permit, on property not belonging to the 





Request to check the well-being of a citizen based on a possibility of 





Illegal hunting or hunting related safety concerns. 
Drug crime 
 
Manufacturing, possessing or trafficking controlled substances 









Released substances that are either flammable or combustible, 
explosive, toxic, noxious, corrosive, oxidizable, an irritant or 




Deliberate exposure in public or in view of the general public by a 
person of a portion or portions of his or her body, in circumstances 















Taking, retention, or concealment of a child or children by a parent, 
other family member, or their agency, in derogation of the custody 






Knowingly depositing trash in any manner, on any public or private 
property or in any way public or private waters, without permission 





Utilizing tools to gain entry into a locked vehicle at the request of the 
vehicle’s owner. Availability of the service differs across agencies. 
Child luring 
 
Consists of an adult knowingly and intentionally inducing a child, by 
any means, with the intent of committing a crime or endanger the 




Any non-accident boating related complaint or specific request for a 




A minor purchasing or attempting to purchase alcoholic 
liquor/tobacco, consume or attempt to consume alcoholic 
liquor/tobacco, possess or attempt to possess alcoholic 
liquor/tobacco, or have any bodily alcohol content.  
Missing child 
 
Any situation where a child’s whereabouts become unknown to the 




Any adult missing person between the age of 18-21 years of age. Or 
any adult missing person considered endangered as the result of 
previous medical concerns, mental capacity, or any situation which 
puts the missing persons life and health at risk.  
Neighbor 
trouble 
Any dispute reported between neighbors that does not involve a 
specific crime but requires law enforcement intervention to assure 
that the involved parties remain civil.  
 
Overdose Refer to an accidental overdose of medications, narcotics or any other 
substance that poses a threat to the subject’s health and wellbeing.  
Panhandling 
 
Attempt to obtain a monetary or tangible gain by approaching and 





Any equipment, product, or material that is modified for making, 




Any parking related violation including handicapped parking issues, 
fire lane violations, etc. 
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Property check  
 
Requests from businesses or individuals to check the security of 











Reported violation of a court order such as a conditional bond release 




The act or practice of engaging in promiscuous sexual relations in 











Assault, batter, wound, obstruct, or endanger a deputy attempting to 
serve or execute any process, rule, or order made or issued by lawful 




A person under age 18 who is away from home or place of legal 






Report by a private citizen of a recovered runaway which requires a 





A ‘willful course of conduct’ involving repeated or continuing 
harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable 
person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel 
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 
Traffic control 
 
Reports of malfunctioning traffic signals and details requiring a 




Any act that violates a state or municipalities traffic laws. 
Trespassing 
 
Act of entering a person’s property without consent.  
 




Someone intends to annoy, harass or threaten you by making a 
telephone continually ring, making lewd incident or obscene 
comments, making a call where the caller does not identify himself, 
making repeated telephone calls where conversation consists only of 
harassment, making a call and using heavy breathing or silence with 





Urinating in public. 
Vagrancy 
 
One who has no established residence and wanders idly from place to 




Certifies that the vehicle is not stolen and eligible for title- requires 




Used to track arrests based on warrants issued by the courts.  
 
 
 
  
 
